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					<description><![CDATA[<p>White Paper Beyond 2019 A New Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy for the United Kingdom, After Ukraine and Iran By Mr Richard Ryan, Barrister, Blakiston&#8217;s Chambers &#183; June 2026 Status and method. This paper relies on primary and official sources, supplemented by reputable reporting for incident chronology. All facts are verified as [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/2673-2/"></a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
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<p class="wp-kicker">White Paper</p>
<h1>Beyond 2019</h1>
<p class="wp-sub">A New Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy for the United Kingdom, After Ukraine and Iran</p>
<p class="wp-meta">By Mr Richard Ryan, Barrister, Blakiston&rsquo;s Chambers &middot; June 2026</p>
<div class="wp-note"><strong>Status and method.</strong> This paper relies on primary and official sources, supplemented by reputable reporting for incident chronology. All facts are verified as at 2&nbsp;June&nbsp;2026. Battlefield figures drawn from active conflict reporting are attributed to their originating source and presented as attributed claims rather than judicially established fact. The paper contains no classified or privileged material. All footnote links are live.</div>
<p><strong>The United Kingdom&rsquo;s published national counter drone policy; the <em>UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy</em>, presented to Parliament as Command Paper 187 on 21&nbsp;October&nbsp;2019<sup id="fnref-1"><a href="#fn-1">[1]</a></sup>; is materially out of date as a strategic document.</strong> It remains the only published national strategy in the field for the whole of government, yet it is now approximately six years and seven months old, and roughly three and a half years beyond its own planning horizon.</p>
<p>The strategy was sound for its time. It identified the highest harm illegal uses of small drones; terrorism, smuggling into prisons, disruption of critical national infrastructure; and prescribed layered intervention, industry standards, responder powers and public education.<sup id="fnref-2"><a href="#fn-2">[2]</a></sup> But it was expressly confined to malicious and illegal use of small aerial drones, in a domestic policing and protective security frame. That frame has been overtaken by operational reality in Ukraine and the Iranian theatre: massed one way attack drones, combined drone and missile salvos, container and special forces launch, dense electronic warfare, fibre optic command links and AI assisted guidance now define the threat.</p>
<p>Subsequent UK documents do not update the 2019 strategy; they work around it. The Defence Drone Strategy (2024),<sup id="fnref-3"><a href="#fn-3">[3]</a></sup> the Strategic Defence Review 2025,<sup id="fnref-4"><a href="#fn-4">[4]</a></sup> NPSA&rsquo;s site specific guidance,<sup id="fnref-5"><a href="#fn-5">[5]</a></sup> and the Ministry of Defence&rsquo;s 2026 pursuit of new defeat powers at military sites<sup id="fnref-6"><a href="#fn-6">[6]</a></sup> together form a patchwork of sectoral adaptations laid over an unrevised core. This paper argues that the 2019 strategy should be retired as a standalone statement and replaced by an integrated <strong>Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy</strong>, supported by a consolidated legal code for detection, disruption and defeat, and by an annual ministerial statement to Parliament.</p>
<h2>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;The threat has become a strategic mass system</h2>
<p>The central lesson of 2024&ndash;2026 is not that drones have become more common but that they have become a strategic mass system &mdash; a consumable class of munition and sensor used for saturation, decoying, attrition of intelligence assets, target acquisition and the deliberate erosion of a defender&rsquo;s cost exchange ratio. On the night of 2&nbsp;June&nbsp;2026, Ukraine&rsquo;s air force reported that Russia had launched 656 drones and 73 missiles in a single overnight barrage, of which 602 drones and 40 missiles were downed or suppressed.<sup id="fnref-7"><a href="#fn-7">[7]</a></sup><sup id="fnref-8"><a href="#fn-8">[8]</a></sup> Single salvos now routinely exceed several hundred drones.</p>
<p>Critical infrastructure has been directly affected. In February&nbsp;2025 a Russian Geran-2 (Shahed type) drone struck the New Safe Confinement over Chornobyl&rsquo;s reactor four;<sup id="fnref-9"><a href="#fn-9">[9]</a></sup> by December&nbsp;2025 the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that the structure had lost its primary safety functions, including confinement.<sup id="fnref-10"><a href="#fn-10">[10]</a></sup> In May&nbsp;2026 a drone strike caused a fire at an electrical generator on the perimeter of the United Arab Emirates&rsquo; Barakah nuclear plant; a civilian reactor site; leaving one unit running on emergency diesel generators.<sup id="fnref-11"><a href="#fn-11">[11]</a></sup><sup id="fnref-12"><a href="#fn-12">[12]</a></sup></p>
<p>The homeland and deployed force dimension is now concrete for the United Kingdom. In early March&nbsp;2026 a Shahed type drone struck a runway at RAF&nbsp;Akrotiri in Cyprus; a British Sovereign Base Area; causing limited damage,<sup id="fnref-13"><a href="#fn-13">[13]</a></sup> and the UK flew defensive sorties and, where requested, acted in the collective self defence of regional allies.<sup id="fnref-14"><a href="#fn-14">[14]</a></sup> Ukraine&rsquo;s Operation Spider&rsquo;s Web (June&nbsp;2025) had already shown that 117 first person view drones launched from concealed truck borne containers could strike strategic bomber bases far from any front line, damaging more than 40 aircraft, with some guidance reportedly AI assisted.<sup id="fnref-15"><a href="#fn-15">[15]</a></sup></p>
<h3>A necessary qualification</h3>
<p>Not every battlefield lesson maps to the British mainland. The most credible open analysis holds that long range Shahed type strikes on Great Britain would face high attrition because of geography and warning time, while shorter range drones launched from containers or by hostile special forces remain a credible risk to high value assets at home. The policy implication is to discriminate between vectors; not to import foreign assumptions wholesale, and not to dismiss the threat. A refreshed strategy should say so candidly.</p>
<h2>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;Why the 2019 strategy can no longer stand alone</h2>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2019 provision</th>
<th>Current reality</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the highest harm illegal use of small aerial drones in the UK.</td>
<td>Concern now extends to defence sites, CNI in crisis or conflict, and state launched drones and missiles.</td>
<td>Too narrow as a national frame.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short planning horizon from 2019.</td>
<td>Document is c.&nbsp;6.6 years old; NPSA requires regular review because methods change quickly.</td>
<td>Formally stale; refresh overdue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empower police and responders.</td>
<td>MoD now seeks its own defeat powers at Defence sites because police only authorities are inadequate.</td>
<td>Institutionally outdated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial drones only.</td>
<td>New Defence policy extends to land and maritime uncrewed systems.</td>
<td>Conceptually outdated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter drone as a discrete problem.</td>
<td>NATO now treats small UAS through hypersonic missiles as one integrated air and missile defence continuum.<sup id="fnref-16"><a href="#fn-16">[16]</a></sup></td>
<td>The silo is no longer tenable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>The clearest institutional signal came in February&nbsp;2026, when the Ministry of Defence reported 266 drone incidents near UK military sites during 2025 (up from 126 in 2024) and sought fresh statutory powers through the Armed Forces Bill; extending beyond aerial drones to land and maritime systems; to allow Defence personnel to defeat drones at their own sites without waiting for police intervention.<sup id="fnref-6"><a href="#fn-6">[6]</a></sup> When the armed forces must legislate around a framework built for policing to protect their own bases, that framework has expired.</p>
<h2>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;The legal framework: developed, but fragmented</h2>
<p>Domestic powers have expanded since 2019 but remain complex. The Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 created bespoke constabulary powers to ground, stop, search, inspect and seize unmanned aircraft, and amended section&nbsp;93 of the Police Act 1997 to facilitate authorisations for certain counter drone measures.<sup id="fnref-17"><a href="#fn-17">[17]</a></sup><sup id="fnref-18"><a href="#fn-18">[18]</a></sup> In the civil regime, the Civil Aviation Authority&rsquo;s Direct Remote&nbsp;ID requirements came into force on 1&nbsp;January&nbsp;2026 for UK1, UK2, UK3, UK5 and UK6 class drones, with extension to most drones carrying a camera from 1&nbsp;January&nbsp;2028.<sup id="fnref-19"><a href="#fn-19">[19]</a></sup></p>
<p>Yet lawful defeat is markedly harder than detection. Operational use of a jammer is generally an offence under section&nbsp;68 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, and Ofcom has no power to authorise operational use; only narrow trial and research licences in shielded conditions.<sup id="fnref-20"><a href="#fn-20">[20]</a></sup> Government is separately examining the enforcement framework around jammers.<sup id="fnref-21"><a href="#fn-21">[21]</a></sup> Kinetic or electronic interference may amount to unlawful property or wireless interference absent proper authorisation; the Act&rsquo;s own explanatory notes acknowledge as much. Techniques that take over a drone by software may engage the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and sensing engages the Data Protection Act 2018, the UK GDPR and the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires the state both to protect life from foreseeable threats and to keep its sensing and defeat measures necessary and proportionate. A lawful defeat chain is a designed legal artefact, not an improvisation.</p>
<p>Overseas action sits within international law. The Government&rsquo;s March&nbsp;2026 legal position on Iranian regional attacks invoked the collective self defence of allies under Article&nbsp;51 of the UN Charter, subject to necessity and proportionality and Security Council notification.<sup id="fnref-14"><a href="#fn-14">[14]</a></sup> Once in armed conflict, drones attract no special category: they are governed by the ordinary rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution applicable to all weapons.<sup id="fnref-22"><a href="#fn-22">[22]</a></sup></p>
<h2>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;Recommendations</h2>
<p>The Government should replace the 2019 strategy with a new instrument covering the whole of government. Five propositions should anchor it:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Integrate, do not append.</strong> A single Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy spanning the Home Office, MoD, Cabinet Office resilience, CAA, Ofcom, NPSA, the intelligence community, prisons and CNI operators, aligned to NATO&rsquo;s integrated air and missile defence framework.<sup id="fnref-16"><a href="#fn-16">[16]</a></sup></li>
<li><strong>Consolidate the law.</strong> A statutory code (or, at minimum, statutory guidance) defining who may detect, disrupt and defeat uncrewed systems, where, against which threat category, under what authorisation, with what recording and what review after an incident &mdash; differentiating urban areas, prisons, airports, defence sites and overseas operations.</li>
<li><strong>Adopt a layered baseline that is alert to cost.</strong> Use NPSA&rsquo;s site specific, threat informed model as the national spine,<sup id="fnref-23"><a href="#fn-23">[23]</a></sup> plugging into a wider air and missile defence architecture for higher end threats, and prioritising defeat options that are low in collateral, deep in magazine and economically rational. A missile fired at every cheap drone is not a strategy; it is a budgetary confession.</li>
<li><strong>Treat industry and export control as readiness.</strong> Link procurement, export licensing, sanctions intelligence and sovereign industrial strategy, with secure by design and open architecture requirements across C-UAS procurement. A state that cannot source the components of its own counter drone systems is not strategically autonomous.</li>
<li><strong>Compliance and oversight by design.</strong> Require a written legal basis, data minimisation, retention limits and human oversight for every C-UAS deployment by a public authority; subject identification by AI to documented necessity and a review of error rates; and provide Parliament an annual ministerial statement on C-UAS powers, deployments, tests, safety incidents, rights compliance and lessons learned, with NPSA and the ICO involved where domestic surveillance is concerned.</li>
</ol>
<h2>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;Conclusion</h2>
<p>None of this discards the 2019 strategy&rsquo;s best inheritance; its insistence on layered intervention over an optimism founded on gadgets, an instinct NPSA&rsquo;s later guidance has only reinforced.<sup id="fnref-5"><a href="#fn-5">[5]</a></sup> The task is not to repudiate 2019 but to lift its sound protective security spine into an architecture wide enough for the threat that now exists: a spectrum of low cost, autonomous and electronically contested uncrewed systems, ranging from nuisance to war. The 2019 strategy answered the question of its decade. It is time to ask the question of this one.</p>
<div class="wp-authornote"><strong>About the author.</strong> Mr Richard Ryan is a barrister of Blakiston&rsquo;s Chambers..</div>
<div class="wp-footnotes">
<h2 style="font-size:1.15rem;">Footnotes &amp; sources (23)</h2>
<ol>
<li id="fn-1">UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, CP 187, presented to Parliament 21 October 2019 (GOV.UK). <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-counter-unmanned-aircraft-strategy" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-counter-unmanned-aircraft-strategy</a> <a href="#fnref-1" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-2">UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy (HTML version), GOV.UK, published 21 October 2019. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-counter-unmanned-aircraft-strategy/table" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-counter-unmanned-aircraft-strategy/table</a> <a href="#fnref-2" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-3">Defence Drone Strategy — the UK’s approach to Defence Uncrewed Systems, GOV.UK, published 22 February 2024. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-drone-strategy-the-uks-approach-to-defence-uncrewed-systems/defence-drone-strategy-the-uks-approach-to-defence-uncrewed-systems" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-drone-strategy-the-uks-approach-to-defence-uncrewed-systems/defence-drone-strategy-the-uks-approach-to-defence-uncrewed-systems</a> <a href="#fnref-3" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-4">The Strategic Defence Review 2025 — Making Britain Safer, GOV.UK, published 2 June 2025. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad</a> <a href="#fnref-4" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-5">NPSA, “Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS)” specialised guidance. <a href="https://www.npsa.gov.uk/specialised-guidance/uncrewed-aerial-systems/counter-uncrewed-aerial-systems-c-uas" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.npsa.gov.uk/specialised-guidance/uncrewed-aerial-systems/counter-uncrewed-aerial-systems-c-uas</a> <a href="#fnref-5" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-6">Ministry of Defence, “New powers for Defence personnel to defeat drones following doubling of incidents near bases” (266 incidents in 2025, up from 126), GOV.UK, 2 February 2026. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-powers-for-defence-personnel-to-defeat-drones-following-doubling-of-incidents-near-bases" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-powers-for-defence-personnel-to-defeat-drones-following-doubling-of-incidents-near-bases</a> <a href="#fnref-6" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-7">“Russia launched 656 drones and 73 missiles” — figures attributed to the Ukrainian Air Force; CBS News, 2 June 2026. <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-major-attacks-missile-drone-kill-several-wound-dozens/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-major-attacks-missile-drone-kill-several-wound-dozens/</a> <a href="#fnref-7" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-8">NPR, “Russian attack on Ukraine kills at least 14”, 2 June 2026 (corroborating launch and interception figures). <a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/06/02/nx-s1-5844071/russian-attack-ukraine" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.npr.org/2026/06/02/nx-s1-5844071/russian-attack-ukraine</a> <a href="#fnref-8" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-9">Chornobyl New Safe Confinement struck by a Geran-2 (Shahed type) drone, 14 February 2025: Greenpeace Ukraine mission report, 20 March 2025. <a href="https://www.greenpeace.org/ukraine/en/news/3504/fifty-percent-of-north-roof-structure-of-chornobyl-new-safe-confinement-shelter-severely-damaged/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.greenpeace.org/ukraine/en/news/3504/fifty-percent-of-north-roof-structure-of-chornobyl-new-safe-confinement-shelter-severely-damaged/</a> <a href="#fnref-9" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-10">IAEA assessment (December 2025) that the New Safe Confinement had lost its primary safety functions, including confinement (reported via United24/Reuters). <a href="https://united24media.com/latest-news/iaea-chornobyls-new-safe-confinement-can-no-longer-contain-radiation-after-russian-drone-attack-14067" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://united24media.com/latest-news/iaea-chornobyls-new-safe-confinement-can-no-longer-contain-radiation-after-russian-drone-attack-14067</a> <a href="#fnref-10" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-11">Drone strike causing a generator fire at the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant, 17 May 2026: Al Jazeera, 17 May 2026. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/17/drone-strike-sparks-fire-at-uaes-barakah-nuclear-power-plant" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/17/drone-strike-sparks-fire-at-uaes-barakah-nuclear-power-plant</a> <a href="#fnref-11" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-12">NPR, “Drone strikes UAE nuclear plant”, 18 May 2026 (IAEA: one reactor on emergency diesel generators). <a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/05/18/g-s1-122534/drone-strikes-uae-nuclear-plant" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.npr.org/2026/05/18/g-s1-122534/drone-strikes-uae-nuclear-plant</a> <a href="#fnref-12" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-13">Reuters, “Iranian-made drone hits British air base in Cyprus” (RAF Akrotiri runway strike, limited damage), 2 March 2026. <a href="https://www.aol.com/articles/iranian-made-drone-hits-british-121630466.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.aol.com/articles/iranian-made-drone-hits-british-121630466.html</a> <a href="#fnref-13" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-14">Summary of the UK Government legal position: the legality of defensive action in respect of Iranian regional attacks, GOV.UK (10 Downing Street), March 2026. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/summary-of-the-uk-government-legal-position-the-legality-of-defensive-action-in-respect-of-iranian-regional-attacks" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/news/summary-of-the-uk-government-legal-position-the-legality-of-defensive-action-in-respect-of-iranian-regional-attacks</a> <a href="#fnref-14" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-15">CSIS, “How Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web Redefines Asymmetric Warfare” (117 drones; 40+ aircraft struck; some AI assisted guidance). <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare</a> <a href="#fnref-15" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-16">NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence Policy, 13 February 2025 (threat spectrum “from small… UASs to all types of cruise and ballistic missiles, including hypersonic”). <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_233084.htm" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_233084.htm</a> <a href="#fnref-16" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-17">Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 (c. 12), legislation.gov.uk. <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/12/contents/enacted" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/12/contents/enacted</a> <a href="#fnref-17" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-18">Explanatory Notes to the Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 (kinetic/jamming measures may amount to unlawful interference; amendment of s. 93 Police Act 1997). <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/12/pdfs/ukpgaen_20210012_en.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/12/pdfs/ukpgaen_20210012_en.pdf</a> <a href="#fnref-18" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-19">UK Civil Aviation Authority, “Remote ID (RID)” — Direct RID in force from 1 January 2026 for UK1, UK2, UK3, UK5 and UK6 drones; extension from 1 January 2028. <a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/drones/regulations-consultations-and-policy-programmes/policy-programmes/remote-id-rid/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.caa.co.uk/drones/regulations-consultations-and-policy-programmes/policy-programmes/remote-id-rid/</a> <a href="#fnref-19" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-20">Ofcom, “GPS jamming exercises” — operational use of a jammer is an offence under s. 68 Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006; Ofcom cannot authorise operational use. <a href="https://www.ofcom.org.uk/spectrum/frequencies/gps-jamming-exercises" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.ofcom.org.uk/spectrum/frequencies/gps-jamming-exercises</a> <a href="#fnref-20" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-21">DSIT, “Possession of radiofrequency jammers and the relevant legal framework” (call for evidence), GOV.UK, 2026. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/possession-of-radiofrequency-jammers-and-the-relevant-legal-framework/possession-of-radiofrequency-jammers-and-the-relevant-legal-framework" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/possession-of-radiofrequency-jammers-and-the-relevant-legal-framework/possession-of-radiofrequency-jammers-and-the-relevant-legal-framework</a> <a href="#fnref-21" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-22">ICRC, “FAQ: international humanitarian law and the use of drones in armed conflict” (distinction, proportionality, precaution). <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-humanitarian-law-drones-armed-conflict" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-humanitarian-law-drones-armed-conflict</a> <a href="#fnref-22" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
<li id="fn-23">NPSA, “Countering Threats from Uncrewed Aerial Systems — Making Your Site Ready”. <a href="https://www.npsa.gov.uk/resources/c-uas-making-your-site-ready" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.npsa.gov.uk/resources/c-uas-making-your-site-ready</a> <a href="#fnref-23" aria-label="Back to text">&#8617;</a></li>
</ol>
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<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/2673-2/"></a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
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		<title>Drones, Security, and the Law: Understanding the UK’s Counter-Drone Framework</title>
		<link>https://blakistons.co.uk/drones-security-and-the-law-understanding-the-uks-counter-drone-framework/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin.richard]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Nov 2024 09:11:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Counter-Drone Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wireless Telegraphy Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[airspace protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aviation safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counter-drone measures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone jamming]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[legal compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military drone threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ofcom licence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RAF Lakenheath]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blakistons.co.uk/?p=2522</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Drones, Security, and the Law: Understanding the UK’s Counter-Drone Framework By Richard Ryan, Drone &#038; Counter Drone Lawyer Drones have transformed industries, from agriculture to filmmaking, offering immense benefits. However, their misuse presents significant risks, including privacy violations, safety hazards, and national security threats. The UK&#8217;s legal framework, particularly the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, plays [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/drones-security-and-the-law-understanding-the-uks-counter-drone-framework/">Drones, Security, and the Law: Understanding the UK’s Counter-Drone Framework</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" src="https://blakistons.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/271124_Drones-Security-and-the-Law-Understanding-the-UKs-Counter-Drone-Framework-300x171.webp" alt="" width="300" height="171" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-2523" srcset="https://blakistons.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/271124_Drones-Security-and-the-Law-Understanding-the-UKs-Counter-Drone-Framework-300x171.webp 300w, https://blakistons.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/271124_Drones-Security-and-the-Law-Understanding-the-UKs-Counter-Drone-Framework-1024x585.webp 1024w, https://blakistons.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/271124_Drones-Security-and-the-Law-Understanding-the-UKs-Counter-Drone-Framework-768x439.webp 768w, https://blakistons.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/271124_Drones-Security-and-the-Law-Understanding-the-UKs-Counter-Drone-Framework-1536x878.webp 1536w, https://blakistons.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/271124_Drones-Security-and-the-Law-Understanding-the-UKs-Counter-Drone-Framework-600x343.webp 600w, https://blakistons.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/271124_Drones-Security-and-the-Law-Understanding-the-UKs-Counter-Drone-Framework.webp 1792w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></p>
<p><strong>Drones, Security, and the Law: Understanding the UK’s Counter-Drone Framework</strong></p>
<p><strong>By Richard Ryan, Drone &#038; Counter Drone Lawyer</strong></p>
<p>Drones have transformed industries, from agriculture to filmmaking, offering immense benefits. However, their misuse presents significant risks, including privacy violations, safety hazards, and national security threats. The UK&#8217;s legal framework, particularly the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, plays a critical role in managing these challenges, especially concerning the use of jamming devices to counter rogue drones.</p>
<p>Recent incidents, such as drone sightings near US airbases in Suffolk and Norfolk, underscore the importance of understanding these laws and their practical applications. Let’s delve into the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, licensing requirements, and how this legislation shapes counter-drone strategies.<br />
________________________________________<br />
<strong>The Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006: A Legal Cornerstone</strong></p>
<p>The Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 regulates the use of wireless equipment in the UK, including jamming devices designed to neutralise drones by disrupting their communication signals. It ensures the responsible use of the electromagnetic spectrum to prevent harmful interference with critical communications, including emergency services and air traffic control.<br />
General Prohibition on Jamming Without a Licence</p>
<p>Section 8(1) of the Act states:<br />
It is unlawful—<br />
(a) to establish or use a wireless telegraphy station, or<br />
(b) to install or use wireless telegraphy apparatus,<br />
except under and in accordance with a licence (a “wireless telegraphy licence”) granted under this section by Ofcom.<br />
This provision creates a blanket prohibition on jamming devices unless explicitly authorised by Ofcom, the UK’s communications regulator.</p>
<p>Why Is Jamming Restricted?<br />
The restrictions exist to:<br />
1.	Minimise Interference: Prevent disruptions to essential networks, including emergency services, air traffic control, and legitimate drone operators.<br />
2.	Ensure Safety: Avoid unintended consequences, such as causing drones to crash, endangering lives or property.<br />
3.	Protect Spectrum Integrity: Maintain efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum, preventing technical issues caused by unauthorised interference.<br />
________________________________________<br />
<strong>Licensing and Exemptions: The Path to Legal Use</strong></p>
<p>Licensing Requirements<br />
To use jamming technology legally, a licence from Ofcom is mandatory. Licences are typically granted only to:<br />
•	Law Enforcement Agencies: For public safety operations.<br />
•	The Military: For national defence and counter-terrorism efforts.<br />
•	High-Risk Sectors: Airports, energy plants, or critical infrastructure sites under strict regulatory oversight.</p>
<p>No Blanket Exemptions<br />
Section 8(3) of the Act allows Ofcom to exempt certain wireless apparatus from licensing. However, Section 8(5) explicitly excludes jamming devices from exemption due to their high potential for interference. Exempt devices must not:<br />
•	Endanger safety of life.<br />
•	Cause undue interference with wireless telegraphy.<br />
•	Adversely affect spectrum efficiency.<br />
Since jammers inherently disrupt wireless signals, they do not meet these criteria.<br />
________________________________________<br />
<strong>Proportionality and Transparency in Licensing</strong></p>
<p>Even when granted, licences for jamming devices must comply with principles outlined in Section 8(3B), ensuring:<br />
•	Objective Justification: Based on the specific risks posed by rogue drones.<br />
•	Proportionality: Countermeasures must align with the threat level.<br />
•	Transparency: Clear communication of licence terms to ensure non-discriminatory enforcement.<br />
For instance, a jamming licence for operations near airports must focus solely on mitigating rogue drones without disrupting legitimate communications or nearby authorised drone operations.<br />
________________________________________<br />
<strong>Practical Implications for Drone Jamming</strong></p>
<p>Private Individuals<br />
As a private individual, you cannot legally use jamming devices, even if a drone invades your privacy or trespasses on your property. Instead:<br />
•	Report the Incident: Contact the police or the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).<br />
•	Avoid Unauthorised Action: Deploying a jammer is a criminal offence under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006.</p>
<p>Organisations in High-Risk Sectors<br />
If you represent a high-risk organisation, such as an airport or energy facility, you may apply for a jamming licence. This requires:<br />
•	Demonstrating Necessity: Proving that detection systems alone are insufficient.<br />
•	Ensuring Compliance: Implementing safeguards to prevent collateral interference and safety risks.</p>
<p>Alternatives to Jamming<br />
If a licence is not feasible, alternatives include:<br />
•	Detection Systems: Radar, RF sensors, and other tools to identify and track drones.<br />
•	Physical Mitigation: Devices like nets or capture drones that neutralise rogue drones without disrupting their signals.<br />
________________________________________<br />
<strong>Recent Developments: Drones Over US Airbases</strong></p>
<p>The recent deployment of British troops to US airbases in Suffolk and Norfolk highlights the real-world implications of counter-drone law. Drones have been sighted near RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Feltwell, sparking concerns over a potential &#8220;sinister&#8221; plot, with Russian involvement not ruled out.<br />
The RAF has offered advanced counter-drone systems, including the &#8220;Ninja&#8221; and &#8220;Orcus,&#8221; which can jam and control rogue drones, forcing them to return to their origin or reroute safely. These incidents underscore the necessity of authorised and regulated counter-drone measures to address evolving threats.<br />
________________________________________<br />
<strong>Key Takeaways from the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006</strong></p>
<p>1.	Licensing is Essential: Section 8(1) prohibits the use of jamming devices without a licence from Ofcom.<br />
2.	No Exemptions for Jammers: Jamming devices inherently interfere with wireless signals and do not qualify for licensing exemptions.<br />
3.	Proportionality Matters: Licences are granted only for justified, targeted, and proportionate use.<br />
4.	Alternatives Exist: Detection systems and physical mitigation tools are viable options for those without licences.<br />
________________________________________<br />
<strong>Conclusion: Ensuring Compliance in Counter-Drone Operations</strong></p>
<p>The Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 ensures a balanced approach to counter-drone operations, prioritising safety, efficiency, and lawful use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Unauthorised jamming is not only illegal but can lead to significant penalties, including fines and imprisonment.</p>
<p>As a counter-drone lawyer, I assist clients in navigating this complex regulatory landscape, from applying for Ofcom licences to ensuring compliance with drone and counter-drone laws. For tailored advice on counter-drone measures or legal representation. Together, we can help secure the skies while safeguarding your rights and responsibilities.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/drones-security-and-the-law-understanding-the-uks-counter-drone-framework/">Drones, Security, and the Law: Understanding the UK’s Counter-Drone Framework</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
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