From 1 January 2026, the UK drone regulatory framework enters a new phase. While the underlying legal structure remains based on the Air Navigation Order 2016 and UK UAS Regulations, several operational changes are being introduced. Understanding the distinction between legislation, Civil Aviation Authority guidance, and industry practice is now essential.

This article provides a practical legal overview of the key changes affecting recreational and commercial drone operators flying within the Open Category in the United Kingdom.

Law and Guidance Are Not the Same Thing

One of the most common misunderstandings among drone operators is the assumption that everything in the Drone Code or CAA guidance is itself law.

The legal framework consists primarily of legislation, including the Air Navigation Order 2016 and UK UAS Regulations. These are the provisions under which enforcement action and prosecutions may occur.

The CAA also publishes guidance, including CAP 722, Acceptable Means of Compliance and the Drone Code. These materials are highly important, but they are generally guidance rather than legislation. Compliance with them will usually be persuasive evidence of safe and responsible operation.

A useful way to think about compliance is:

• Green: operating within CAA guidance and published best practice.
• Amber: operating within the law but outside guidance.
• Red: operating outside the legal framework.

Flying outside guidance may sometimes remain lawful, but operators must be ready to justify their decisions if challenged by the police, the CAA or a court.

Registration Requirements

Most drones with a camera and weighing more than 100 grams require registration under the Drone and Model Aircraft Registration and Education Scheme.

Operators will generally need both an Operator ID and a Flyer ID.

The Operator ID identifies the person responsible for the aircraft and must be displayed on the drone. The Flyer ID confirms that the pilot has passed the required competency test and remains valid for five years.

Importantly, it is the operator who is registered rather than the drone itself.

Universal Rules for All Drone Flights

Maximum Altitude

The maximum operating height remains 120 metres, or 400 feet, above the closest point of the earth’s surface. This matters particularly when flying near cliffs, hills, mountains or other changing terrain.

Visual Line of Sight

Visual Line of Sight remains a central requirement of UK drone regulation.

The pilot must be able to see the aircraft sufficiently to avoid collisions in the air and manage risks on the ground. Seeing only a small dot or relying solely on navigation lights is unlikely to be defensible if an incident occurs.

First Person View Flying

Where FPV goggles are used, a competent observer or spotter is generally required. The spotter should remain beside the pilot and maintain awareness of air and ground hazards while the pilot is focused on the video feed.

Airspace Restrictions

Many drone prosecutions arise from breaches of airspace restrictions rather than from technical flying errors.

Airspace should be checked before every flight using a reliable and current source of aeronautical information. The information should be refreshed immediately before launch.

Key restriction types include:

• Flight Restriction Zones: permanent restricted areas around airports, prisons and protected sites.
• Temporary Restrictions: restrictions created for events, security operations and public safety purposes.
• NOTAMs: aviation notices which may affect drone operations.

Operators should use modern airspace mapping tools and should not assume that yesterday’s airspace position remains correct today.

A1, A2 and A3 Operational Categories

A1: Flying Over People

The A1 category provides the greatest flexibility. Certain drones under 250 grams may be flown over uninvolved persons, although flight over crowds remains prohibited.

This category generally includes legacy drones under 250g, UK0 and UK1 aircraft, C0 aircraft and C1 aircraft subject to transitional provisions.

A2: Flying Close to People

A2 operations allow flight near uninvolved persons but generally prohibit flight directly over them. Operators normally require an A2 Certificate of Competency.

Certain UK2 and C2 aircraft may operate with reduced separation distances where the applicable requirements are met.

A3: Flying Far from People

A3 operations are intended for open areas away from uninvolved persons and built-up environments.

Operators must generally maintain 50 metres from uninvolved persons and 150 metres from residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas.

Article 16 Authorisations

Members of recognised model aircraft and drone associations may benefit from Article 16 Authorisations. These permissions can provide greater operational flexibility, including reduced separation distances and access to some locations that would otherwise be more restricted under the Open Category framework.

Ground Hazards and Article 241

Even where all technical drone requirements are satisfied, operators remain subject to wider safety duties.

Article 241 of the Air Navigation Order provides that a person must not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.

Ground hazards may include members of the public, vehicles, buildings, infrastructure, wildlife and protected environmental sites.

Particular care should be taken when operating near Sites of Special Scientific Interest and other environmentally protected areas.

Remote ID Arrives in 2026

One of the most significant developments is the introduction of Remote ID.

Remote ID creates an electronic identification system allowing drone operations to be identified through information transmitted by the aircraft.

Implementation is being phased in. New UK1, UK2 and UK3 drones released from 2026 will require Remote ID functionality. Existing aircraft will transition over a longer implementation period extending towards 2028.

Operators should monitor CAA updates closely as implementation progresses.

Night Flying Requirements

Night flying remains permissible within the Open Category.

From 2026, operators will generally require a green flashing light attached to the aircraft.

The purpose of the light is to assist people on the ground in recognising the aircraft as a drone. It should not be treated as a substitute for maintaining Visual Line of Sight.

Insurance and Operational Responsibility

Recreational operators are generally not legally required to carry insurance, although doing so is strongly recommended.

Commercial operators typically require specialist aviation insurance compliant with applicable regulatory requirements.

Pilots should also ensure they are fit to fly, avoid operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and remain alert to low-flying manned aircraft at all times.

Conclusion

The 2026 changes represent an evolution rather than a revolution in UK drone regulation.

The key principles remain unchanged: understand the law, check airspace before every flight, maintain Visual Line of Sight, operate safely and proportionately, and keep abreast of developments concerning Remote ID and future airspace integration.

For most operators, compliance remains straightforward. Those who understand the distinction between legislation and guidance, conduct appropriate pre-flight planning and adopt a risk-based approach should continue to fly safely and lawfully throughout 2026 and beyond.

Disclaimer: This article is provided for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. Specific advice should be sought in relation to individual circumstances.

Richard Ryan is a practising barrister, Arbitrator , drone lawyer, and regulatory specialist with more than 20 years’ experience in litigation, arbitration, aviation, defence, technology, construction, and commercial law. He advises drone operators, aerospace companies, government bodies, and technology businesses on complex regulatory, operational, and compliance issues relating to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), counter-UAS technologies, urban air mobility, and emerging aviation regulation.

Richard is currently undertaking PhD research at Cranfield University examining the future regulatory framework for Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM), and the integration of drones into shared airspace. He regularly writes on developments in drone law, aviation regulation, privacy, safety, and the future of autonomous flight.

The views expressed in this article are for general information purposes only and do not constitute legal advice.

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White Paper

Beyond 2019

A New Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy for the United Kingdom, After Ukraine and Iran

By Mr Richard Ryan, Barrister, Blakiston’s Chambers · June 2026

The United Kingdom’s published national counter drone policy; the UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, presented to Parliament as Command Paper 187 on 21 October 2019^[1]; is materially out of date as a strategic document. It remains the only published national strategy in the field for the whole of government, yet it is now approximately six years and seven months old, and roughly three and a half years beyond its own planning horizon.

The strategy was sound for its time. It identified the highest harm illegal uses of small drones; terrorism, smuggling into prisons, disruption of critical national infrastructure; and prescribed layered intervention, industry standards, responder powers and public education.^[2] But it was expressly confined to malicious and illegal use of small aerial drones, in a domestic policing and protective security frame. That frame has been overtaken by operational reality in Ukraine and the Iranian theatre: massed one way attack drones, combined drone and missile salvos, container and special forces launch, dense electronic warfare, fibre optic command links and AI assisted guidance now define the threat.

Subsequent UK documents do not update the 2019 strategy; they work around it. The Defence Drone Strategy (2024),^[3] the Strategic Defence Review 2025,^[4] NPSA’s site specific guidance,^[5] and the Ministry of Defence’s 2026 pursuit of new defeat powers at military sites^[6] together form a patchwork of sectoral adaptations laid over an unrevised core. This paper argues that the 2019 strategy should be retired as a standalone statement and replaced by an integrated Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy, supported by a consolidated legal code for detection, disruption and defeat, and by an annual ministerial statement to Parliament.

1.  The threat has become a strategic mass system

The central lesson of 2024–2026 is not that drones have become more common but that they have become a strategic mass system — a consumable class of munition and sensor used for saturation, decoying, attrition of intelligence assets, target acquisition and the deliberate erosion of a defender’s cost exchange ratio. On the night of 2 June 2026, Ukraine’s air force reported that Russia had launched 656 drones and 73 missiles in a single overnight barrage, of which 602 drones and 40 missiles were downed or suppressed.^[7][8] Single salvos now routinely exceed several hundred drones.

Critical infrastructure has been directly affected. In February 2025 a Russian Geran-2 (Shahed type) drone struck the New Safe Confinement over Chornobyl’s reactor four;^[9] by December 2025 the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that the structure had lost its primary safety functions, including confinement.^[10] In May 2026 a drone strike caused a fire at an electrical generator on the perimeter of the United Arab Emirates’ Barakah nuclear plant; a civilian reactor site; leaving one unit running on emergency diesel generators.^[11][12]

The homeland and deployed force dimension is now concrete for the United Kingdom. In early March 2026 a Shahed type drone struck a runway at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus; a British Sovereign Base Area; causing limited damage,^[13] and the UK flew defensive sorties and, where requested, acted in the collective self defence of regional allies.^[14] Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web (June 2025) had already shown that 117 first person view drones launched from concealed truck borne containers could strike strategic bomber bases far from any front line, damaging more than 40 aircraft, with some guidance reportedly AI assisted.^[15]

A necessary qualification

Not every battlefield lesson maps to the British mainland. The most credible open analysis holds that long range Shahed type strikes on Great Britain would face high attrition because of geography and warning time, while shorter range drones launched from containers or by hostile special forces remain a credible risk to high value assets at home. The policy implication is to discriminate between vectors; not to import foreign assumptions wholesale, and not to dismiss the threat. A refreshed strategy should say so candidly.

2.  Why the 2019 strategy can no longer stand alone

The clearest institutional signal came in February 2026, when the Ministry of Defence reported 266 drone incidents near UK military sites during 2025 (up from 126 in 2024) and sought fresh statutory powers through the Armed Forces Bill; extending beyond aerial drones to land and maritime systems; to allow Defence personnel to defeat drones at their own sites without waiting for police intervention.^[6] When the armed forces must legislate around a framework built for policing to protect their own bases, that framework has expired.

3.  The legal framework: developed, but fragmented

Domestic powers have expanded since 2019 but remain complex. The Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 created bespoke constabulary powers to ground, stop, search, inspect and seize unmanned aircraft, and amended section 93 of the Police Act 1997 to facilitate authorisations for certain counter drone measures.^[17][18] In the civil regime, the Civil Aviation Authority’s Direct Remote ID requirements came into force on 1 January 2026 for UK1, UK2, UK3, UK5 and UK6 class drones, with extension to most drones carrying a camera from 1 January 2028.^[19]

Yet lawful defeat is markedly harder than detection. Operational use of a jammer is generally an offence under section 68 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, and Ofcom has no power to authorise operational use; only narrow trial and research licences in shielded conditions.^[20] Government is separately examining the enforcement framework around jammers.^[21] Kinetic or electronic interference may amount to unlawful property or wireless interference absent proper authorisation; the Act’s own explanatory notes acknowledge as much. Techniques that take over a drone by software may engage the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and sensing engages the Data Protection Act 2018, the UK GDPR and the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires the state both to protect life from foreseeable threats and to keep its sensing and defeat measures necessary and proportionate. A lawful defeat chain is a designed legal artefact, not an improvisation.

Overseas action sits within international law. The Government’s March 2026 legal position on Iranian regional attacks invoked the collective self defence of allies under Article 51 of the UN Charter, subject to necessity and proportionality and Security Council notification.^[14] Once in armed conflict, drones attract no special category: they are governed by the ordinary rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution applicable to all weapons.^[22]

4.  Recommendations

The Government should replace the 2019 strategy with a new instrument covering the whole of government. Five propositions should anchor it:

1. Integrate, do not append. A single Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy spanning the Home Office, MoD, Cabinet Office resilience, CAA, Ofcom, NPSA, the intelligence community, prisons and CNI operators, aligned to NATO’s integrated air and missile defence framework.^[16]
2. Consolidate the law. A statutory code (or, at minimum, statutory guidance) defining who may detect, disrupt and defeat uncrewed systems, where, against which threat category, under what authorisation, with what recording and what review after an incident — differentiating urban areas, prisons, airports, defence sites and overseas operations.
3. Adopt a layered baseline that is alert to cost. Use NPSA’s site specific, threat informed model as the national spine,^[23] plugging into a wider air and missile defence architecture for higher end threats, and prioritising defeat options that are low in collateral, deep in magazine and economically rational. A missile fired at every cheap drone is not a strategy; it is a budgetary confession.
4. Treat industry and export control as readiness. Link procurement, export licensing, sanctions intelligence and sovereign industrial strategy, with secure by design and open architecture requirements across C-UAS procurement. A state that cannot source the components of its own counter drone systems is not strategically autonomous.
5. Compliance and oversight by design. Require a written legal basis, data minimisation, retention limits and human oversight for every C-UAS deployment by a public authority; subject identification by AI to documented necessity and a review of error rates; and provide Parliament an annual ministerial statement on C-UAS powers, deployments, tests, safety incidents, rights compliance and lessons learned, with NPSA and the ICO involved where domestic surveillance is concerned.

5.  Conclusion

None of this discards the 2019 strategy’s best inheritance; its insistence on layered intervention over an optimism founded on gadgets, an instinct NPSA’s later guidance has only reinforced.^[5] The task is not to repudiate 2019 but to lift its sound protective security spine into an architecture wide enough for the threat that now exists: a spectrum of low cost, autonomous and electronically contested uncrewed systems, ranging from nuisance to war. The 2019 strategy answered the question of its decade. It is time to ask the question of this one.

The post appeared first on Blakistons.

By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer

Constructive outcome, practical lessons. A technical proximity breach was confirmed, a more serious allegation was dismissed, and there are clear takeaways that raise standards on evidence, cooperation and public safety.

This post is for general information only and is not legal advice.

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Military Drones and AI Regulation: A UK Drone Lawyer’s Perspective

By Richard Ryan, UK Drone Lawyer

On 7 January 2025, The Guardian published an article highlighting the British AI consultancy Faculty AI’s involvement in the development of drone technology for defence clients, prompting renewed questions about where legal, ethical, and regulatory boundaries should lie for AI-driven military applications.
Faculty AI, already prominent for its work with various UK government departments (including the NHS and the Department for Education) and advisory services for the AI Safety Institute (AISI), has reportedly developed and deployed AI models on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for military purposes. Although it remains unclear whether these drones are intended for lethal operations, the revelations have amplified concerns about how best to regulate or restrict the use of AI in weapon systems.
Below, I explore the key legal issues and examine how the recently adopted EU AI Act—as well as the evolving UK regulatory framework—may shape the future of this sector.
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1. Faculty AI’s Defence Work: A Brief Overview
1.1 Government and Public Sector Ties
Faculty AI, known for its work with the Vote Leave campaign in 2016, was later engaged by Dominic Cummings to provide data analytics during the pandemic. Since then, it has won multiple government contracts worth at least £26.6m, extending its work into healthcare (via the NHS), education, and policy consulting with the AISI on frontier AI safety.
1.2 UAV Development
The Guardian reports that Faculty AI has experience in deploying AI models on UAVs. Its partner firm, Hadean, indicated that the two companies collaborated on subject identification, tracking objects in movement, and exploring swarm deployment. While Faculty states that it aims to create “safer, more robust solutions”, details on whether these drones might be capable of lethal autonomous targeting remain undisclosed.
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2. The EU AI Act: A New Regulatory Milestone
2.1 Status of the EU AI Act
Introduced by the European Commission in 2021 as a proposed regulation, the EU AI Act has since been adopted via the EU’s legislative process. As of early 2025, it is recognised as a binding regulation designed to harmonise AI rules across all EU Member States. Although the UK is no longer part of the EU, any UK-based company offering AI products or services within the EU must ensure compliance with the regulation’s requirements.
2.2 Risk-Tiered Framework
The EU AI Act operates on a tiered risk basis:
• Unacceptable risk: Certain AI applications (e.g., social scoring) are outright banned.
• High risk: This category includes critical infrastructure, healthcare, and—potentially—defence-related AI systems that could significantly affect people’s safety or fundamental rights. Such systems must meet strict transparency, oversight, and data governance requirements.
• Limited or minimal risk: These uses are subject to fewer obligations, generally focused on transparency (e.g., disclosing AI usage to end users).
For high-risk AI in military contexts, the EU AI Act demands robust human oversight, thorough documentation, and strict compliance obligations, particularly around accountability and the prevention of harm.
2.3 Potential Impact on Military Drones
While national security and defence largely remain the prerogative of individual EU Member States, the EU AI Act’s principles can still influence how companies and governments view the development of autonomous or semi-autonomous drones. Key considerations include:
• Transparent Data and Design: Documenting data sets, development processes, and operational parameters.
• Human in the Loop: Ensuring a human operator is always able to override or intervene in the AI’s decision-making. Other terms such as Human on the Loop and Human outside the Loop are also referred to.
• Liability and Penalties: Breaches can incur hefty fines—up to 6% of global turnover—thus acting as a significant deterrent against unethical or unlawful AI deployment.
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3. The UK’s Approach to AI Regulation and Military Drones
3.1 Divergence from the EU?
Post-Brexit, the UK has chosen a “pro-innovation” approach to AI regulation. Rather than adopting a single, all-encompassing statute akin to the EU AI Act, the UK is implementing a sector-by-sector and risk-based strategy, guided by existing regulators such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Competition and Markets Authority.
3.2 AI Safety Institute (AISI)
Established under former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in 2023, the AISI focuses on frontier AI safety research. Faculty AI’s role in testing large language models and advising the AISI on threats like disinformation and system security places the company in a key position to influence UK policy. Critics argue that this may create potential conflicts of interest if the same organisation is also developing AI for military use.
3.3 House of Lords Recommendations
In 2023, a House of Lords committee urged the UK Government to clarify the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to lethal drone strikes and to work towards an international agreement limiting or banning fully autonomous weapons systems. The Government response acknowledged the importance of maintaining “human control” in critical decisions but did not enact binding legislation banning lethal autonomous drones outright.
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4. Legal and Ethical Concerns for AI-Enabled Drones
4.1 International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
IHL principles—distinction (separating combatants from civilians) and proportionality (limiting harm relative to military objectives)—are central to discussions on AI-driven drones. Fully autonomous UAVs, capable of selecting and engaging targets without human intervention, raise profound legal questions on accountability, particularly if biases or system errors result in wrongful casualties.
4.2 Allocation of Liability
Traditionally, accountability in military operations lies with commanders and operators. With increasingly autonomous systems, however, liability could extend to technology developers, programmers, or even the purchaser of the system. Clarifying how legal responsibilities are distributed may become a focal point for future litigation and regulatory reform.
4.3 Export Controls
Companies like Faculty AI must also comply with arms-export rules when providing AI-targeting systems or related software to foreign entities. In the UK, export licences for military-grade technology are subject to domestic legislation and international protocols, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on dual-use goods.
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5. Looking Ahead: Balancing Innovation, Safety, and Accountability
5.1 Stronger National Frameworks
Although the UK favours a pro-innovation stance, there is growing pressure from Parliament and civil society for more rigorous, enforceable rules on potentially lethal AI applications. The EU AI Act may serve as a reference point for the UK to consider stricter domestic regulations.
5.2 International Collaboration
Calls for global agreements—treaties or non-binding accords—to prohibit fully autonomous weapons continue to gain momentum. The House of Lords committee specifically recommended international engagement to ensure that lethal force remains under human control.
5.3 Corporate Accountability
Organisations operating at the intersection of commercial defence contracts and government policy—such as Faculty AI—need transparent internal processes and robust ethics boards to mitigate conflicts of interest. Demonstrating genuine corporate responsibility will be vital for maintaining public trust.
5.4 Ethical and Safety Audits
As AI becomes more embedded in defence, mandatory ethical and safety audits may become standard practice. These would scrutinise algorithmic fairness, training data, and how effectively systems can identify and mitigate unintended harms.
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6. Conclusion
Faculty AI’s role in developing AI for military drones underscores how high the stakes are when cutting-edge technology meets defence applications. With the EU AI Act now in force as a binding regulation, Europe has provided a blueprint for tighter control over “high-risk” AI systems. In contrast, the UK’s approach still offers substantial flexibility for companies, potentially raising both legal and ethical concerns around autonomy, accountability, and conflicts of interest.
From an IHL standpoint, keeping a human responsible for any life-and-death decision is imperative. As a UK drone lawyer, I urge policymakers, regulators, and industry stakeholders to keep asking: Where do we draw the line between legitimate defensive innovation and an unacceptable risk to civilians? Only by establishing clear, enforceable legal standards—anchored in international law and ethical scrutiny—can we ensure AI-powered drones serve to protect rather than endanger fundamental human values.

Bio – Richard Ryan, UK Drone Lawyer

Richard Ryan is a UK-based drone lawyer specialising in the regulatory, ethical, and commercial aspects of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artificial intelligence (AI). Through a series of blogs, Richard Ryan has explored critical issues such as the EU AI Act, the UK’s evolving “pro-innovation” regulatory landscape, and the legal considerations surrounding military drones and lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Drawing on extensive experience in advising government bodies, technology companies, and public institutions, Richard Ryan brings a deep understanding of how international humanitarian law (IHL), export controls, and data protection obligations intersect in modern drone operations. Their writing emphasises the importance of maintaining human oversight in AI-driven systems, championing ethical development and transparent accountability mechanisms.

A trusted voice in the field, Richard Ryan regularly comments on emerging case law, parliamentary recommendations, and global discussions around frontier AI safety. The mission is to help stakeholders—from hobbyist drone operators to established aerospace firms—navigate the complexities of regulation, risk management, and innovation.

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