White Paper
A New Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy for the United Kingdom, After Ukraine and Iran
The United Kingdom’s published national counter drone policy; the UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, presented to Parliament as Command Paper 187 on 21 October 2019[1]; is materially out of date as a strategic document. It remains the only published national strategy in the field for the whole of government, yet it is now approximately six years and seven months old, and roughly three and a half years beyond its own planning horizon.
The strategy was sound for its time. It identified the highest harm illegal uses of small drones; terrorism, smuggling into prisons, disruption of critical national infrastructure; and prescribed layered intervention, industry standards, responder powers and public education.[2] But it was expressly confined to malicious and illegal use of small aerial drones, in a domestic policing and protective security frame. That frame has been overtaken by operational reality in Ukraine and the Iranian theatre: massed one way attack drones, combined drone and missile salvos, container and special forces launch, dense electronic warfare, fibre optic command links and AI assisted guidance now define the threat.
Subsequent UK documents do not update the 2019 strategy; they work around it. The Defence Drone Strategy (2024),[3] the Strategic Defence Review 2025,[4] NPSA’s site specific guidance,[5] and the Ministry of Defence’s 2026 pursuit of new defeat powers at military sites[6] together form a patchwork of sectoral adaptations laid over an unrevised core. This paper argues that the 2019 strategy should be retired as a standalone statement and replaced by an integrated Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy, supported by a consolidated legal code for detection, disruption and defeat, and by an annual ministerial statement to Parliament.
The central lesson of 2024–2026 is not that drones have become more common but that they have become a strategic mass system — a consumable class of munition and sensor used for saturation, decoying, attrition of intelligence assets, target acquisition and the deliberate erosion of a defender’s cost exchange ratio. On the night of 2 June 2026, Ukraine’s air force reported that Russia had launched 656 drones and 73 missiles in a single overnight barrage, of which 602 drones and 40 missiles were downed or suppressed.[7][8] Single salvos now routinely exceed several hundred drones.
Critical infrastructure has been directly affected. In February 2025 a Russian Geran-2 (Shahed type) drone struck the New Safe Confinement over Chornobyl’s reactor four;[9] by December 2025 the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that the structure had lost its primary safety functions, including confinement.[10] In May 2026 a drone strike caused a fire at an electrical generator on the perimeter of the United Arab Emirates’ Barakah nuclear plant; a civilian reactor site; leaving one unit running on emergency diesel generators.[11][12]
The homeland and deployed force dimension is now concrete for the United Kingdom. In early March 2026 a Shahed type drone struck a runway at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus; a British Sovereign Base Area; causing limited damage,[13] and the UK flew defensive sorties and, where requested, acted in the collective self defence of regional allies.[14] Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web (June 2025) had already shown that 117 first person view drones launched from concealed truck borne containers could strike strategic bomber bases far from any front line, damaging more than 40 aircraft, with some guidance reportedly AI assisted.[15]
Not every battlefield lesson maps to the British mainland. The most credible open analysis holds that long range Shahed type strikes on Great Britain would face high attrition because of geography and warning time, while shorter range drones launched from containers or by hostile special forces remain a credible risk to high value assets at home. The policy implication is to discriminate between vectors; not to import foreign assumptions wholesale, and not to dismiss the threat. A refreshed strategy should say so candidly.
| 2019 provision | Current reality | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Focus on the highest harm illegal use of small aerial drones in the UK. | Concern now extends to defence sites, CNI in crisis or conflict, and state launched drones and missiles. | Too narrow as a national frame. |
| Short planning horizon from 2019. | Document is c. 6.6 years old; NPSA requires regular review because methods change quickly. | Formally stale; refresh overdue. |
| Empower police and responders. | MoD now seeks its own defeat powers at Defence sites because police only authorities are inadequate. | Institutionally outdated. |
| Aerial drones only. | New Defence policy extends to land and maritime uncrewed systems. | Conceptually outdated. |
| Counter drone as a discrete problem. | NATO now treats small UAS through hypersonic missiles as one integrated air and missile defence continuum.[16] | The silo is no longer tenable. |
The clearest institutional signal came in February 2026, when the Ministry of Defence reported 266 drone incidents near UK military sites during 2025 (up from 126 in 2024) and sought fresh statutory powers through the Armed Forces Bill; extending beyond aerial drones to land and maritime systems; to allow Defence personnel to defeat drones at their own sites without waiting for police intervention.[6] When the armed forces must legislate around a framework built for policing to protect their own bases, that framework has expired.
Domestic powers have expanded since 2019 but remain complex. The Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 created bespoke constabulary powers to ground, stop, search, inspect and seize unmanned aircraft, and amended section 93 of the Police Act 1997 to facilitate authorisations for certain counter drone measures.[17][18] In the civil regime, the Civil Aviation Authority’s Direct Remote ID requirements came into force on 1 January 2026 for UK1, UK2, UK3, UK5 and UK6 class drones, with extension to most drones carrying a camera from 1 January 2028.[19]
Yet lawful defeat is markedly harder than detection. Operational use of a jammer is generally an offence under section 68 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, and Ofcom has no power to authorise operational use; only narrow trial and research licences in shielded conditions.[20] Government is separately examining the enforcement framework around jammers.[21] Kinetic or electronic interference may amount to unlawful property or wireless interference absent proper authorisation; the Act’s own explanatory notes acknowledge as much. Techniques that take over a drone by software may engage the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and sensing engages the Data Protection Act 2018, the UK GDPR and the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires the state both to protect life from foreseeable threats and to keep its sensing and defeat measures necessary and proportionate. A lawful defeat chain is a designed legal artefact, not an improvisation.
Overseas action sits within international law. The Government’s March 2026 legal position on Iranian regional attacks invoked the collective self defence of allies under Article 51 of the UN Charter, subject to necessity and proportionality and Security Council notification.[14] Once in armed conflict, drones attract no special category: they are governed by the ordinary rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution applicable to all weapons.[22]
The Government should replace the 2019 strategy with a new instrument covering the whole of government. Five propositions should anchor it:
None of this discards the 2019 strategy’s best inheritance; its insistence on layered intervention over an optimism founded on gadgets, an instinct NPSA’s later guidance has only reinforced.[5] The task is not to repudiate 2019 but to lift its sound protective security spine into an architecture wide enough for the threat that now exists: a spectrum of low cost, autonomous and electronically contested uncrewed systems, ranging from nuisance to war. The 2019 strategy answered the question of its decade. It is time to ask the question of this one.