Drone Incidents Archives - Blakistons

A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots

admin.richard — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 17:53:49 +0000

By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer

Constructive outcome, practical lessons. A technical proximity breach was confirmed, a more serious allegation was dismissed, and there are clear takeaways that raise standards on evidence, cooperation and public safety.

Outcome at a glance

Count 1 (conviction): Operating an unmanned aircraft close to the site of an ongoing emergency response — Air Navigation Order 2016 Articles 265B(3), 265B(5)(j) and 265F(3)(c) (reflecting UAS.OPEN.060(3)).
Count 2 (dismissed): Obstructing or hindering emergency workers — Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act 2006, sections 1 and 4 — no case to answer.
Sentence: £300 (reduced from £2,500). Deprivation order refused — the client’s equipment will be returned.

Competence, cooperation and public interest flying

The client is an experienced operator with hundreds of hours and thousands of flights, combining sound aviation literacy with routine work around public interest incidents. On the day in question, the client used aircraft tracking tools and air band monitoring, maintained a conservative standoff where no formal cordon existed, and landed promptly when requested by police. This was a measured and safety first response in a dynamic setting.

Lesson 1: Telemetry clarity

When presenting flight data, clarity matters. Plot the flight path with a thin, precise line so the base map remains legible, including fences, road edges, cordons and measured standoffs. A thick line can obscure the very features that prove separation.

Keep a clean thin line map and a forensic overlay with timestamps for take off, orbit points, return to home and landing, plus measured distances to fixed features.
Use a thin line that clearly shows accurate telemetry when placed on a map, not a thick line that obscures part of the map.

Lesson 2: Plan for seizure and understand where DJI DAT lives

High fidelity DJI DAT logs are stored on the aircraft and typically require connecting the drone to a computer to extract. If a drone is seized by police, immediate access to those DAT files is difficult.

Build redundancy: back up app and controller logs after each flight, use screen recordings of the flight user interface, and capture independent stills or video.
For sensitive assignments, consider periodic DAT offloads in advance.

Five straightforward commitments

Thin line telemetry as the default for mapping outputs.
Evidence resilience: dual path logging (logs plus screen capture) and periodic DAT offloads.
Proportionate communications near emergency activity where appropriate.
A simple one page ops note on every job covering airspace, standoffs and abort triggers.
Calm, courteous engagement with officers, with a record of powers used and a property schedule if equipment is seized.

Technical reference: cross motorway separation

To contextualise the judge’s description (opposite side of a six lane motorway plus hard shoulder plus verge), the following uses standard UK dimensions.

Assumptions from UK highway standards

Lane width (motorways): 3.65 m per lane (DMRB CD 127). [1]
Hard shoulder width: 3.3 m (National Highways). [2]
Central reservation (median): assume about 3.0 m (DMRB derived guidance). [3]
Verge: varies by site; on trunk roads, about 3.0 m is common. Use 2.0 to 3.0 m to bracket reality. [4]

Baseline components

Six lanes = 6 x 3.65 = 21.90 m. [1]
Two hard shoulders = 6.60 m. [2]
Central reservation (median) about 3.00 m. [3]
Verge per side about 2.0 to 3.0 m. [4]

Real world lateral separation (verge to verge)

Distance = 6 lanes + 2 x hard shoulder + 2 x verge + median

With 2.0 m verges (conservative): 21.90 + 6.60 + 4.00 + 3.00 = 35.50 m
With 3.0 m verges (typical): 21.90 + 6.60 + 6.00 + 3.00 = 37.50 m

Figure to use: about 37.5 m horizontal separation verge to verge (typical). Lower bound: about 35.5 m if verges are unusually narrow.

Lean reading (narrow phrasing)

Six lanes plus one hard shoulder plus one verge (omitting the median and the opposite side shoulder and verge):

21.90 + 3.30 + (2.0 to 3.0) = 27.2 to 28.2 m

This underestimates the physical cross section that most operators and engineers would use.

Add altitude for slant distance

If height is h, the slant range is sqrt(lateral^2 + h^2).

With 37.5 m lateral: 48.0 m at 30 m AGL, 70.8 m at 60 m, 125.7 m at 120 m.
With 35.5 m lateral: 46.5 m at 30 m, 69.2 m at 60 m, 124.2 m at 120 m.

Practical effect: even before adding any field offset inside the field beyond the verge, cross motorway separation is around 36 to 38 m. Any field offset adds to that figure. Slant range increases further with altitude.

Standards: DMRB CD 127, National Highways, TII DN GEO 03036, Transport Scotland.

Bottom line

This is a constructive outcome. The most serious allegation fell away, the fine is modest, and the client retains their equipment. More importantly, the experience is being used to lead on best practice: clearer telemetry, stronger data resilience and exemplary on scene conduct, supporting emergency services, informing the public and keeping UK skies safe.

About the author

Richard Ryan is a Barrister (Direct Access), Mediator and Chartered Arbitrator based in the UK, specialising in drone and counter-drone law, aviation regulation, and complex commercial disputes. He advises operators, insurers and public bodies on SORA/AAE approvals, BVLOS programmes, privacy/data governance, and risk allocation across the drone ecosystem.

This post is for general information only and is not legal advice.

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When “Just a Minute” Becomes BVLOS: Legal Lessons for Drone Operators from CHIRP’s September 2025 Reports

admin.richard — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 19:14:43 +0000

By Richard Ryan, Barrister & Drone Lawyer – practical takeaways, not legal advice for your specific situation.

Why this matters

CHIRP’s Drone/UAS FEEDBACK Edition 14 (September 2025) curates incidents that look ordinary until you view them through a law-and-liability lens:
three model-flying events that drifted into unintentional BVLOS, a Mini 2 injury at a carnival, a controller or app freeze mid-mission,
a fatigue-tinged flight that autolanded at 20 percent battery into a tree, and an RTH climb toward powerlines. Each contains avoidable legal exposure
that you can mitigate with better planning, clear roles, and a few settings changes.

The incidents, in plain English – and what the law expects

1) Unintentional BVLOS x3 (BMFA community)

What happened: One EDF jet lost power from a poor solder joint after a user modification; two other flights went BVLOS when sea fog or thermal lift arrived faster than forecast.
Legal frame (UK): The Drone and Model Aircraft Code requires direct VLOS and the ability to determine orientation at all times. If you cannot do that, the flight is non-compliant.
Practical fix: Treat post-purchase alterations as airworthiness-significant and inspect them before each flight. Use BMFA’s SWEETS pre-flight. Adopt a simple “radial scan” habit: eyes out (aircraft and airspace) then quick glance down (controller or map) then eyes out again.

2) Nottingham Carnival injury (Mini 2)

What happened: A minor pressed “land” while the supervising adult was distracted; the drone struck another child who was sitting on someone’s shoulders. Police confiscated the aircraft. No Operator ID was displayed and it was flown over a crowd.
Legal frame (UK): Never fly over crowds or assemblies of people. Label the aircraft with a visible Operator ID. Where injury occurs, expect scrutiny under general endangerment provisions.
Practical fix: Establish a safe TOLA (take-off and landing area) away from the crowd. Use aviation-style handover phraseology: “You have control” / “I have control”. Keep controller audio alerts audible. Supervision of minors must be active and informed by the Code.

3) “My app froze” (Mavic 4 Pro + RC2; 87-waypoint mission)

What happened: Switching to Map View mid-mission froze the Fly app. The pilot used the hardware RTH button to recover the aircraft. Possible overload from running a large waypoint mission while screen-recording.
Legal frame: You remain responsible for safe operation even when the UI hiccups. The defensible question is whether your procedures anticipated foreseeable failures, such as hardware RTH muscle memory, function checks, and reboot-on-the-ground policies.
Practical fix: For long waypoint jobs, test the profile without screen-recording first. Pre-brief the hardware RTH action. Use a visual observer if you will be heads-down.

4) Fatigue and stress (power-line inspection)

What happened: The pilot became disoriented, lost VLOS about 1,700 ft from home, hit 20 percent battery, and, unaware that “land at 20 percent” was set, descended into a tree despite pressing RTH.
Practical fix: Know and brief your low-battery action (RTH vs auto-land vs hover) in the Operations Manual. Use two-crew where terrain or workload increases disorientation risk. Remember UK requirements to maintain VLOS and orientation at all times.

5) RTH vs powerlines (mapping mission)

What happened: An automated flight went off-nominal. On RTH, the aircraft likely contacted an obstacle while climbing. CHIRP notes the perception trap of judging wire clearance at range and reminds that wires sag mid-span.
Practical fix: Set RTH altitude locally before each flight, above towers, tree lines, cranes, and powerlines. Do not rely on obstacle avoidance to detect thin wires. Pre-flight, measure line heights relative to the home point and add margin for sag and wind.

Five legal pillars these cases keep hitting

VLOS is non-negotiable. Keep the aircraft in direct sight and be able to tell its orientation, with a full view of surrounding airspace.
Crowds are out of bounds. “Assemblies of people” are defined by the inability to disperse quickly, not by a headcount.
Operator ID labelling is strict. Visible, legible, on the airframe. Sub-250 g camera drones typically still require an Operator ID.
Endangerment provisions are broad. If someone is endangered or injured, regulators may consider reckless or negligent operation.
Automation is not absolution. You own the outcomes of RTH, low-battery actions, waypointing, and controller limits.

Turn the lessons into a defensible playbook

A. Pre-flight and design for failure

Modified anything? Treat user soldering, adapters, and third-party leads as risk-relevant. Inspect that joint every flight until replaced with a proven assembly. Log the check.
Weather is slippery. Do not rely on one app. Triangulate forecasts. Identify abort gates if visibility closes in (fog, showers, glare). Use SWEETS at the field.
Controller workload. For heavy waypoint missions, disable screen-recording unless proven stable. Rehearse hardware RTH and app-independent control.

B. RTH and battery settings you can defend

Set RTH altitude locally, every time. Clear known obstacles and powerlines. Consider Advanced RTH where available.
Know low-battery behavior. Document thresholds in the Operations Manual, brief them to the crew, and confirm on the controller before take-off.

C. People, roles, and sterile cockpit

Observer next to you for heads-down tasks, with real-time verbal coordination.
Minors at the sticks? Only with active oversight, formal handovers, and never within or over a crowd.
Events and assemblies. Create buffer zones and safe TOLA sites. If a client insists on crowd-proximate shots, the safest and most defensible answer is often no without appropriate authorization and controls.

D. Evidence and reporting (preserve the facts)

After any occurrence, preserve flight logs, app caches, screen recordings, controller settings, and note battery and RTH configuration.
Consider confidential safety reporting to CHIRP in the UK (and NASA ASRS in the U.S.) to help the community learn without blame.

Bottom line

The risk here is ordinary: a conversation at the wrong moment, fog rolling in, a buried setting, an RTH altitude that did not clear wires,
or a controller pushed too hard. The Code’s core duties – VLOS, no crowds, proper ID labelling,
know your automation, and keep records – are your best legal shield when something goes wrong.

BMFA SWEETS: a quick pre-flight check

S — Sun: position now and later; glare; keep VLOS; avoid flying through the sun.
W — Wind: direction/strength/turbulence; safe areas for forced or dead-stick landings.
E — Environment: visibility (rain, mist, fog, fading light), people nearby, RF risks, space to fly a full circuit.
E — Emergencies: plan what you will do if there is a malfunction or airspace incursion; confirm failsafes.
T — Transmitter control: local Tx control and frequencies; correct model; trims/rates; Tx power/voltage.
S — Site rules: club rules, local byelaws, no-fly zones, height and airspace limits.

Note: some older guides use “Eventualities” for the first E. Meaning is the same: think ahead about what could happen and how you will handle it.

This article is general information, not legal advice. If an incident has occurred, speak to counsel at Blakiston’s Chambers before making statements to third parties and preserve all electronic evidence immediately.

Credit and resources

Based on incidents and analysis in CHIRP Drone/UAS FEEDBACK Edition 14 (September 2025).
BMFA pre-flight mnemonic SWEETS: handbook.bmfa.uk/13-general-model-safety
UK Drone and Model Aircraft Code: register-drones.caa.co.uk
Report a safety concern to CHIRP (confidential): chirp.co.uk/aviation/submit-a-report

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What’s relevant for Drone Operators when the drone crashes – lessons learned from Alauda Airspeeder MkII?

zeroabove — Wed, 24 Feb 2021 15:49:39 +0000

Having reviewed the 65 pages of the AAIB-25876 report in respect of the Alauda Airspeeder MkII owned by Riotplan Proprietary Limited trading as Alauda Racing crash on 4 July 2019 at Goodwood Aerodrome, the following comments are relevant:

1.There is reference to the commanders flying experience in hours, which included the last 90 days and the last 28 days. Are your records up-to-date?

2. The operators Operating Safety Case (OSC) contained several statements that were shown to be untrue. What does your OSC state?

3. In this case the CAA did not meet the operator or inspect the UA before the accident flight. Why not invite the CAA to inspect your platform so that you have it on record?

4. The CAA were not present at the test flight. Why not invite the CAA to attend the test flight?

5. The UA sustained damage to its landing gear as a consequence of loss of power on a test flight the day before the accident. Under the regulations, the OSC and the exemption provided by the CAA, this was supposed to have been reported, but was not. If in doubt, report?

6. Observing on the day in question, were two members of the CAA’s UAS unit, who were involved in assessing the operator’s application for exemption.

7. At the CAA UAS unit the section lead was a signatory on the exemption and he joined the CAA in May 2018. There have been numerous questions on resources that pertain to the CAA UAS unit. This is further endorsed by report which states “the CAA stated that the level of resources available meant it was not possible for the UA sector team to follow up every exemption.”

8. The CAA asked the Australian Civil Aviation Authority for further information, which does not appear to have been provided. However, the AAIB did ask CASA, and some information was provided. Does this mean that regulators will only correspond in the event of a serious incident? This is certainly going to become much more relevant for those drone operators that are operating in EU jurisdictions and how the EU intends to harmonise information in the future in order to allow drone operators to fly in different jurisdictions when qualified in another. It will be interesting to see how the UK intends to accept drone operators from the EU based upon UK regulations as these regulations may diverged in the future;

9. If you have a number of transmitters as part of your OSC that relate to redundancy, don’t leave them in the workshop!

10. The AAIB will appoint experts to examine certain aspects of the UA. In this case, experts were used to examine the circuit boards for compliance and specialist video forensic examiners using photogrammetry (interestingly from video, the expert was able to determine the UA’s heading, ground speed and altitude);

11. The AAIB compared this UA’s manufacture to EASA’s Special Conditions that relate to gliders with electric propulsion units and associated high-voltage batteries. In the event that there is an absence of regulation, comparisons will be made to other similar regulatory standards;

12. When writing mitigation measures for single points of failure, be mindful that if there is a failure in radio link communication that the UA will continue flying using its last known command. Interestingly, in this case there was no consideration on the effect of a kill switch not operating and that the hazard of a “flyaway” was not considered;

13. As a drone operator, do not state that your system has a return to home function when no GPS is fitted to the UA!

14. From an operator’s perspective, the operator in this case appears to make the admission that there was insufficient time and resources to adequately test and stabilise their equipment in unfamiliar surroundings. Additionally they stated that the team were all relatively inexperienced with aviation systems, procedures, required documentation and the need to formally understand and adhere to these processes. These are significant statements that underline the culture of an organisation in its approach to safe use of equipment and its emphasis on providing necessary training. Do your teams understand the legal obligations that relate to your operational authorisation and/or OSC?

15. As of August 2020, there are over 106,000 registered UA operators in the UK and over 45,000 operators flying model aircraft. That is a significant number of operators that require relevant training and understanding of their legal obligations;

16. According to the drones reunited website, the CAA state that most flyaways occur due to battery loss, poor signal, or a technology failure and some of this is also down to pilot error. It is essential that these aspects are covered in your risk assessment;

17. There are a number of amendments with respect to safety recommendations to CAP 722, which are:

1. detailed evaluation of any unmanned aircraft systems that use on-board systems to mitigate risks with risk severity classifications of “major, hazardous or catastrophic.”
2. guidance on the planning, completion and documenting of radiofrequency surveys to reduce the risk of radio-frequency interference or signal loss when operating unmanned aircraft systems;
3. unmanned aircraft system operators that use unmanned aircraft which rely on a radiolinks to operate safety systems are to provide radiofrequency survey reports to the CAA for review;
4. guidance on how to define an unmanned aircraft systems operational and safety areas, using up-to-date maps, accurate trajectory analysis and human automated safety system reaction times to ensure a safe operation;
5. the CAA are to provide examples of unmanned aircraft system safety systems;
6. the report recommends that the CAA introduce requirements to define a minimum standard for safety systems to be installed in unmanned aircraft systems operating under an operational authorisation to ensure adequate mitigation in the event of a malfunction;
7. data recording systems which are capable of demonstrating compliance with the authorisations conditions, safe operation and the logging of any failures which may affect the safe operation of the unmanned aircraft system are to be required;
8. minimum requirements for the monitoring of high-voltage stored energy devices to ensure safety of operations are recommended;
9. operators of unmanned aircraft systems should have an effective safety management system in place prior to issuing an operational authorisation;
10. expect an inspection from the CAA when seeking an operational authorisation for an unmanned aircraft system that the CAA have not previously had experience with;
11. expect the CAA to adopt appropriate design, production, maintenance and reliability standards for all unmanned aircraft systems with aircraft capable of imparting over 80 J of energy, the same recommendation is made to EASA. It will be interesting to see how this develops within the new CE marking regime that is to apply in the future;

This is a really useful case study for drone operators to consider. It certainly is a timely reminder to make sure that your operational safety cases and/or OSC’s are up-to-date and that all the staff that are involved in your operation are cognisant of their legal obligations with respect to the regulations, the OSC and the exemption provided by the Civil Aviation Authority. If you have any questions about this or any other legal issues, please email info@blakistons.com

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The mystery of the Gatwick drone

zeroabove — Wed, 23 Dec 2020 13:15:20 +0000

A drone sighting caused the airport to close for two days in 2018, but despite a lengthy police investigation, no culprit was ever found. So what exactly did people see in the Sussex sky?

Soon after 9pm on Wednesday 19 December 2018, an airport security officer who had just finished his shift at Gatwick airport was standing at a bus stop on site, waiting to go home, when he saw something strange. He immediately called the Gatwick control centre and reported what he had seen: two drones. One was hovering above a vehicle inside the airport complex, and the other was flying alongside the nearby perimeter fence. The message was relayed to senior management. Unauthorised drone activity is considered a danger to aircraft and passengers because of the risk of collision. Within minutes, Gatwick’s only runway had been closed and all flights were suspended.

Over the next half hour, 20 police and airport security vehicles drove around the airport, lights flashing and sirens blaring, with the intention of scaring whoever was operating the drones. It didn’t work. By 9.30pm, six more sightings had been logged by the Gatwick control centre, five of them from police officers. Inside the airport, thousands of passengers waited to set off on their Christmas holidays. In the sky above, planes circled, waiting to land. Some were at the end of long journeys, and more than a dozen aircraft were soon dangerously low on fuel.

Read the full article here.

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