Drone Industry Concerns Archives - Blakistons

A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots

admin.richard — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 17:53:49 +0000

By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer

Constructive outcome, practical lessons. A technical proximity breach was confirmed, a more serious allegation was dismissed, and there are clear takeaways that raise standards on evidence, cooperation and public safety.

Outcome at a glance

Count 1 (conviction): Operating an unmanned aircraft close to the site of an ongoing emergency response — Air Navigation Order 2016 Articles 265B(3), 265B(5)(j) and 265F(3)(c) (reflecting UAS.OPEN.060(3)).
Count 2 (dismissed): Obstructing or hindering emergency workers — Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act 2006, sections 1 and 4 — no case to answer.
Sentence: £300 (reduced from £2,500). Deprivation order refused — the client’s equipment will be returned.

Competence, cooperation and public interest flying

The client is an experienced operator with hundreds of hours and thousands of flights, combining sound aviation literacy with routine work around public interest incidents. On the day in question, the client used aircraft tracking tools and air band monitoring, maintained a conservative standoff where no formal cordon existed, and landed promptly when requested by police. This was a measured and safety first response in a dynamic setting.

Lesson 1: Telemetry clarity

When presenting flight data, clarity matters. Plot the flight path with a thin, precise line so the base map remains legible, including fences, road edges, cordons and measured standoffs. A thick line can obscure the very features that prove separation.

Keep a clean thin line map and a forensic overlay with timestamps for take off, orbit points, return to home and landing, plus measured distances to fixed features.
Use a thin line that clearly shows accurate telemetry when placed on a map, not a thick line that obscures part of the map.

Lesson 2: Plan for seizure and understand where DJI DAT lives

High fidelity DJI DAT logs are stored on the aircraft and typically require connecting the drone to a computer to extract. If a drone is seized by police, immediate access to those DAT files is difficult.

Build redundancy: back up app and controller logs after each flight, use screen recordings of the flight user interface, and capture independent stills or video.
For sensitive assignments, consider periodic DAT offloads in advance.

Five straightforward commitments

Thin line telemetry as the default for mapping outputs.
Evidence resilience: dual path logging (logs plus screen capture) and periodic DAT offloads.
Proportionate communications near emergency activity where appropriate.
A simple one page ops note on every job covering airspace, standoffs and abort triggers.
Calm, courteous engagement with officers, with a record of powers used and a property schedule if equipment is seized.

Technical reference: cross motorway separation

To contextualise the judge’s description (opposite side of a six lane motorway plus hard shoulder plus verge), the following uses standard UK dimensions.

Assumptions from UK highway standards

Lane width (motorways): 3.65 m per lane (DMRB CD 127). [1]
Hard shoulder width: 3.3 m (National Highways). [2]
Central reservation (median): assume about 3.0 m (DMRB derived guidance). [3]
Verge: varies by site; on trunk roads, about 3.0 m is common. Use 2.0 to 3.0 m to bracket reality. [4]

Baseline components

Six lanes = 6 x 3.65 = 21.90 m. [1]
Two hard shoulders = 6.60 m. [2]
Central reservation (median) about 3.00 m. [3]
Verge per side about 2.0 to 3.0 m. [4]

Real world lateral separation (verge to verge)

Distance = 6 lanes + 2 x hard shoulder + 2 x verge + median

With 2.0 m verges (conservative): 21.90 + 6.60 + 4.00 + 3.00 = 35.50 m
With 3.0 m verges (typical): 21.90 + 6.60 + 6.00 + 3.00 = 37.50 m

Figure to use: about 37.5 m horizontal separation verge to verge (typical). Lower bound: about 35.5 m if verges are unusually narrow.

Lean reading (narrow phrasing)

Six lanes plus one hard shoulder plus one verge (omitting the median and the opposite side shoulder and verge):

21.90 + 3.30 + (2.0 to 3.0) = 27.2 to 28.2 m

This underestimates the physical cross section that most operators and engineers would use.

Add altitude for slant distance

If height is h, the slant range is sqrt(lateral^2 + h^2).

With 37.5 m lateral: 48.0 m at 30 m AGL, 70.8 m at 60 m, 125.7 m at 120 m.
With 35.5 m lateral: 46.5 m at 30 m, 69.2 m at 60 m, 124.2 m at 120 m.

Practical effect: even before adding any field offset inside the field beyond the verge, cross motorway separation is around 36 to 38 m. Any field offset adds to that figure. Slant range increases further with altitude.

Standards: DMRB CD 127, National Highways, TII DN GEO 03036, Transport Scotland.

Bottom line

This is a constructive outcome. The most serious allegation fell away, the fine is modest, and the client retains their equipment. More importantly, the experience is being used to lead on best practice: clearer telemetry, stronger data resilience and exemplary on scene conduct, supporting emergency services, informing the public and keeping UK skies safe.

About the author

Richard Ryan is a Barrister (Direct Access), Mediator and Chartered Arbitrator based in the UK, specialising in drone and counter-drone law, aviation regulation, and complex commercial disputes. He advises operators, insurers and public bodies on SORA/AAE approvals, BVLOS programmes, privacy/data governance, and risk allocation across the drone ecosystem.

This post is for general information only and is not legal advice.

The post A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots appeared first on Blakistons.

Rapid Briefing: “UK Drone Regulations and Net Risk” (PwC, Sept 2025) — Issues, Gaps, Opportunities

admin.richard — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 08:05:36 +0000

“`By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer

What the paper actually shows (evidence you can cite)

Insurers say risk is intrinsically low; very few third-party injury claims; risk has reduced over the decade with better tech/training. (pp. 9–11)
UK’s ‘zero-risk + case-by-case’ stance hasn’t produced safer skies than more prescriptive/permissive regimes (US/EU/Canada/Singapore); it has delayed progress. (pp. 12–13)
Net-risk lens: drones remove more risk than they introduce (e.g., falls from height, confined spaces, helicopter exposure). (pp. 14–18)
BVLOS doesn’t materially increase risk where well-managed; biggest predictors are location and safety management. (pp. 10–11, 19–22)
Incident data 2022–24: commercial operations show zero fatalities across UK, US, EU, Canada, Singapore; only a handful of serious injuries. (Appendix + country sections, pp. 55–61)
SORA friction/cost: UK SORA application at SAIL II is £3,495; mitigations/AMC still qualitative ? “OSC-style” uncertainty persists. (p. 35)
“Picking winners”: five BVLOS priorities (emergency response, powerlines, maritime SAR, rail, crop spraying). (pp. 6, 25–33)
Policy levers: shift to digital PDRAs for repeatable, low-risk scenarios; reuse prior approvals; model on EU PDRAs/Canada’s lower-risk BVLOS. (pp. 36–37; Appendix 1)
Emergency services gap: the old standing exemption (E4506) lapsed; routine BVLOS now hard to get—BTP resorted to State Aircraft rules. (p. 27)
Comparative table (risk models, UTM status, Remote ID, scale-up reality) explains why the UK feels “high-friction”. (p. 52)

Regulatory & enforcement issues to flag (and build matters around)

Incoherent risk calibration: the UK treats many Specific-category ops as high-risk despite cross-market low incident severity and strong insurer data. (pp. 9–13, 55–57)
Process opacity & cost-burden: SORA mitigations/AMC are qualitative ? inconsistent asks; high fees despite narrow temporal/spatial grants. (p. 35)
Emergency-services capability gap: loss of E4506 creates avoidable delay/risk; forces work-arounds (State Aircraft) rather than transparent PDRA. (p. 27)
AAE not yet a permissioning tool: policy concept ? scalable authorisation path (contrast EU PDRA-G03 for linear infrastructure). (pp. 28–31, 36)
Net-risk inversions: requirements like “observer in a boat” for coastal EVLOS can increase system risk and cost vs. sensor-driven shore control. (p. 21)
Data transparency: the UK has many “record-only” entries; EU public access is patchy; hard for operators/insurers to benchmark safety cases publicly. (pp. 54–61)

Practical exposure points for stakeholders

Insurers: common declinature trip-wires—ops outside the authorisation envelope; poor log preservation; weak maintenance/firmware governance. (pp. 9–11, 35–36)
Operators/pilots: SORA drift, local land-use limitations, and fragmented permissions across linear corridors; evidence-pack discipline needed. (pp. 28–31, 35–36, 56–57)
Associations/community: need bilingual templates/FAQs and incident learning loops; emphasise the airspace vs land-use distinction to reduce friction. (inferred)
Public bodies (blue-light, MCA, NR, utilities): proven benefits blocked by bespoke approvals—strong case for sector PDRA playbooks. (pp. 26–33, 36)

What this means for drone pilots, operators, and companies

As a drone lawyer, my reading of the PwC paper is that the safety record increasingly supports predictable, rules-based authorisations, but the UK still applies bespoke processes that create delay, cost and legal uncertainty. The winners will be those who treat compliance as an operational capability, not a paperwork chore.

Implications for Drone Pilots

Documentation is defence: retain native telemetry, app/controller logs, and pre-flight risk assessments. These are crucial in insurer claims and any CAA inquiry.
VLOS/BVLOS discipline: be explicit about how VLOS was maintained (or the BVLOS mitigations used). Ambiguity here is a common enforcement and insurance pain point.
Privacy on site: where people are identifiable, prepare a simple lawful-basis note and signage plan; it reduces complaint/escalation risk significantly.

Implications for Operators

Align your OA/ops manual with SORA and AAE logic: show how mitigations reduce both air and ground risk. Clear mapping cuts questions and accelerates approvals.
Design for repeatability: build PDRA-ready evidence packs for your most common jobs (e.g., rail/powerline corridors) so each new mission is a variation, not a reinvention.
Insurance resilience: standardise maintenance/firmware baselines and battery care logs; many declinatures stem from gaps here, not from the incident itself.
Contracts that reflect reality: flowing down responsibilities to subcontractors (airworthiness, data protection, incident reporting) reduces exposure and smooths procurement.

Implications for Drone Companies & Enterprise Users

Board-level accountability: appoint a named senior responsible owner (SRO) for UAS operations with decision logs—critical if decisions are later examined in court or by regulators.
Data governance as an asset: implement DPIAs where warranted, role-based access to imagery, retention/deletion schedules, and breach protocols. This increases tender scores and reduces enforcement risk.
Public value narrative: quantify how drone tasks remove traditional risks (work at height, road possessions, helicopter hours). This “net-risk” case supports proportional, scalable permissions.

Where legal support helps, assists, and mitigates

Approvals & permissions: structuring SORA/AAE applications with proportional mitigations, re-using prior evidence, and narrowing scope to reduce fees and conditions.
Policy & appeals: challenging irrational or net-risk-increasing conditions; seeking clarifications; and preparing proportionate alternatives that the regulator can accept.
Privacy & data: lawful-basis memos, DPIAs, signage/LLN templates, and response playbooks for complaints or subject access requests.
Insurance & claims: coverage mapping, notification strategy, and evidence preservation to avoid declinature; subrogation prospects where third parties contributed to loss.
Contracts: allocating risk cleanly across clients, operators and subcontractors (indemnities, limitation, IP/data ownership, incident reporting).

Bottom line: the sector is safe and maturing. Those who can demonstrate their risk controls, evidence compliance, and standardise approvals will grow fastest—with fewer legal shocks along the way.

Talking points for meetings & panels

Same safety, slower UK growth: insurers and incident data show low intrinsic risk—authorisations should be predictable and prescriptive, not bespoke. (pp. 9–13, 36–37)
Digital PDRAs now: for repeatable BVLOS (powerlines/rail/SAR/maritime/agri)—reuse evidence from prior OSCs; mirror EU PDRA/Canada logic. (pp. 25–33, 36)
Emergency drones need an emergency rulebook: the E4506 gap is pushing forces into State Aircraft work-arounds. (p. 27)
Incident reality: zero fatalities in 2022–24 across major markets; claims are mainly minor property/equipment—calibrate conditions accordingly. (pp. 55–61; pp. 9–11)

“`

The post Rapid Briefing: “UK Drone Regulations and Net Risk” (PwC, Sept 2025) — Issues, Gaps, Opportunities appeared first on Blakistons.

When “Just a Minute” Becomes BVLOS: Legal Lessons for Drone Operators from CHIRP’s September 2025 Reports

admin.richard — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 19:14:43 +0000

By Richard Ryan, Barrister & Drone Lawyer – practical takeaways, not legal advice for your specific situation.

Why this matters

CHIRP’s Drone/UAS FEEDBACK Edition 14 (September 2025) curates incidents that look ordinary until you view them through a law-and-liability lens:
three model-flying events that drifted into unintentional BVLOS, a Mini 2 injury at a carnival, a controller or app freeze mid-mission,
a fatigue-tinged flight that autolanded at 20 percent battery into a tree, and an RTH climb toward powerlines. Each contains avoidable legal exposure
that you can mitigate with better planning, clear roles, and a few settings changes.

The incidents, in plain English – and what the law expects

1) Unintentional BVLOS x3 (BMFA community)

What happened: One EDF jet lost power from a poor solder joint after a user modification; two other flights went BVLOS when sea fog or thermal lift arrived faster than forecast.
Legal frame (UK): The Drone and Model Aircraft Code requires direct VLOS and the ability to determine orientation at all times. If you cannot do that, the flight is non-compliant.
Practical fix: Treat post-purchase alterations as airworthiness-significant and inspect them before each flight. Use BMFA’s SWEETS pre-flight. Adopt a simple “radial scan” habit: eyes out (aircraft and airspace) then quick glance down (controller or map) then eyes out again.

2) Nottingham Carnival injury (Mini 2)

What happened: A minor pressed “land” while the supervising adult was distracted; the drone struck another child who was sitting on someone’s shoulders. Police confiscated the aircraft. No Operator ID was displayed and it was flown over a crowd.
Legal frame (UK): Never fly over crowds or assemblies of people. Label the aircraft with a visible Operator ID. Where injury occurs, expect scrutiny under general endangerment provisions.
Practical fix: Establish a safe TOLA (take-off and landing area) away from the crowd. Use aviation-style handover phraseology: “You have control” / “I have control”. Keep controller audio alerts audible. Supervision of minors must be active and informed by the Code.

3) “My app froze” (Mavic 4 Pro + RC2; 87-waypoint mission)

What happened: Switching to Map View mid-mission froze the Fly app. The pilot used the hardware RTH button to recover the aircraft. Possible overload from running a large waypoint mission while screen-recording.
Legal frame: You remain responsible for safe operation even when the UI hiccups. The defensible question is whether your procedures anticipated foreseeable failures, such as hardware RTH muscle memory, function checks, and reboot-on-the-ground policies.
Practical fix: For long waypoint jobs, test the profile without screen-recording first. Pre-brief the hardware RTH action. Use a visual observer if you will be heads-down.

4) Fatigue and stress (power-line inspection)

What happened: The pilot became disoriented, lost VLOS about 1,700 ft from home, hit 20 percent battery, and, unaware that “land at 20 percent” was set, descended into a tree despite pressing RTH.
Practical fix: Know and brief your low-battery action (RTH vs auto-land vs hover) in the Operations Manual. Use two-crew where terrain or workload increases disorientation risk. Remember UK requirements to maintain VLOS and orientation at all times.

5) RTH vs powerlines (mapping mission)

What happened: An automated flight went off-nominal. On RTH, the aircraft likely contacted an obstacle while climbing. CHIRP notes the perception trap of judging wire clearance at range and reminds that wires sag mid-span.
Practical fix: Set RTH altitude locally before each flight, above towers, tree lines, cranes, and powerlines. Do not rely on obstacle avoidance to detect thin wires. Pre-flight, measure line heights relative to the home point and add margin for sag and wind.

Five legal pillars these cases keep hitting

VLOS is non-negotiable. Keep the aircraft in direct sight and be able to tell its orientation, with a full view of surrounding airspace.
Crowds are out of bounds. “Assemblies of people” are defined by the inability to disperse quickly, not by a headcount.
Operator ID labelling is strict. Visible, legible, on the airframe. Sub-250 g camera drones typically still require an Operator ID.
Endangerment provisions are broad. If someone is endangered or injured, regulators may consider reckless or negligent operation.
Automation is not absolution. You own the outcomes of RTH, low-battery actions, waypointing, and controller limits.

Turn the lessons into a defensible playbook

A. Pre-flight and design for failure

Modified anything? Treat user soldering, adapters, and third-party leads as risk-relevant. Inspect that joint every flight until replaced with a proven assembly. Log the check.
Weather is slippery. Do not rely on one app. Triangulate forecasts. Identify abort gates if visibility closes in (fog, showers, glare). Use SWEETS at the field.
Controller workload. For heavy waypoint missions, disable screen-recording unless proven stable. Rehearse hardware RTH and app-independent control.

B. RTH and battery settings you can defend

Set RTH altitude locally, every time. Clear known obstacles and powerlines. Consider Advanced RTH where available.
Know low-battery behavior. Document thresholds in the Operations Manual, brief them to the crew, and confirm on the controller before take-off.

C. People, roles, and sterile cockpit

Observer next to you for heads-down tasks, with real-time verbal coordination.
Minors at the sticks? Only with active oversight, formal handovers, and never within or over a crowd.
Events and assemblies. Create buffer zones and safe TOLA sites. If a client insists on crowd-proximate shots, the safest and most defensible answer is often no without appropriate authorization and controls.

D. Evidence and reporting (preserve the facts)

After any occurrence, preserve flight logs, app caches, screen recordings, controller settings, and note battery and RTH configuration.
Consider confidential safety reporting to CHIRP in the UK (and NASA ASRS in the U.S.) to help the community learn without blame.

Bottom line

The risk here is ordinary: a conversation at the wrong moment, fog rolling in, a buried setting, an RTH altitude that did not clear wires,
or a controller pushed too hard. The Code’s core duties – VLOS, no crowds, proper ID labelling,
know your automation, and keep records – are your best legal shield when something goes wrong.

BMFA SWEETS: a quick pre-flight check

S — Sun: position now and later; glare; keep VLOS; avoid flying through the sun.
W — Wind: direction/strength/turbulence; safe areas for forced or dead-stick landings.
E — Environment: visibility (rain, mist, fog, fading light), people nearby, RF risks, space to fly a full circuit.
E — Emergencies: plan what you will do if there is a malfunction or airspace incursion; confirm failsafes.
T — Transmitter control: local Tx control and frequencies; correct model; trims/rates; Tx power/voltage.
S — Site rules: club rules, local byelaws, no-fly zones, height and airspace limits.

Note: some older guides use “Eventualities” for the first E. Meaning is the same: think ahead about what could happen and how you will handle it.

This article is general information, not legal advice. If an incident has occurred, speak to counsel at Blakiston’s Chambers before making statements to third parties and preserve all electronic evidence immediately.

Credit and resources

Based on incidents and analysis in CHIRP Drone/UAS FEEDBACK Edition 14 (September 2025).
BMFA pre-flight mnemonic SWEETS: handbook.bmfa.uk/13-general-model-safety
UK Drone and Model Aircraft Code: register-drones.caa.co.uk
Report a safety concern to CHIRP (confidential): chirp.co.uk/aviation/submit-a-report

The post When “Just a Minute” Becomes BVLOS: Legal Lessons for Drone Operators from CHIRP’s September 2025 Reports appeared first on Blakistons.

What the UK Drone Industry Can Learn from EASA’s Adoption of SORA 2.5

admin.richard — Tue, 30 Sep 2025 10:57:46 +0000

By Richard Ryan, Barrister & Drone Lawyer •
30th September 2025

Introduction

On 29 September 2025, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published ED Decision 2025/018/R, updating the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947. This update introduces the European version of the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) 2.5, developed by the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS).

Although the UK has left the EU regulatory framework, these developments are highly relevant. UK operators, manufacturers, and regulators can learn much from how EASA is simplifying compliance, clarifying roles, and promoting harmonisation across Member States.

What Changed under SORA 2.5?

Simplification of procedures: Ambiguities from earlier SORA versions have been removed, making it easier for operators and authorities to understand their obligations.
Clarity of roles: Responsibilities are now more clearly divided between operators, designers, and manufacturers. For example, design verification reports (DVRs) from EASA are required at SAIL IV, and type certification is required at SAIL V and VI.
Terminology alignment: EU-specific terms replace JARUS wording. For instance, “EVLOS” has been dropped in favour of “BVLOS with airspace observer”.
Containment requirements: Refined criteria for ground risk buffers and adjacent ground areas, particularly relevant for BVLOS and urban operations.
Flexibility for competent authorities: NAAs can use direct assessment, recognised entities, or qualified entities to review compliance.
Removal of weak cybersecurity rules: EASA stripped out JARUS’s cybersecurity provisions, deeming them disproportionate, but stressed that vulnerability assessments remain best practice.

Lessons for the UK CAA

Consistency and clarity – EASA has responded to industry feedback by clarifying operator versus manufacturer responsibilities. The UK’s guidance could benefit from similar precision, particularly in BVLOS authorisations.
Streamlining approvals – The two-phase SORA process (Phase 1 for risk identification, Phase 2 for compliance evidence) allows operators to obtain early regulatory feedback. This approach could make the UK’s OSC process faster and more predictable.
Population density mapping – EASA now recommends more accurate, dynamic maps to avoid over- or under-estimating risk in commercial and recreational areas. The UK could adopt a similar model, especially for urban drone delivery corridors.
Terminology alignment – Dropping “EVLOS” in favour of “BVLOS with AO” reflects operational reality and removes confusion. The UK should consider whether maintaining unique terminology helps or hinders international harmonisation.
Cybersecurity gap – By removing JARUS’s rules but encouraging vulnerability assessments, EASA has left space for proportionate, risk-based security. The CAA could similarly mandate cybersecurity risk assessments in line with wider aviation resilience standards.

Best Practice for UK Drone Pilots and Operators

Adopt SORA 2.5 methodology voluntarily – Even though the UK hasn’t formally adopted it, operators preparing risk assessments will benefit from aligning with European standards, especially if seeking approvals abroad.
Keep clear records – Maintain compliance matrices and comprehensive safety portfolios (CSPs) as outlined in SORA 2.5. This not only supports OSC applications but also protects operators in audits and insurance claims.
Use accurate population data – Don’t rely solely on outdated maps; supplement with local knowledge, real-time data, or site surveys to avoid underestimating risk.
Plan robust contingency procedures – Ensure abnormal and emergency procedures are well defined, tested, and rehearsed with crew. The new focus on containment means that “fly-away” risks must be demonstrably controlled.
Stay ahead on cybersecurity – Even though not mandated, conduct vulnerability assessments for command-and-control links and data storage. Cyber weaknesses could undermine insurance and liability cover.

Conclusion

EASA’s adoption of SORA 2.5 is a significant step towards regulatory clarity and harmonisation across Europe. The UK CAA should take note: simplifying authorisations, clarifying roles, and embracing proportionate risk-based approaches would strengthen the UK’s position as a leader in drone regulation.

For operators and pilots, the message is clear: best practice means anticipating international standards, not just meeting the minimum domestic requirement.

At Blakiston’s Chambers we advise drone operators, manufacturers, and service providers on all aspects of UK drone law, including airspace rights, regulatory compliance, and litigation risk. If your business is concerned about trespass or overflight liability, our team can help.

The post What the UK Drone Industry Can Learn from EASA’s Adoption of SORA 2.5 appeared first on Blakistons.

Trespass by Drones: Is Section 76 Civil Aviation Act 1982 Fit for Purpose?

admin.richard — Tue, 30 Sep 2025 09:51:14 +0000

Blakiston’s Chambers – Insight for Drone Operators •
30th September 2025

Why this matters for drone companies

The question of whether a drone operator can be sued for trespass when flying over private land is no longer a theoretical debate. With drones now routinely used for surveying, deliveries, inspections, and filming, landowners are increasingly asking whether they can stop flights above their property.

At the heart of this issue lies section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. Originally drafted for manned aviation, it has never been fully adapted to the realities of drones flying close to the ground, often well below 400 feet.

Recent High Court cases – Anglo-International Upholland Ltd v Wainwright (2023) and MBR Acres Ltd v Curtin (2025) – have thrown the law into sharper focus. For drone operators, the practical question is whether your drone can legally enter the airspace above a neighbour’s land without risking an injunction or damages claim.

Trespass: the basic position

Trespass is normally straightforward: step onto someone’s land without permission, and you’re liable – even if you cause no harm. Landowners don’t need to prove loss; mere entry is enough.

But what about airspace? Does a landowner “own the sky” above their property? Historically, English law used the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum – whoever owns the soil owns all the way up to the heavens. Courts have long since rejected that absolute view. Instead, the law recognises ownership only of the airspace “necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the land”.

For manned aircraft, Parliament drew a compromise in section 76(1): flights at a “reasonable height” cannot be challenged as trespass or nuisance. But what is a “reasonable height” when drones are often flown at 50 metres, 20 metres, or even lower?

Bernstein and the buffer zone

In Bernstein v Skyviews (1978), a landowner sued after an aircraft flew hundreds of feet above his estate to take photographs. The court held that this was not trespass, because the aircraft was too high to interfere with the landowner’s use of his land.

That decision gave us a rough principle: landowners control only the slice of airspace that matters to their ordinary use of land. The problem is that drones now operate in precisely that slice – near buildings, gardens, roads, and industrial sites – where interference with land use is most likely.

The new drone cases

1. Anglo-International (2023)

Drone flights over a derelict college were used to capture images which encouraged trespassers to enter the site. The judge treated the flights as mischievous and granted an injunction, holding that section 76 did not protect the operators.

The ruling was short and did not carefully analyse airspace ownership or flight height, but it showed courts are willing to act against drone flights if their purpose is seen as facilitating trespass or mischief.

2. MBR Acres (2025)

Animal rights campaigners used drones to film over a research facility. Some drones were flown as low as the height of a single-storey building, but evidence on height and operators was inconsistent.

The judge refused to grant an injunction. He accepted that flights at 50 metres or more did not interfere with the use of the land. Importantly, he suggested that other legal remedies – nuisance, harassment, or data protection – might be more appropriate than trespass.

What this means for drone operators

Trespass claims are harder to make stick than many landowners think. Courts are reluctant to find trespass unless flights interfere with the actual use of land (e.g. disrupting activity on site, flying extremely low, or endangering people).
Section 76 may be becoming redundant. Both Bernstein and MBR Acres suggest that unless a flight interferes with land use, there is no trespass at all – making section 76’s “reasonable height” defence almost irrelevant.
Purpose of flight matters – at least sometimes. In Anglo-International, mischievous use of drones was enough to justify an injunction. Operators engaged in legitimate commercial activity (surveying, deliveries, inspections) are on stronger ground.
Evidence is critical. Landowners will struggle to obtain injunctions unless they can prove height, frequency, and impact of flights. For operators, maintaining robust flight logs and compliance records (as required by the UK drone regulations) is the best defence.
Regulatory compliance is non-negotiable. Section 76 only protects operators if flights are lawful. Breach of drone regulations (flying beyond visual line of sight, too close to people, or over congested areas without permissions) will undermine any defence.

Looking ahead

The law remains unsettled. Drone operators should assume:

Routine overflights at safe, documented altitudes are unlikely to amount to trespass, provided they don’t interfere with land use.
Low-level flights directly over private land remain risky, particularly if they appear intrusive, harassing, or unsafe.
Other causes of action are emerging – nuisance, data protection, and harassment are likely to be more powerful tools for landowners than trespass.

For commercial operators, the key is to plan flight paths with landowner sensitivities in mind, document compliance, and keep up with evolving case law. What remains unclear is whether Parliament will modernise section 76 to deal explicitly with drones – or whether the courts will continue to adapt 20th-century law to 21st-century technology.

Blakiston’s Chambers advises drone operators, manufacturers, and service providers on all aspects of UK drone law, including airspace rights, regulatory compliance, and litigation risk. If your business is concerned about trespass or overflight liability, our team can help.

The post Trespass by Drones: Is Section 76 Civil Aviation Act 1982 Fit for Purpose? appeared first on Blakistons.

What’s relevant for Drone Operators when the drone crashes – lessons learned from Alauda Airspeeder MkII?

zeroabove — Wed, 24 Feb 2021 15:49:39 +0000

Having reviewed the 65 pages of the AAIB-25876 report in respect of the Alauda Airspeeder MkII owned by Riotplan Proprietary Limited trading as Alauda Racing crash on 4 July 2019 at Goodwood Aerodrome, the following comments are relevant:

1.There is reference to the commanders flying experience in hours, which included the last 90 days and the last 28 days. Are your records up-to-date?

2. The operators Operating Safety Case (OSC) contained several statements that were shown to be untrue. What does your OSC state?

3. In this case the CAA did not meet the operator or inspect the UA before the accident flight. Why not invite the CAA to inspect your platform so that you have it on record?

4. The CAA were not present at the test flight. Why not invite the CAA to attend the test flight?

5. The UA sustained damage to its landing gear as a consequence of loss of power on a test flight the day before the accident. Under the regulations, the OSC and the exemption provided by the CAA, this was supposed to have been reported, but was not. If in doubt, report?

6. Observing on the day in question, were two members of the CAA’s UAS unit, who were involved in assessing the operator’s application for exemption.

7. At the CAA UAS unit the section lead was a signatory on the exemption and he joined the CAA in May 2018. There have been numerous questions on resources that pertain to the CAA UAS unit. This is further endorsed by report which states “the CAA stated that the level of resources available meant it was not possible for the UA sector team to follow up every exemption.”

8. The CAA asked the Australian Civil Aviation Authority for further information, which does not appear to have been provided. However, the AAIB did ask CASA, and some information was provided. Does this mean that regulators will only correspond in the event of a serious incident? This is certainly going to become much more relevant for those drone operators that are operating in EU jurisdictions and how the EU intends to harmonise information in the future in order to allow drone operators to fly in different jurisdictions when qualified in another. It will be interesting to see how the UK intends to accept drone operators from the EU based upon UK regulations as these regulations may diverged in the future;

9. If you have a number of transmitters as part of your OSC that relate to redundancy, don’t leave them in the workshop!

10. The AAIB will appoint experts to examine certain aspects of the UA. In this case, experts were used to examine the circuit boards for compliance and specialist video forensic examiners using photogrammetry (interestingly from video, the expert was able to determine the UA’s heading, ground speed and altitude);

11. The AAIB compared this UA’s manufacture to EASA’s Special Conditions that relate to gliders with electric propulsion units and associated high-voltage batteries. In the event that there is an absence of regulation, comparisons will be made to other similar regulatory standards;

12. When writing mitigation measures for single points of failure, be mindful that if there is a failure in radio link communication that the UA will continue flying using its last known command. Interestingly, in this case there was no consideration on the effect of a kill switch not operating and that the hazard of a “flyaway” was not considered;

13. As a drone operator, do not state that your system has a return to home function when no GPS is fitted to the UA!

14. From an operator’s perspective, the operator in this case appears to make the admission that there was insufficient time and resources to adequately test and stabilise their equipment in unfamiliar surroundings. Additionally they stated that the team were all relatively inexperienced with aviation systems, procedures, required documentation and the need to formally understand and adhere to these processes. These are significant statements that underline the culture of an organisation in its approach to safe use of equipment and its emphasis on providing necessary training. Do your teams understand the legal obligations that relate to your operational authorisation and/or OSC?

15. As of August 2020, there are over 106,000 registered UA operators in the UK and over 45,000 operators flying model aircraft. That is a significant number of operators that require relevant training and understanding of their legal obligations;

16. According to the drones reunited website, the CAA state that most flyaways occur due to battery loss, poor signal, or a technology failure and some of this is also down to pilot error. It is essential that these aspects are covered in your risk assessment;

17. There are a number of amendments with respect to safety recommendations to CAP 722, which are:

1. detailed evaluation of any unmanned aircraft systems that use on-board systems to mitigate risks with risk severity classifications of “major, hazardous or catastrophic.”
2. guidance on the planning, completion and documenting of radiofrequency surveys to reduce the risk of radio-frequency interference or signal loss when operating unmanned aircraft systems;
3. unmanned aircraft system operators that use unmanned aircraft which rely on a radiolinks to operate safety systems are to provide radiofrequency survey reports to the CAA for review;
4. guidance on how to define an unmanned aircraft systems operational and safety areas, using up-to-date maps, accurate trajectory analysis and human automated safety system reaction times to ensure a safe operation;
5. the CAA are to provide examples of unmanned aircraft system safety systems;
6. the report recommends that the CAA introduce requirements to define a minimum standard for safety systems to be installed in unmanned aircraft systems operating under an operational authorisation to ensure adequate mitigation in the event of a malfunction;
7. data recording systems which are capable of demonstrating compliance with the authorisations conditions, safe operation and the logging of any failures which may affect the safe operation of the unmanned aircraft system are to be required;
8. minimum requirements for the monitoring of high-voltage stored energy devices to ensure safety of operations are recommended;
9. operators of unmanned aircraft systems should have an effective safety management system in place prior to issuing an operational authorisation;
10. expect an inspection from the CAA when seeking an operational authorisation for an unmanned aircraft system that the CAA have not previously had experience with;
11. expect the CAA to adopt appropriate design, production, maintenance and reliability standards for all unmanned aircraft systems with aircraft capable of imparting over 80 J of energy, the same recommendation is made to EASA. It will be interesting to see how this develops within the new CE marking regime that is to apply in the future;

This is a really useful case study for drone operators to consider. It certainly is a timely reminder to make sure that your operational safety cases and/or OSC’s are up-to-date and that all the staff that are involved in your operation are cognisant of their legal obligations with respect to the regulations, the OSC and the exemption provided by the Civil Aviation Authority. If you have any questions about this or any other legal issues, please email info@blakistons.com

The post What’s relevant for Drone Operators when the drone crashes – lessons learned from Alauda Airspeeder MkII? appeared first on Blakistons.

Letter to my MP regarding the #Drone Bill

zeroabove — Tue, 28 Jan 2020 09:11:29 +0000

Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill [HL] 2019 (“the Drone Bill”)

Download the letter here.

The post Letter to my MP regarding the #Drone Bill appeared first on Blakistons.