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Navigating UK SORA: A Drone Lawyer’s Guide to CAA Decision No. 60

admin.richard — Mon, 06 Jul 2026 09:53:17 +0000

Drone Law | UK SORA | CAA Regulation | AI Governance

Summary: CAA Decision No. 60 marks a significant development in the regulation of Specific category drone operations in the UK. Coming into force on 1 October 2026, it updates the UK SORA framework and introduces clearer expectations around compliance evidence, ground-risk mitigation, containment, kinetic energy analysis and evidence retention. For operators, the message is clear: compliance is no longer just a narrative safety case. It must be evidenced, retained and auditable.

1. Why Decision No. 60 Matters

The UK’s lower airspace is becoming increasingly complex. Beyond Visual Line of Sight operations, drone delivery, infrastructure inspection, emergency services use, autonomous routing and higher-risk commercial UAS activity all require a more mature regulatory framework.

CAA Decision No. 60 updates the Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for UK Regulation (EU) 2019/947. In practical terms, it strengthens the UK Specific Operation Risk Assessment, or UK SORA, for operators seeking authorisation in the Specific category.

The legal significance is that UK SORA is becoming a structured assurance methodology. Operators must not merely state that an operation is safe. They must demonstrate that the aircraft, procedures, people, operational volume, ground environment, airspace risks, mitigations and emergency arrangements meet the required level of safety.

2. UK SORA Is Not a Box-Ticking Exercise

UK SORA exists to support the operational risk assessment required for Specific category operations. It considers both ground risk and air risk, then applies mitigations and operational safety objectives according to the Specific Assurance and Integrity Level, or SAIL.

The updated framework is particularly important because it clarifies how operators must gather, present and retain compliance evidence. This is a move away from generalised operational assertions and towards aviation-grade documentation.

3. The Three Compliance Pathways

Decision No. 60 identifies three broad routes for demonstrating compliance.

Pathway	What It Means	Legal Significance
Declarative approach	The operator declares that it meets the relevant acceptable means of compliance.	Suitable for lower-risk requirements, but the declaration must still be accurate and supportable.
Agreed compliance basis	The operator and CAA agree in advance how compliance will be demonstrated.	Useful for novel or complex operations where evidence may include testing, analysis or design appraisal.
Compliance evidence approach	The operator submits both the compliance basis and the underlying evidence to the CAA.	The most rigorous route, likely to be required for higher-risk or technically complex operations.

Operators must also retain compliance evidence for the duration of the operational authorisation and for three years after operations under that authorisation cease. That evidence may become critical in a CAA audit, incident investigation, insurance dispute or civil claim.

4. Ground Risk: What Happens If the Drone Falls?

Ground risk is central to UK SORA. The law is concerned not only with whether the drone can fly, but with what happens if it fails. Decision No. 60 provides more detailed guidance on how operators may reduce ground risk.

Mitigation	Description	Key Legal Risk
M1A: Sheltering	Relying on people being inside structures.	The aircraft must not be capable of penetrating the relevant structures.
M1B: Operational restrictions	Operating at times or in areas where fewer uninvolved people are present.	Population assumptions must be evidenced and realistic.
M1C: Ground observation	Using observers or technical systems to detect uninvolved people.	Detection capability, observer competence and response procedures must be credible.
M2: Impact mitigation	Reducing impact energy through parachutes, flight termination or design features.	Deployment reliability, minimum altitude, failure modes and secondary hazards must be addressed.

5. Kinetic Energy and Penetration Risk

Decision No. 60 gives particular importance to kinetic energy. This matters because it converts safety claims into measurable injury-risk analysis.

Kinetic Energy	Risk Category	Operator Requirement
Up to 175 joules	Lower hazard	Generally less demanding penetration analysis, subject to the operational context.
175 to 7,000 joules	Medium hazard	Penetration analysis should be conducted against representative structures.
Over 7,000 joules	High hazard	More rigorous evidence is required, potentially including crashworthiness analysis and structural modelling.

Operators should not rely on generic manufacturer statements. They need platform-specific evidence: mass, velocity, terminal impact behaviour, parachute performance, battery fire risk and representative structural analysis.

6. Containment and Fly-Away Risk

Containment is a central pillar of the updated UK SORA framework. It asks whether the unmanned aircraft can be kept within its operational volume and ground risk buffer, even after failure or loss of control.

For lower-risk operations, containment may be assessed qualitatively through design appraisal and procedural evidence. For higher-risk operations, the CAA may expect quantitative probability targets, such as demonstrating that the probability of exiting the relevant volume or buffer is below specified thresholds per flight hour.

Containment evidence may include geo-caging, tethering, independent flight termination systems, lost-link logic, command-and-control resilience, navigation integrity, power-system independence and emergency procedures.

7. EU AI Act and UK AI Standards

Decision No. 60 is not an AI regulation. However, many modern drone operations increasingly rely on AI-enabled functions, including detect-and-avoid, automated route planning, computer vision, landing assistance, ground-person detection, predictive maintenance and autonomous contingency management.

The EU AI Act is relevant as a benchmark for risk management, technical documentation, record-keeping, transparency, human oversight, robustness and cybersecurity. The UK does not currently have a single equivalent UK AI Act. Instead, it follows a sector-led, principles-based model based on safety, security and robustness; transparency and explainability; fairness; accountability and governance; and contestability and redress.

UK SORA Issue	AI Governance Standard	Practical Evidence
Operational risk assessment	Lifecycle risk management	Hazard log, AI failure-mode analysis, operating design domain and residual-risk register.
Compliance evidence	Technical documentation	Version-controlled technical file, test reports, software release notes and design appraisals.
Ground observation	Accuracy and human oversight	Detection metrics, false-negative analysis, lighting limits and observer escalation procedures.
Containment	Robustness and cybersecurity	Geo-cage testing, lost-link logic, GNSS spoofing assessment and command-link resilience.
Evidence retention	Record-keeping and auditability	Flight logs, telemetry, AI outputs, incident reviews and corrective actions.

8. Data Protection and Surveillance Risk

Many Specific category operations involve cameras, thermal imaging, mapping payloads or AI-enabled object recognition. UK SORA primarily addresses safety, but operators must also consider privacy, data protection and surveillance risk.

If cameras or AI systems detect uninvolved persons, personal data may be captured, stored or analysed. Operators may need a data protection impact assessment, retention limits, access controls, privacy notices and clear rules on secondary use.

9. What Operators Should Do Before 1 October 2026

Operators should review their safety cases and evidence packs now. In particular, they should check:

Aircraft mass, speed, kinetic energy and terminal velocity;
Ground-risk assumptions and population-density evidence;
Sheltering, operational restriction and observation claims;
Parachute, flight termination and impact mitigation evidence;
Containment evidence, including geo-caging and lost-link logic;
AI-enabled functions, including detect-and-avoid and automated decision-support tools;
Evidence retention systems;
Supplier contracts for access to technical data.

10. Bottom Line

CAA Decision No. 60 marks a shift from descriptive drone safety cases to structured assurance. Operators must now be able to prove their safety claims through coherent, retained and auditable evidence.

The most important development is the convergence between aviation safety and AI governance. UK SORA asks whether the drone operation is safe. The EU AI Act and UK AI principles ask whether automated systems are risk-managed, documented, robust, explainable, secure and subject to human oversight. For modern drone operations, those are increasingly the same question.

Compliance is not what the operator says it does. Compliance is what the operator can prove.

About the Author

Richard Ryan is a barrister, Chartered Arbitrator and specialist in drone law, aviation regulation and artificial intelligence. He advises operators, manufacturers and public bodies on UK CAA regulation, UK SORA, BVLOS operations, AI governance and commercial drone operations. He is currently undertaking a PhD at Cranfield University researching the legal framework for autonomous aviation and future airspace integration.

This article is general legal commentary and does not constitute legal advice.

The post Navigating UK SORA: A Drone Lawyer’s Guide to CAA Decision No. 60 appeared first on Blakistons.

admin.richard — Wed, 03 Jun 2026 16:49:56 +0000

White Paper

Beyond 2019

A New Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy for the United Kingdom, After Ukraine and Iran

By Mr Richard Ryan, Barrister, Blakiston’s Chambers · June 2026

Status and method. This paper relies on primary and official sources, supplemented by reputable reporting for incident chronology. All facts are verified as at 2 June 2026. Battlefield figures drawn from active conflict reporting are attributed to their originating source and presented as attributed claims rather than judicially established fact. The paper contains no classified or privileged material. All footnote links are live.

The United Kingdom’s published national counter drone policy; the UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, presented to Parliament as Command Paper 187 on 21 October 2019^[1]; is materially out of date as a strategic document. It remains the only published national strategy in the field for the whole of government, yet it is now approximately six years and seven months old, and roughly three and a half years beyond its own planning horizon.

The strategy was sound for its time. It identified the highest harm illegal uses of small drones; terrorism, smuggling into prisons, disruption of critical national infrastructure; and prescribed layered intervention, industry standards, responder powers and public education.^[2] But it was expressly confined to malicious and illegal use of small aerial drones, in a domestic policing and protective security frame. That frame has been overtaken by operational reality in Ukraine and the Iranian theatre: massed one way attack drones, combined drone and missile salvos, container and special forces launch, dense electronic warfare, fibre optic command links and AI assisted guidance now define the threat.

Subsequent UK documents do not update the 2019 strategy; they work around it. The Defence Drone Strategy (2024),^[3] the Strategic Defence Review 2025,^[4] NPSA’s site specific guidance,^[5] and the Ministry of Defence’s 2026 pursuit of new defeat powers at military sites^[6] together form a patchwork of sectoral adaptations laid over an unrevised core. This paper argues that the 2019 strategy should be retired as a standalone statement and replaced by an integrated Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy, supported by a consolidated legal code for detection, disruption and defeat, and by an annual ministerial statement to Parliament.

1. The threat has become a strategic mass system

The central lesson of 2024–2026 is not that drones have become more common but that they have become a strategic mass system — a consumable class of munition and sensor used for saturation, decoying, attrition of intelligence assets, target acquisition and the deliberate erosion of a defender’s cost exchange ratio. On the night of 2 June 2026, Ukraine’s air force reported that Russia had launched 656 drones and 73 missiles in a single overnight barrage, of which 602 drones and 40 missiles were downed or suppressed.^[7]^[8] Single salvos now routinely exceed several hundred drones.

Critical infrastructure has been directly affected. In February 2025 a Russian Geran-2 (Shahed type) drone struck the New Safe Confinement over Chornobyl’s reactor four;^[9] by December 2025 the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that the structure had lost its primary safety functions, including confinement.^[10] In May 2026 a drone strike caused a fire at an electrical generator on the perimeter of the United Arab Emirates’ Barakah nuclear plant; a civilian reactor site; leaving one unit running on emergency diesel generators.^[11]^[12]

The homeland and deployed force dimension is now concrete for the United Kingdom. In early March 2026 a Shahed type drone struck a runway at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus; a British Sovereign Base Area; causing limited damage,^[13] and the UK flew defensive sorties and, where requested, acted in the collective self defence of regional allies.^[14] Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web (June 2025) had already shown that 117 first person view drones launched from concealed truck borne containers could strike strategic bomber bases far from any front line, damaging more than 40 aircraft, with some guidance reportedly AI assisted.^[15]

A necessary qualification

Not every battlefield lesson maps to the British mainland. The most credible open analysis holds that long range Shahed type strikes on Great Britain would face high attrition because of geography and warning time, while shorter range drones launched from containers or by hostile special forces remain a credible risk to high value assets at home. The policy implication is to discriminate between vectors; not to import foreign assumptions wholesale, and not to dismiss the threat. A refreshed strategy should say so candidly.

2. Why the 2019 strategy can no longer stand alone

2019 provision	Current reality	Assessment
Focus on the highest harm illegal use of small aerial drones in the UK.	Concern now extends to defence sites, CNI in crisis or conflict, and state launched drones and missiles.	Too narrow as a national frame.
Short planning horizon from 2019.	Document is c. 6.6 years old; NPSA requires regular review because methods change quickly.	Formally stale; refresh overdue.
Empower police and responders.	MoD now seeks its own defeat powers at Defence sites because police only authorities are inadequate.	Institutionally outdated.
Aerial drones only.	New Defence policy extends to land and maritime uncrewed systems.	Conceptually outdated.
Counter drone as a discrete problem.	NATO now treats small UAS through hypersonic missiles as one integrated air and missile defence continuum.^[16]	The silo is no longer tenable.

The clearest institutional signal came in February 2026, when the Ministry of Defence reported 266 drone incidents near UK military sites during 2025 (up from 126 in 2024) and sought fresh statutory powers through the Armed Forces Bill; extending beyond aerial drones to land and maritime systems; to allow Defence personnel to defeat drones at their own sites without waiting for police intervention.^[6] When the armed forces must legislate around a framework built for policing to protect their own bases, that framework has expired.

3. The legal framework: developed, but fragmented

Domestic powers have expanded since 2019 but remain complex. The Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 created bespoke constabulary powers to ground, stop, search, inspect and seize unmanned aircraft, and amended section 93 of the Police Act 1997 to facilitate authorisations for certain counter drone measures.^[17]^[18] In the civil regime, the Civil Aviation Authority’s Direct Remote ID requirements came into force on 1 January 2026 for UK1, UK2, UK3, UK5 and UK6 class drones, with extension to most drones carrying a camera from 1 January 2028.^[19]

Yet lawful defeat is markedly harder than detection. Operational use of a jammer is generally an offence under section 68 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, and Ofcom has no power to authorise operational use; only narrow trial and research licences in shielded conditions.^[20] Government is separately examining the enforcement framework around jammers.^[21] Kinetic or electronic interference may amount to unlawful property or wireless interference absent proper authorisation; the Act’s own explanatory notes acknowledge as much. Techniques that take over a drone by software may engage the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and sensing engages the Data Protection Act 2018, the UK GDPR and the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires the state both to protect life from foreseeable threats and to keep its sensing and defeat measures necessary and proportionate. A lawful defeat chain is a designed legal artefact, not an improvisation.

Overseas action sits within international law. The Government’s March 2026 legal position on Iranian regional attacks invoked the collective self defence of allies under Article 51 of the UN Charter, subject to necessity and proportionality and Security Council notification.^[14] Once in armed conflict, drones attract no special category: they are governed by the ordinary rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution applicable to all weapons.^[22]

4. Recommendations

The Government should replace the 2019 strategy with a new instrument covering the whole of government. Five propositions should anchor it:

Integrate, do not append. A single Counter Uncrewed Systems and Air Threat Resilience Strategy spanning the Home Office, MoD, Cabinet Office resilience, CAA, Ofcom, NPSA, the intelligence community, prisons and CNI operators, aligned to NATO’s integrated air and missile defence framework.^[16]
Consolidate the law. A statutory code (or, at minimum, statutory guidance) defining who may detect, disrupt and defeat uncrewed systems, where, against which threat category, under what authorisation, with what recording and what review after an incident — differentiating urban areas, prisons, airports, defence sites and overseas operations.
Adopt a layered baseline that is alert to cost. Use NPSA’s site specific, threat informed model as the national spine,^[23] plugging into a wider air and missile defence architecture for higher end threats, and prioritising defeat options that are low in collateral, deep in magazine and economically rational. A missile fired at every cheap drone is not a strategy; it is a budgetary confession.
Treat industry and export control as readiness. Link procurement, export licensing, sanctions intelligence and sovereign industrial strategy, with secure by design and open architecture requirements across C-UAS procurement. A state that cannot source the components of its own counter drone systems is not strategically autonomous.
Compliance and oversight by design. Require a written legal basis, data minimisation, retention limits and human oversight for every C-UAS deployment by a public authority; subject identification by AI to documented necessity and a review of error rates; and provide Parliament an annual ministerial statement on C-UAS powers, deployments, tests, safety incidents, rights compliance and lessons learned, with NPSA and the ICO involved where domestic surveillance is concerned.

5. Conclusion

None of this discards the 2019 strategy’s best inheritance; its insistence on layered intervention over an optimism founded on gadgets, an instinct NPSA’s later guidance has only reinforced.^[5] The task is not to repudiate 2019 but to lift its sound protective security spine into an architecture wide enough for the threat that now exists: a spectrum of low cost, autonomous and electronically contested uncrewed systems, ranging from nuisance to war. The 2019 strategy answered the question of its decade. It is time to ask the question of this one.

About the author. Mr Richard Ryan is a barrister of Blakiston’s Chambers..

Footnotes & sources (23)

UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, CP 187, presented to Parliament 21 October 2019 (GOV.UK). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-counter-unmanned-aircraft-strategy ↩
UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy (HTML version), GOV.UK, published 21 October 2019. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-counter-unmanned-aircraft-strategy/table ↩
Defence Drone Strategy — the UK’s approach to Defence Uncrewed Systems, GOV.UK, published 22 February 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-drone-strategy-the-uks-approach-to-defence-uncrewed-systems/defence-drone-strategy-the-uks-approach-to-defence-uncrewed-systems ↩
The Strategic Defence Review 2025 — Making Britain Safer, GOV.UK, published 2 June 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad ↩
NPSA, “Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS)” specialised guidance. https://www.npsa.gov.uk/specialised-guidance/uncrewed-aerial-systems/counter-uncrewed-aerial-systems-c-uas ↩
Ministry of Defence, “New powers for Defence personnel to defeat drones following doubling of incidents near bases” (266 incidents in 2025, up from 126), GOV.UK, 2 February 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-powers-for-defence-personnel-to-defeat-drones-following-doubling-of-incidents-near-bases ↩
“Russia launched 656 drones and 73 missiles” — figures attributed to the Ukrainian Air Force; CBS News, 2 June 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ukraine-war-major-attacks-missile-drone-kill-several-wound-dozens/ ↩
NPR, “Russian attack on Ukraine kills at least 14”, 2 June 2026 (corroborating launch and interception figures). https://www.npr.org/2026/06/02/nx-s1-5844071/russian-attack-ukraine ↩
Chornobyl New Safe Confinement struck by a Geran-2 (Shahed type) drone, 14 February 2025: Greenpeace Ukraine mission report, 20 March 2025. https://www.greenpeace.org/ukraine/en/news/3504/fifty-percent-of-north-roof-structure-of-chornobyl-new-safe-confinement-shelter-severely-damaged/ ↩
IAEA assessment (December 2025) that the New Safe Confinement had lost its primary safety functions, including confinement (reported via United24/Reuters). https://united24media.com/latest-news/iaea-chornobyls-new-safe-confinement-can-no-longer-contain-radiation-after-russian-drone-attack-14067 ↩
Drone strike causing a generator fire at the UAE’s Barakah nuclear plant, 17 May 2026: Al Jazeera, 17 May 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/17/drone-strike-sparks-fire-at-uaes-barakah-nuclear-power-plant ↩
NPR, “Drone strikes UAE nuclear plant”, 18 May 2026 (IAEA: one reactor on emergency diesel generators). https://www.npr.org/2026/05/18/g-s1-122534/drone-strikes-uae-nuclear-plant ↩
Reuters, “Iranian-made drone hits British air base in Cyprus” (RAF Akrotiri runway strike, limited damage), 2 March 2026. https://www.aol.com/articles/iranian-made-drone-hits-british-121630466.html ↩
Summary of the UK Government legal position: the legality of defensive action in respect of Iranian regional attacks, GOV.UK (10 Downing Street), March 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/summary-of-the-uk-government-legal-position-the-legality-of-defensive-action-in-respect-of-iranian-regional-attacks ↩
CSIS, “How Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web Redefines Asymmetric Warfare” (117 drones; 40+ aircraft struck; some AI assisted guidance). https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-ukraines-spider-web-operation-redefines-asymmetric-warfare ↩
NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence Policy, 13 February 2025 (threat spectrum “from small… UASs to all types of cruise and ballistic missiles, including hypersonic”). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_233084.htm ↩
Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 (c. 12), legislation.gov.uk. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/12/contents/enacted ↩
Explanatory Notes to the Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 (kinetic/jamming measures may amount to unlawful interference; amendment of s. 93 Police Act 1997). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/12/pdfs/ukpgaen_20210012_en.pdf ↩
UK Civil Aviation Authority, “Remote ID (RID)” — Direct RID in force from 1 January 2026 for UK1, UK2, UK3, UK5 and UK6 drones; extension from 1 January 2028. https://www.caa.co.uk/drones/regulations-consultations-and-policy-programmes/policy-programmes/remote-id-rid/ ↩
Ofcom, “GPS jamming exercises” — operational use of a jammer is an offence under s. 68 Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006; Ofcom cannot authorise operational use. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/spectrum/frequencies/gps-jamming-exercises ↩
DSIT, “Possession of radiofrequency jammers and the relevant legal framework” (call for evidence), GOV.UK, 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/possession-of-radiofrequency-jammers-and-the-relevant-legal-framework/possession-of-radiofrequency-jammers-and-the-relevant-legal-framework ↩
ICRC, “FAQ: international humanitarian law and the use of drones in armed conflict” (distinction, proportionality, precaution). https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-humanitarian-law-drones-armed-conflict ↩
NPSA, “Countering Threats from Uncrewed Aerial Systems — Making Your Site Ready”. https://www.npsa.gov.uk/resources/c-uas-making-your-site-ready ↩

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How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean

admin.richard — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 18:28:20 +0000

By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer

How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft — and what the defence carve-outs really mean.

In Brief…

Purely military AI systems are out of scope of the EU AI Act. If an AI system is developed or used exclusively for military/defence or national-security purposes, the Act does not apply. (EUR-Lex)
Dual-use is different. If the same autonomy stack, sensors or models are marketed or used for civilian purposes in the EU (for example, civil UAS, border or law-enforcement tasks), the Act can apply — with stringent duties for “high-risk” systems. (EUR-Lex)
Real-world testing is regulated. Pre-market R&D is generally excluded, but real-world testing isn’t — it requires specific safeguards and registration. (EUR-Lex)
Foundation models (GPAI) have their own rules from 2 Aug 2025; the defence carve-out in the Act is written for AI systems, not explicitly for models. If a model is placed on the EU market generally, the provider’s GPAI obligations can still bite. (EUR-Lex)

Context: sUAS News reports that GA-ASI is showcasing its autonomous fighter portfolio (for example, YFQ-42A CCA, MQ-20 Avenger) at the International Fighter Conference in Rome, 4–6 Nov 2025. This post overlays that scenario with the EU AI Act’s rules.

1) First principles: When does the EU AI Act apply?

The Act has extraterritorial reach. It covers (i) providers and deployers in the EU, (ii) providers placing on the EU market or putting systems into service in the EU — even if they are not established here — and (iii) providers/deployers in third countries where the AI system’s output is used in the EU. (EUR-Lex)

However, Article 2(3) draws a bright line: the Act does not apply to AI systems used exclusively for military, defence or national security. It also does not apply where a system is not placed on the EU market but its output is used in the EU exclusively for those purposes. Recital 24 reiterates this and clarifies that non-defence use falls back under the Act. (EUR-Lex)

What this means in Rome:

A closed, defence-only showcase for European militaries: out of scope.
A civil-use pitch, civil flight trials, or plans to sell autonomy modules to EU civilian buyers: in scope (see the high-risk section below). (EUR-Lex)

2) The key defence carve-outs (and their limits)

Carve-out #1 — Defence/military:

“This Regulation shall not apply to AI systems … used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes.” (Article 2(3))

Two important nuances:

Exclusivity matters. The moment an autonomy stack or sensor suite is also marketed or used for civilian or law-enforcement tasks, the defence exclusion no longer shields those non-defence uses. (EUR-Lex)
Models vs systems. The text explicitly excludes AI systems for defence; it does not create an explicit defence exclusion for general-purpose AI models. If a GPAI model is placed on the EU market, Chapter V obligations for model providers can still apply — even if one downstream customer is a defence user. (More on GPAI below.) (EUR-Lex)

Carve-out #2 — Pre-market R&D:
R&D before placing on the market is generally outside scope, but real-world testing is not. Testing in real-world conditions triggers a dedicated regime (for example, registration, time limits, informed consent or special conditions for law enforcement, incident reporting). (EUR-Lex)

Carve-out #3 — Emergency derogations (non-defence):
For exceptional public-security reasons (or imminent threats to life/health), market surveillance authorities can authorise temporary use of a high-risk AI system before full conformity assessment — subject to strict conditions. Law-enforcement or civil-protection bodies can also use in urgent cases, then seek authorisation without undue delay. This is not a defence-specific carve-out, but it explains emergency deployments outside the military context. (EUR-Lex)

3) If the defence exclusion doesn’t apply, would autonomous fighters tech be “high-risk”?

Very likely yes — for civil variants or dual-use spin-outs:

Annex I (product-safety route). AI that is a safety component of products covered by sectoral EU safety laws is high-risk where those products need third-party conformity assessment. That list explicitly includes EU civil aviation law (Reg. 2018/1139) — covering unmanned aircraft and their remotely controllable equipment. In a civil-UAS configuration, an autonomy stack acting as a safety component would be regulated as high-risk. (EUR-Lex)
Annex III (stand-alone uses). Separate “high-risk” buckets also capture, for example, remote biometric identification and other sensitive functions (if and where permitted by Union/national law), critical infrastructure safety components, and more. If a fighter-born sensing suite were repurposed for civil border surveillance or public-space identification, you quickly hit these Annex III categories. (EUR-Lex)

What “high-risk” demands in practice
Providers must implement a risk-management system, data governance, technical documentation, logging, transparency/instructions, human oversight, and accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity — then pass conformity assessment, issue an EU Declaration of Conformity, and affix CE marking. Deployers also carry duties (for example, monitoring, data relevance, user notification in some cases). (EUR-Lex)

4) Sensors on show: what about face recognition and other “red lines”?

The EU bans several AI practices outright (from 2 Feb 2025), including:

Untargeted scraping of facial images to build recognition databases.
Biometric categorisation inferring sensitive traits (for example, race, political opinions, religion).
Emotion recognition in workplaces or schools (with narrow safety/medical exceptions).
Predictive “risk assessments” of criminality based solely on personality traits/profiling.
Real-time remote biometric identification (RBI) in public spaces for law enforcement — unless strictly authorised and necessary for narrowly defined objectives (for example, locating a specific suspect in serious crimes, preventing a specific imminent threat, finding missing persons), with prior judicial/independent approval and registration. (EUR-Lex)

Implication for a trade-show demo: training a camera on attendees to test real-time RBI in a public venue would likely be unlawful unless those strict law-enforcement exceptions and procedural safeguards apply — which they typically will not at a commercial defence conference. (EUR-Lex)

5) Real-world testing in the EU (civil or dual-use variants)

If a provider runs real-world flight tests in the EU (outside the defence exclusion), the Act requires — among other things — registration, an EU-established entity or EU legal representative, limits on duration (normally up to six months, extendable once), rules on informed consent (with special handling for law-enforcement tests), qualified oversight, and the ability to reverse/ignore the system’s outputs. Serious incidents must be reported promptly. (EUR-Lex)

6) Foundation models (GPAI): obligations can still attach

From 2 Aug 2025, Chapter V sets baseline transparency and copyright-policy duties for providers of general-purpose AI models (with extra obligations if the model presents systemic risks). The defence exclusion in Article 2(3) is framed for AI systems, not models. So, if a foundation model is placed on the EU market, the model provider can have obligations even if a downstream customer is a defence prime. (Open-source specifics and systemic-risk thresholds also apply.) (EUR-Lex)

7) Timelines you need in Rome (as of 6 Nov 2025)

Entry into force: 1 Aug 2024 (20 days after OJ publication).
Prohibited practices + core chapters (I–II): apply from 2 Feb 2025.
GPAI rules (Chapter V), plus other chapters (III §4, VII, XII, and Article 78): apply from 2 Aug 2025.
General application: 2 Aug 2026 (high-risk regime starts to bite broadly).
Article 6(1) Annex III classification trigger & related obligations: 2 Aug 2027. (EUR-Lex)

8) Enforcement and penalties

Violating prohibited practices (Article 5) can draw fines up to €35m or 7% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.
Other operator obligations can reach €15m or 3%; supplying misleading information can reach €7.5m or 1% (SMEs benefit from caps). Separate fine scales apply to EU institutions. (EUR-Lex)

9) Practical playbook for IFC attendees

If you are a defence OEM showing autonomy stacks:

Map uses: Defence-only (excluded) vs any civil or law-enforcement pathways (potentially in scope). Document the exclusivity of defence deployments if you rely on the carve-out. (EUR-Lex)
GPAI suppliers: If you place a foundation model on the EU market, expect Chapter V duties regardless of defence customers. (EUR-Lex)
No RBI demos on the show floor. Those prohibitions already apply in 2025. (EUR-Lex)
Planning EU flight tests for civil variants? Prepare for real-world testing conditions (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (EUR-Lex)
For civil UAS commercialisation, treat your autonomy as high-risk (EASA product-safety route), budget time for conformity assessment and CE marking. (EUR-Lex)

If you are a European ministry or agency:

Distinguish military operations (out of scope) from law-enforcement or border uses (in scope; watch RBI limits and high-risk duties). Consider Article 46 emergency derogations only in exceptional and documented cases. (EUR-Lex)

If you are a civil UAS integrator:

Expect the full high-risk package (risk management, data governance, human oversight, cybersecurity, logs, conformity assessment, CE). Build compliance into your system architecture, ML pipelines, safety cases, and ops manuals from day one. (EUR-Lex)

10) Quick decision pathway

Is the use exclusively defence or national security?
Yes: AI system is out of scope.
No: continue. (EUR-Lex)
Is it a civil product or law-enforcement/border use?
Civil product with safety function (for example, civil UAS): High-risk via Annex I ? conformity assessment + CE. (EUR-Lex)
Stand-alone sensitive use (for example, RBI, critical infrastructure): Annex III high-risk or Article 5 prohibition applies. (EUR-Lex)
Is there a GPAI model being placed on the EU market?
Yes: Chapter V duties for model providers from 2 Aug 2025, separate from the defence carve-out for systems. (EUR-Lex)
Is this pre-market testing?
Real-world testing rules apply (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (EUR-Lex)

Bottom line for “Autonomous Fighters in Rome”

A military-only display of GA-ASI’s autonomous fighters is outside the AI Act.
Any civil spin-off (cargo drones, civil surveillance, airport ops) or law-enforcement application in the EU will trigger the Act — often at the high-risk level — together with tight prohibitions around biometric uses in public spaces. Plan your compliance architecture accordingly. (EUR-Lex)

This article is informational and not legal advice. Citations are to the Official Journal text of the Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) for scope (Art. 2), prohibitions (Art. 5), high-risk regime (Ch. III), real-world testing (Arts. 57–61), GPAI (Ch. V incl. Art. 53), timelines (Art. 113), and penalties (Art. 99–101).

About the author — Richard Ryan

Richard Ryan is a UK barrister (Direct Access), mediator and Chartered Arbitrator (FCIArb), and a Bencher of Gray’s Inn. He practises across defence, aerospace, construction, engineering and commodities, with a leading specialism in drone and counter-drone law, unmanned aviation regulation, and AI-enabled safety and compliance. Richard advises government, primes and operators on EU/UK UAS frameworks, BVLOS, U-space/UTM and the EU AI Act. He leads Blakiston’s Chambers and contributes regularly to industry guidance and policy consultations.

The post How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean appeared first on Blakistons.

What the UK Drone Industry Can Learn from EASA’s Adoption of SORA 2.5

admin.richard — Tue, 30 Sep 2025 10:57:46 +0000

By Richard Ryan, Barrister & Drone Lawyer •
30th September 2025

Introduction

On 29 September 2025, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published ED Decision 2025/018/R, updating the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947. This update introduces the European version of the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) 2.5, developed by the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS).

Although the UK has left the EU regulatory framework, these developments are highly relevant. UK operators, manufacturers, and regulators can learn much from how EASA is simplifying compliance, clarifying roles, and promoting harmonisation across Member States.

What Changed under SORA 2.5?

Simplification of procedures: Ambiguities from earlier SORA versions have been removed, making it easier for operators and authorities to understand their obligations.
Clarity of roles: Responsibilities are now more clearly divided between operators, designers, and manufacturers. For example, design verification reports (DVRs) from EASA are required at SAIL IV, and type certification is required at SAIL V and VI.
Terminology alignment: EU-specific terms replace JARUS wording. For instance, “EVLOS” has been dropped in favour of “BVLOS with airspace observer”.
Containment requirements: Refined criteria for ground risk buffers and adjacent ground areas, particularly relevant for BVLOS and urban operations.
Flexibility for competent authorities: NAAs can use direct assessment, recognised entities, or qualified entities to review compliance.
Removal of weak cybersecurity rules: EASA stripped out JARUS’s cybersecurity provisions, deeming them disproportionate, but stressed that vulnerability assessments remain best practice.

Lessons for the UK CAA

Consistency and clarity – EASA has responded to industry feedback by clarifying operator versus manufacturer responsibilities. The UK’s guidance could benefit from similar precision, particularly in BVLOS authorisations.
Streamlining approvals – The two-phase SORA process (Phase 1 for risk identification, Phase 2 for compliance evidence) allows operators to obtain early regulatory feedback. This approach could make the UK’s OSC process faster and more predictable.
Population density mapping – EASA now recommends more accurate, dynamic maps to avoid over- or under-estimating risk in commercial and recreational areas. The UK could adopt a similar model, especially for urban drone delivery corridors.
Terminology alignment – Dropping “EVLOS” in favour of “BVLOS with AO” reflects operational reality and removes confusion. The UK should consider whether maintaining unique terminology helps or hinders international harmonisation.
Cybersecurity gap – By removing JARUS’s rules but encouraging vulnerability assessments, EASA has left space for proportionate, risk-based security. The CAA could similarly mandate cybersecurity risk assessments in line with wider aviation resilience standards.

Best Practice for UK Drone Pilots and Operators

Adopt SORA 2.5 methodology voluntarily – Even though the UK hasn’t formally adopted it, operators preparing risk assessments will benefit from aligning with European standards, especially if seeking approvals abroad.
Keep clear records – Maintain compliance matrices and comprehensive safety portfolios (CSPs) as outlined in SORA 2.5. This not only supports OSC applications but also protects operators in audits and insurance claims.
Use accurate population data – Don’t rely solely on outdated maps; supplement with local knowledge, real-time data, or site surveys to avoid underestimating risk.
Plan robust contingency procedures – Ensure abnormal and emergency procedures are well defined, tested, and rehearsed with crew. The new focus on containment means that “fly-away” risks must be demonstrably controlled.
Stay ahead on cybersecurity – Even though not mandated, conduct vulnerability assessments for command-and-control links and data storage. Cyber weaknesses could undermine insurance and liability cover.

Conclusion

EASA’s adoption of SORA 2.5 is a significant step towards regulatory clarity and harmonisation across Europe. The UK CAA should take note: simplifying authorisations, clarifying roles, and embracing proportionate risk-based approaches would strengthen the UK’s position as a leader in drone regulation.

For operators and pilots, the message is clear: best practice means anticipating international standards, not just meeting the minimum domestic requirement.

At Blakiston’s Chambers we advise drone operators, manufacturers, and service providers on all aspects of UK drone law, including airspace rights, regulatory compliance, and litigation risk. If your business is concerned about trespass or overflight liability, our team can help.

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Military Drones and AI Regulation: A UK Drone Lawyer’s Perspective

admin.richard — Tue, 07 Jan 2025 13:29:44 +0000

Military Drones and AI Regulation: A UK Drone Lawyer’s Perspective

By Richard Ryan, UK Drone Lawyer

On 7 January 2025, The Guardian published an article highlighting the British AI consultancy Faculty AI’s involvement in the development of drone technology for defence clients, prompting renewed questions about where legal, ethical, and regulatory boundaries should lie for AI-driven military applications.
Faculty AI, already prominent for its work with various UK government departments (including the NHS and the Department for Education) and advisory services for the AI Safety Institute (AISI), has reportedly developed and deployed AI models on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for military purposes. Although it remains unclear whether these drones are intended for lethal operations, the revelations have amplified concerns about how best to regulate or restrict the use of AI in weapon systems.
Below, I explore the key legal issues and examine how the recently adopted EU AI Act—as well as the evolving UK regulatory framework—may shape the future of this sector.
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1. Faculty AI’s Defence Work: A Brief Overview
1.1 Government and Public Sector Ties
Faculty AI, known for its work with the Vote Leave campaign in 2016, was later engaged by Dominic Cummings to provide data analytics during the pandemic. Since then, it has won multiple government contracts worth at least £26.6m, extending its work into healthcare (via the NHS), education, and policy consulting with the AISI on frontier AI safety.
1.2 UAV Development
The Guardian reports that Faculty AI has experience in deploying AI models on UAVs. Its partner firm, Hadean, indicated that the two companies collaborated on subject identification, tracking objects in movement, and exploring swarm deployment. While Faculty states that it aims to create “safer, more robust solutions”, details on whether these drones might be capable of lethal autonomous targeting remain undisclosed.
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2. The EU AI Act: A New Regulatory Milestone
2.1 Status of the EU AI Act
Introduced by the European Commission in 2021 as a proposed regulation, the EU AI Act has since been adopted via the EU’s legislative process. As of early 2025, it is recognised as a binding regulation designed to harmonise AI rules across all EU Member States. Although the UK is no longer part of the EU, any UK-based company offering AI products or services within the EU must ensure compliance with the regulation’s requirements.
2.2 Risk-Tiered Framework
The EU AI Act operates on a tiered risk basis:
• Unacceptable risk: Certain AI applications (e.g., social scoring) are outright banned.
• High risk: This category includes critical infrastructure, healthcare, and—potentially—defence-related AI systems that could significantly affect people’s safety or fundamental rights. Such systems must meet strict transparency, oversight, and data governance requirements.
• Limited or minimal risk: These uses are subject to fewer obligations, generally focused on transparency (e.g., disclosing AI usage to end users).
For high-risk AI in military contexts, the EU AI Act demands robust human oversight, thorough documentation, and strict compliance obligations, particularly around accountability and the prevention of harm.
2.3 Potential Impact on Military Drones
While national security and defence largely remain the prerogative of individual EU Member States, the EU AI Act’s principles can still influence how companies and governments view the development of autonomous or semi-autonomous drones. Key considerations include:
• Transparent Data and Design: Documenting data sets, development processes, and operational parameters.
• Human in the Loop: Ensuring a human operator is always able to override or intervene in the AI’s decision-making. Other terms such as Human on the Loop and Human outside the Loop are also referred to.
• Liability and Penalties: Breaches can incur hefty fines—up to 6% of global turnover—thus acting as a significant deterrent against unethical or unlawful AI deployment.
________________________________________
3. The UK’s Approach to AI Regulation and Military Drones
3.1 Divergence from the EU?
Post-Brexit, the UK has chosen a “pro-innovation” approach to AI regulation. Rather than adopting a single, all-encompassing statute akin to the EU AI Act, the UK is implementing a sector-by-sector and risk-based strategy, guided by existing regulators such as the Information Commissioner’s Office and the Competition and Markets Authority.
3.2 AI Safety Institute (AISI)
Established under former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in 2023, the AISI focuses on frontier AI safety research. Faculty AI’s role in testing large language models and advising the AISI on threats like disinformation and system security places the company in a key position to influence UK policy. Critics argue that this may create potential conflicts of interest if the same organisation is also developing AI for military use.
3.3 House of Lords Recommendations
In 2023, a House of Lords committee urged the UK Government to clarify the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to lethal drone strikes and to work towards an international agreement limiting or banning fully autonomous weapons systems. The Government response acknowledged the importance of maintaining “human control” in critical decisions but did not enact binding legislation banning lethal autonomous drones outright.
________________________________________
4. Legal and Ethical Concerns for AI-Enabled Drones
4.1 International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
IHL principles—distinction (separating combatants from civilians) and proportionality (limiting harm relative to military objectives)—are central to discussions on AI-driven drones. Fully autonomous UAVs, capable of selecting and engaging targets without human intervention, raise profound legal questions on accountability, particularly if biases or system errors result in wrongful casualties.
4.2 Allocation of Liability
Traditionally, accountability in military operations lies with commanders and operators. With increasingly autonomous systems, however, liability could extend to technology developers, programmers, or even the purchaser of the system. Clarifying how legal responsibilities are distributed may become a focal point for future litigation and regulatory reform.
4.3 Export Controls
Companies like Faculty AI must also comply with arms-export rules when providing AI-targeting systems or related software to foreign entities. In the UK, export licences for military-grade technology are subject to domestic legislation and international protocols, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on dual-use goods.
________________________________________
5. Looking Ahead: Balancing Innovation, Safety, and Accountability
5.1 Stronger National Frameworks
Although the UK favours a pro-innovation stance, there is growing pressure from Parliament and civil society for more rigorous, enforceable rules on potentially lethal AI applications. The EU AI Act may serve as a reference point for the UK to consider stricter domestic regulations.
5.2 International Collaboration
Calls for global agreements—treaties or non-binding accords—to prohibit fully autonomous weapons continue to gain momentum. The House of Lords committee specifically recommended international engagement to ensure that lethal force remains under human control.
5.3 Corporate Accountability
Organisations operating at the intersection of commercial defence contracts and government policy—such as Faculty AI—need transparent internal processes and robust ethics boards to mitigate conflicts of interest. Demonstrating genuine corporate responsibility will be vital for maintaining public trust.
5.4 Ethical and Safety Audits
As AI becomes more embedded in defence, mandatory ethical and safety audits may become standard practice. These would scrutinise algorithmic fairness, training data, and how effectively systems can identify and mitigate unintended harms.
________________________________________
6. Conclusion
Faculty AI’s role in developing AI for military drones underscores how high the stakes are when cutting-edge technology meets defence applications. With the EU AI Act now in force as a binding regulation, Europe has provided a blueprint for tighter control over “high-risk” AI systems. In contrast, the UK’s approach still offers substantial flexibility for companies, potentially raising both legal and ethical concerns around autonomy, accountability, and conflicts of interest.
From an IHL standpoint, keeping a human responsible for any life-and-death decision is imperative. As a UK drone lawyer, I urge policymakers, regulators, and industry stakeholders to keep asking: Where do we draw the line between legitimate defensive innovation and an unacceptable risk to civilians? Only by establishing clear, enforceable legal standards—anchored in international law and ethical scrutiny—can we ensure AI-powered drones serve to protect rather than endanger fundamental human values.

Bio – Richard Ryan, UK Drone Lawyer

Richard Ryan is a UK-based drone lawyer specialising in the regulatory, ethical, and commercial aspects of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artificial intelligence (AI). Through a series of blogs, Richard Ryan has explored critical issues such as the EU AI Act, the UK’s evolving “pro-innovation” regulatory landscape, and the legal considerations surrounding military drones and lethal autonomous weapons systems.

Drawing on extensive experience in advising government bodies, technology companies, and public institutions, Richard Ryan brings a deep understanding of how international humanitarian law (IHL), export controls, and data protection obligations intersect in modern drone operations. Their writing emphasises the importance of maintaining human oversight in AI-driven systems, championing ethical development and transparent accountability mechanisms.

A trusted voice in the field, Richard Ryan regularly comments on emerging case law, parliamentary recommendations, and global discussions around frontier AI safety. The mission is to help stakeholders—from hobbyist drone operators to established aerospace firms—navigate the complexities of regulation, risk management, and innovation.

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Government’s Drone Resist Strategy is launched… October 2019

zeroabove — Mon, 11 Nov 2019 15:48:18 +0000

The government finally published the UK’s counter-unmanned aircraft strategy. Ultimately directed at dealing with drone issues that relate to:

Organised crime;
Disruption to national infrastructure;
Acts of terrorism;
Threats to the UK’s national security.

Interestingly the report refers to the incident at Gatwick airport during the Christmas period in 2018, but has failed to refer to or provide any evidence that there was in fact a drone that caused so much disruption to so many. To date, there is still no evidence and Sussex Police have conceded that their investigation produced nothing costing the tax payer hundreds of thousands of pounds. The government’s strategy for promoting legitimate drone use in the UK will be set out in the forthcoming Aviation Strategy (date to be announced).

The Strategy paper focuses on the following with my comments:

The Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill will give police wide powers to deal with illegal drone use.

COMMENT: this will be covered in more detail in another blog;

A new industry action group will be formed that will include drone manufacturers to implement international design standards for integrated safety features and their technology pipelines;

COMMENT: This is great, but realistically, is a Chinese manufacturer going to disclose their technology pipeline? How are different manufacturers going to agree international design standards unless mandated to do so?

A mobile Drone Resist unit containing detection and disruption equipment will be developed for deployment to drone-related incidents and major events across the UK;

COMMENT: This is for the most part reactionary and how will the government mitigate the threat to a live drone attack in multiple locations simultaneously, e.g. three major airports at the same time being attacked by hostile drones.

Police will have to log and record incidents of illegal and/or hostile drone activity to further understand the drone threat;

COMMENT: Police should be doing something similar already as their CAA approved operations manual will most likely contain an obligation to record all flights; therefore not an unnecessary burden.

Policymakers and regulators will engage with manufacturers of drone components;

COMMENT: This is great, but what about a company’s intellectual property rights? What if the company is in the Far East?

By 30 November 2019, operators of drones weighing between 250g and 20Kg will have to register them with the CAA at a cost and drone remote pilots will have to take an online competency test. This will make “it easier to identify a drone that is being misused.”

COMMENT: The Irish Government have had registration since 2017 and it is a bureaucratic burden! It has done nothing for safety apparently. Interesting to note how it will be easier to identify a drone that is being misused without actually stating how this is going to be achieved and why. It is almost another reason to justify registration, which cost has been recently reduced from £16 to £9 by the CAA for a registration platform that costs £millions, when data security by the CAA has recently proven not to be safe.

The government is developing concepts for future implementation of an unmanned traffic management (UTM) system.

Many governments are developing systems, but ultimately data from each drone operator will be required in order to provide the visibility necessary, and the same applies to some general aviation aircraft. The scope is being developed by a number of jurisdictions on both sides of the Atlantic.

New definition of “operational responders” that must have counter drone knowledge, that just does not include the Police, but also:
- Other public sector employees such as prison officers;
- Private sector employees responsible for safety and security (prisons, CNI and crowded places);

COMMENT: Many will need training, will that be left to the NQE’s to pick up? There’s a potential business opportunity!

“The police are able to legally deploy a range of DTI (detect, track and identify) and counter-drone effector systems” versus “current police powers need to be built upon to meet the evolving threat, and some of the processes that underpin these powers were not designed with counter-drone capability in mind.”

COMMENT: There is a clear gap in the law here, are the Police acting illegally as the law is currently written? More analysis in another blog to follow.

It will come as no surprise that the paper raises many quesitons, but is a good start. The governement is commited to working with various stakeholders, but the law must change so that all stakeholders can benfit accordingly…

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