<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Law Enforcement Archives - Blakistons</title>
	<atom:link href="https://blakistons.co.uk/category/law-enforcement/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://blakistons.co.uk/category/law-enforcement/</link>
	<description>Drone Law</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2025 16:25:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-GB</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0</generator>
	<item>
		<title>How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean</title>
		<link>https://blakistons.co.uk/how-europes-new-ai-rulebook-would-and-wouldnt-touch-autonomous-combat-aircraft-and-what-the-defence-carveouts-really-mean/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin.richard]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Nov 2025 18:28:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI and Drone Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Governance and Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Airspace Legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Airspace Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Airspace Management and UTM Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Autonomous Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Autonomous Systems in Aviation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Law and Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Aviation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Procurement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense Innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EASA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Technologies in Logistics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU AI Act Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU Regulations and Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union Policy Updates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future Trends]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government Reports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[High-Risk AI Applications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Law Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Analysis and Recommendations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Challenges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Frameworks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Implications of AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Insights for Drone Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Updates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Local Government Policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Local Government Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Procurement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulations and Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory and Legal Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory Compliance Strategies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory Oversight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk Assessment & Mitigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk Management and Insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety and Risk Management - Emphasizes safety protocols]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety and Security in Aviation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tech Law and Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technological Innovations in Drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technology and Innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Aviation Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Defence Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Government Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[autonomous fighters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometric identification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CE marking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defence law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU AI Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU aviation law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GA-ASI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GPAI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-risk AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Fighter Conference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[manned-unmanned teaming]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[real-world testing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rome]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAS]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blakistons.co.uk/?p=2624</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft — and what the defence carve-outs really mean. In Brief&#8230; Purely military AI systems are out of scope of the EU AI Act. If an AI system is developed or used exclusively for military/defence or national-security [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/how-europes-new-ai-rulebook-would-and-wouldnt-touch-autonomous-combat-aircraft-and-what-the-defence-carveouts-really-mean/">How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><!-- Begin blog content (no title; WordPress provides its own) --></p>
<div>
By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer </p>
<p><em>How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft — and what the defence carve-outs really mean.</em></p>
<hr />
<h3>In Brief&#8230;</h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Purely military AI systems are out of scope</strong> of the EU AI Act. If an AI system is <strong>developed or used exclusively for military/defence or national-security purposes</strong>, the Act does not apply. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Dual-use is different.</strong> If the same autonomy stack, sensors or models are marketed or used for <strong>civilian</strong> purposes in the EU (for example, civil UAS, border or law-enforcement tasks), the Act can apply — with stringent duties for “high-risk” systems. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Real-world testing is regulated.</strong> Pre-market R&amp;D is generally excluded, <strong>but real-world testing isn’t</strong> — it requires specific safeguards and registration. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Foundation models (GPAI)</strong> have their own rules from <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>; the defence carve-out in the Act is written for <strong>AI systems</strong>, not explicitly for <strong>models</strong>. If a model is placed on the EU market generally, the provider’s GPAI obligations can still bite. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Context:</strong> sUAS News reports that GA-ASI is showcasing its autonomous fighter portfolio (for example, YFQ-42A CCA, MQ-20 Avenger) at the International Fighter Conference in Rome, 4–6 Nov 2025. This post overlays that scenario with the EU AI Act’s rules.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<h2>1) First principles: When does the EU AI Act apply?</h2>
<p>The Act has <strong>extraterritorial reach</strong>. It covers (i) providers and deployers in the EU, (ii) providers placing on the EU market or putting systems into service in the EU — even if they are not established here — and (iii) providers/deployers in third countries <strong>where the AI system’s output is used in the EU</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<p>However, <strong>Article 2(3)</strong> draws a bright line: the Act <strong>does not apply</strong> to <strong>AI systems used exclusively</strong> for <strong>military, defence or national security</strong>. It also does not apply where a system is <strong>not</strong> placed on the EU market but its <strong>output is used in the EU exclusively</strong> for those purposes. Recital 24 reiterates this and clarifies that <strong>non-defence use falls back under the Act</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<p><strong>What this means in Rome:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>closed, defence-only</strong> showcase for European militaries: <strong>out of scope</strong>.</li>
<li>A <strong>civil-use pitch</strong>, civil flight trials, or plans to sell autonomy modules to <strong>EU civilian buyers</strong>: <strong>in scope</strong> (see the high-risk section below). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>2) The key defence carve-outs (and their limits)</h2>
<p><strong>Carve-out #1 — Defence/military:</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>“This Regulation shall not apply to AI systems … used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes.” (Article 2(3))</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Two important nuances:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Exclusivity matters.</strong> The moment an autonomy stack or sensor suite is also <strong>marketed or used for civilian</strong> or law-enforcement tasks, the <strong>defence exclusion no longer shields those non-defence uses</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Models vs systems.</strong> The text explicitly excludes <strong>AI systems</strong> for defence; it <strong>does not create an explicit defence exclusion for general-purpose AI models</strong>. If a <strong>GPAI model</strong> is <strong>placed on the EU market</strong>, Chapter V obligations for model providers can still apply — even if one downstream customer is a defence user. (More on GPAI below.) (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Carve-out #2 — Pre-market R&amp;D:</strong><br />
  R&amp;D <strong>before</strong> placing on the market is generally outside scope, <strong>but real-world testing is not</strong>. Testing in real-world conditions triggers a dedicated regime (for example, registration, time limits, informed consent or special conditions for law enforcement, incident reporting). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<p><strong>Carve-out #3 — Emergency derogations (non-defence):</strong><br />
  For <strong>exceptional public-security reasons</strong> (or imminent threats to life/health), <strong>market surveillance authorities</strong> can authorise <strong>temporary use</strong> of a high-risk AI system <strong>before</strong> full conformity assessment — subject to strict conditions. Law-enforcement or civil-protection bodies can also use in urgent cases, then seek authorisation without undue delay. This is <strong>not</strong> a defence-specific carve-out, but it explains emergency deployments outside the military context. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>3) If the defence exclusion doesn’t apply, would autonomous fighters tech be “high-risk”?</h2>
<p>Very likely <strong>yes</strong> — for <strong>civil</strong> variants or dual-use spin-outs:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Annex I (product-safety route).</strong> AI that is a <strong>safety component</strong> of products covered by sectoral EU safety laws is <strong>high-risk</strong> where those products need <strong>third-party conformity assessment</strong>. That list <strong>explicitly includes EU civil aviation law (Reg. 2018/1139)</strong> — covering <strong>unmanned aircraft</strong> and their remotely controllable equipment. In a civil-UAS configuration, an autonomy stack acting as a safety component would be regulated as <strong>high-risk</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Annex III (stand-alone uses).</strong> Separate “high-risk” buckets also capture, for example, <strong>remote biometric identification</strong> and other sensitive functions (if and where permitted by Union/national law), <strong>critical infrastructure</strong> safety components, and more. If a fighter-born sensing suite were repurposed for <strong>civil border surveillance</strong> or <strong>public-space identification</strong>, you quickly hit these Annex III categories. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>What “high-risk” demands in practice</strong><br />
  Providers must implement a <strong>risk-management system</strong>, <strong>data governance</strong>, <strong>technical documentation</strong>, <strong>logging</strong>, <strong>transparency/instructions</strong>, <strong>human oversight</strong>, and <strong>accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity</strong> — then pass <strong>conformity assessment</strong>, issue an <strong>EU Declaration of Conformity</strong>, and affix <strong>CE marking</strong>. Deployers also carry duties (for example, monitoring, data relevance, user notification in some cases). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>4) Sensors on show: what about face recognition and other “red lines”?</h2>
<p>The <strong>EU bans</strong> several AI practices outright (from <strong>2 Feb 2025</strong>), including:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Untargeted scraping</strong> of facial images to build recognition databases.</li>
<li><strong>Biometric categorisation</strong> inferring sensitive traits (for example, race, political opinions, religion).</li>
<li><strong>Emotion recognition</strong> in workplaces or schools (with narrow safety/medical exceptions).</li>
<li><strong>Predictive “risk assessments”</strong> of criminality based solely on personality traits/profiling.</li>
<li><strong>Real-time remote biometric identification (RBI) in public spaces for law enforcement</strong> — <strong>unless</strong> strictly authorised and necessary for narrowly defined objectives (for example, locating a specific suspect in serious crimes, preventing a specific imminent threat, finding missing persons), with prior judicial/independent approval and registration. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Implication for a trade-show demo:</strong> training a camera on attendees to test <strong>real-time RBI</strong> in a public venue would <strong>likely be unlawful</strong> unless those strict law-enforcement exceptions and procedural safeguards apply — which they typically <strong>will not</strong> at a commercial defence conference. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>5) Real-world testing in the EU (civil or dual-use variants)</h2>
<p>If a provider runs <strong>real-world flight tests</strong> in the EU (outside the defence exclusion), the Act requires — among other things — <strong>registration</strong>, an EU-established entity or <strong>EU legal representative</strong>, limits on <strong>duration</strong> (normally up to six months, extendable once), rules on <strong>informed consent</strong> (with special handling for law-enforcement tests), <strong>qualified oversight</strong>, and the ability to <strong>reverse/ignore</strong> the system’s outputs. <strong>Serious incidents</strong> must be reported promptly. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>6) Foundation models (GPAI): obligations can still attach</h2>
<p>From <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>, <strong>Chapter V</strong> sets <strong>baseline transparency and copyright-policy duties</strong> for <strong>providers of general-purpose AI models</strong> (with extra obligations if the model presents <strong>systemic risks</strong>). The defence exclusion in Article 2(3) is framed for <strong>AI systems</strong>, not <strong>models</strong>. So, if a foundation model is <strong>placed on the EU market</strong>, the <strong>model provider</strong> can have obligations even if a downstream customer is a defence prime. (Open-source specifics and systemic-risk thresholds also apply.) (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>7) Timelines you need in Rome (as of 6 Nov 2025)</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Entry into force:</strong> 1 Aug 2024 (20 days after OJ publication).</li>
<li><strong>Prohibited practices + core chapters (I–II):</strong> apply from <strong>2 Feb 2025</strong>.</li>
<li><strong>GPAI rules (Chapter V), plus other chapters (III §4, VII, XII, and Article 78):</strong> apply from <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>.</li>
<li><strong>General application:</strong> <strong>2 Aug 2026</strong> (high-risk regime starts to bite broadly).</li>
<li><strong>Article 6(1) Annex III classification trigger &amp; related obligations:</strong> <strong>2 Aug 2027</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>8) Enforcement and penalties</h2>
<ul>
<li>Violating <strong>prohibited practices</strong> (Article 5) can draw fines up to <strong>€35m or 7%</strong> of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.</li>
<li>Other operator obligations can reach <strong>€15m or 3%</strong>; supplying <strong>misleading information</strong> can reach <strong>€7.5m or 1%</strong> (SMEs benefit from caps). Separate fine scales apply to EU institutions. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>9) Practical playbook for IFC attendees</h2>
<p><strong>If you are a defence OEM showing autonomy stacks:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Map uses</strong>: Defence-only (excluded) vs <strong>any civil or law-enforcement</strong> pathways (potentially in scope). Document the <strong>exclusivity</strong> of defence deployments if you rely on the carve-out. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>GPAI suppliers</strong>: If you place a <strong>foundation model</strong> on the EU market, expect <strong>Chapter V</strong> duties regardless of defence customers. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>No RBI demos</strong> on the show floor. Those prohibitions already apply in 2025. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Planning EU flight tests</strong> for civil variants? Prepare for <strong>real-world testing</strong> conditions (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li>For <strong>civil UAS commercialisation</strong>, treat your autonomy as <strong>high-risk</strong> (EASA product-safety route), budget time for <strong>conformity assessment</strong> and <strong>CE marking</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>If you are a European ministry or agency:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Distinguish <strong>military operations</strong> (out of scope) from <strong>law-enforcement or border</strong> uses (in scope; watch <strong>RBI</strong> limits and high-risk duties). Consider <strong>Article 46</strong> emergency derogations only in <strong>exceptional</strong> and <strong>documented</strong> cases. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>If you are a civil UAS integrator:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Expect the full <strong>high-risk</strong> package (risk management, data governance, human oversight, cybersecurity, logs, conformity assessment, CE). Build compliance into your <strong>system architecture</strong>, <strong>ML pipelines</strong>, <strong>safety cases</strong>, and <strong>ops manuals</strong> from day one. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>10) Quick decision pathway</h2>
<ol>
<li><strong>Is the use exclusively defence or national security?</strong><br />
      Yes: AI <strong>system</strong> is <strong>out of scope</strong>.<br />
      No: continue. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
<li><strong>Is it a civil product or law-enforcement/border use?</strong><br />
      Civil product with safety function (for example, civil UAS): <strong>High-risk</strong> via <strong>Annex I</strong> ? conformity assessment + CE. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)<br />
      Stand-alone sensitive use (for example, RBI, critical infrastructure): <strong>Annex III</strong> high-risk or <strong>Article 5</strong> prohibition applies. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
<li><strong>Is there a GPAI model being placed on the EU market?</strong><br />
      Yes: <strong>Chapter V</strong> duties for <strong>model providers</strong> from <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>, separate from the defence carve-out for systems. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
<li><strong>Is this pre-market testing?</strong><br />
      <strong>Real-world testing</strong> rules apply (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
</ol>
<hr />
<h3>Bottom line for “Autonomous Fighters in Rome”</h3>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>military-only</strong> display of GA-ASI’s autonomous fighters is <strong>outside</strong> the AI Act.</li>
<li>Any <strong>civil</strong> spin-off (cargo drones, civil surveillance, airport ops) or <strong>law-enforcement</strong> application in the EU will trigger the Act — often at the <strong>high-risk</strong> level — together with <strong>tight prohibitions</strong> around biometric uses in public spaces. Plan your <strong>compliance architecture</strong> accordingly. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><em>This article is informational and not legal advice. Citations are to the Official Journal text of the <strong>Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689)</strong> for scope (Art. 2), prohibitions (Art. 5), high-risk regime (Ch. III), real-world testing (Arts. 57–61), GPAI (Ch. V incl. Art. 53), timelines (Art. 113), and penalties (Art. 99–101).</em></p>
<hr />
<section aria-label="Author bio">
<p><strong>About the author — Richard Ryan</strong></p>
<p>Richard Ryan is a UK barrister (Direct Access), mediator and Chartered Arbitrator (FCIArb), and a Bencher of Gray’s Inn. He practises across defence, aerospace, construction, engineering and commodities, with a leading specialism in drone and counter-drone law, unmanned aviation regulation, and AI-enabled safety and compliance. Richard advises government, primes and operators on EU/UK UAS frameworks, BVLOS, U-space/UTM and the EU AI Act. He leads Blakiston’s Chambers and contributes regularly to industry guidance and policy consultations.</p>
</section>
</div>
<p><!-- End blog content --></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/how-europes-new-ai-rulebook-would-and-wouldnt-touch-autonomous-combat-aircraft-and-what-the-defence-carveouts-really-mean/">How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots</title>
		<link>https://blakistons.co.uk/a-constructive-outcome-for-safer-skies-what-the-clients-case-means-for-uk-drone-pilots/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin.richard]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Nov 2025 17:53:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Aviation Law and Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aviation Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BVLOS Operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commercial Drone Operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Accidents & Case Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Incidents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Industry Challenges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Industry Concerns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Industry News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Innovation and Trends]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Law - As the article provides legal insights specific to drone operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Law - Covers legal aspects and compliance specific to drone operations and incidents.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Operators]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Safety and Operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Future of Drone Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Insurance and Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Law Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Analysis and Recommendations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Challenges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Challenges in Drone Operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Frameworks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Insights for Drone Industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Investigations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Updates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulations and Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory and Legal Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory Compliance - Focuses on the importance of adherence to regulatory guidelines and consequences of violations.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory Compliance - Includes insights on compliance with FAA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk Assessment & Mitigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Safety and Security in Aviation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technological Innovations in Drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAS Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAV Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UAVs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Drone Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK drone policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Drone Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorised]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unmanned Aircraft Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blakistons.co.uk/?p=2615</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer Constructive outcome, practical lessons. A technical proximity breach was confirmed, a more serious allegation was dismissed, and there are clear takeaways that raise standards on evidence, cooperation and public safety. Outcome at a glance Count 1 (conviction): Operating an unmanned aircraft close to the site of an ongoing [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/a-constructive-outcome-for-safer-skies-what-the-clients-case-means-for-uk-drone-pilots/">A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><!-- Begin WordPress post content (no H1 included; WordPress will supply the title) --></p>
<p>By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer</p>
<p><strong>Constructive outcome, practical lessons.</strong> A technical proximity breach was confirmed, a more serious allegation was dismissed, and there are clear takeaways that raise standards on evidence, cooperation and public safety.</p>
<section aria-labelledby="outcome">
<h2 id="outcome">Outcome at a glance</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Count 1 (conviction):</strong> Operating an unmanned aircraft close to the site of an ongoing emergency response — <strong>Air Navigation Order 2016</strong> Articles <strong>265B(3)</strong>, <strong>265B(5)(j)</strong> and <strong>265F(3)(c)</strong> (reflecting <strong>UAS.OPEN.060(3)</strong>).</li>
<li><strong>Count 2 (dismissed):</strong> Obstructing or hindering emergency workers — <strong>Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act 2006</strong>, sections <strong>1</strong> and <strong>4</strong> — no case to answer.</li>
<li><strong>Sentence:</strong> <strong>£300</strong> (reduced from <strong>£2,500</strong>). <strong>Deprivation order refused</strong> — the client’s equipment will be returned.</li>
</ul>
<p></strong>.</p>
</section>
<section aria-labelledby="background">
<h2 id="background">Competence, cooperation and public interest flying</h2>
<p>The client is an experienced operator with hundreds of hours and thousands of flights, combining sound aviation literacy with routine work around public interest incidents. On the day in question, the client used aircraft tracking tools and air band monitoring, maintained a conservative standoff where no formal cordon existed, and landed promptly when requested by police. This was a measured and safety first response in a dynamic setting.</p>
</section>
<section aria-labelledby="lesson-telemetry">
<h2 id="lesson-telemetry">Lesson 1: Telemetry clarity</h2>
<p>When presenting flight data, clarity matters. Plot the flight path with a <strong>thin, precise line</strong> so the <strong>base map remains legible</strong>, including fences, road edges, cordons and measured standoffs. A thick line can obscure the very features that prove separation.</p>
<ul>
<li>Keep a clean thin line map and a forensic overlay with timestamps for take off, orbit points, return to home and landing, plus measured distances to fixed features.</li>
<li>Use a thin line that clearly shows accurate telemetry when placed on a map, not a thick line that obscures part of the map.</li>
</ul>
<p>  <!-- Optional image placeholder:
  

<figure>
    <img decoding="async" src="telemetry-thin-vs-thick.png" alt="Thin flight path line keeps the base map legible; thick line obscures fences, roads and standoffs." loading="lazy" />
    
 
<figcaption>Thin versus thick telemetry overlays (illustrative).</figcaption>
 

  </figure>


  --><br />
</section>
<section aria-labelledby="lesson-dat">
<h2 id="lesson-dat">Lesson 2: Plan for seizure and understand where DJI DAT lives</h2>
<p>High fidelity <strong>DJI DAT</strong> logs are stored on the aircraft and typically require <strong>connecting the drone to a computer</strong> to extract. If a drone is seized by police, immediate access to those DAT files is difficult.</p>
<ul>
<li>Build redundancy: back up app and controller logs after each flight, use screen recordings of the flight user interface, and capture independent stills or video.</li>
<li>For sensitive assignments, consider periodic DAT offloads in advance.</li>
</ul>
</section>
<section aria-labelledby="commitments">
<h2 id="commitments">Five straightforward commitments</h2>
<ol>
<li>Thin line telemetry as the default for mapping outputs.</li>
<li>Evidence resilience: dual path logging (logs plus screen capture) and periodic DAT offloads.</li>
<li>Proportionate communications near emergency activity where appropriate.</li>
<li>A simple one page ops note on every job covering airspace, standoffs and abort triggers.</li>
<li>Calm, courteous engagement with officers, with a record of powers used and a property schedule if equipment is seized.</li>
</ol>
</section>
<section aria-labelledby="tech-ref">
<h2 id="tech-ref">Technical reference: cross motorway separation</h2>
<p>To contextualise the judge’s description (opposite side of a six lane motorway plus hard shoulder plus verge), the following uses standard UK dimensions.</p>
<h3>Assumptions from UK highway standards</h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Lane width (motorways):</strong> 3.65 m per lane (DMRB CD 127). <a href="https://moderngov.fareham.gov.uk/documents/s27875/8.12%20DMRB%20CD127%20-%20Cross-sections%20and%20headrooms.pdf" rel="nofollow">[1]</a></li>
<li><strong>Hard shoulder width:</strong> 3.3 m (National Highways). <a href="https://nationalhighways.co.uk/our-work/smart-motorways-evidence-stocktake/emergency-area-width-review/" rel="nofollow">[2]</a></li>
<li><strong>Central reservation (median):</strong> assume about 3.0 m (DMRB derived guidance). <a href="https://cdn.tii.ie/publications/DN-GEO-03036-01.pdf" rel="nofollow">[3]</a></li>
<li><strong>Verge:</strong> varies by site; on trunk roads, about 3.0 m is common. Use 2.0 to 3.0 m to bracket reality. <a href="https://www.transport.gov.scot/publication/dmrb-stage-3-report-pass-of-birnam-to-tay-crossing-a9-dualling/engineering-assessment/" rel="nofollow">[4]</a></li>
</ul>
<h3>Baseline components</h3>
<ul>
<li>Six lanes = 6 x 3.65 = <strong>21.90 m</strong>. <a href="https://moderngov.fareham.gov.uk/documents/s27875/8.12%20DMRB%20CD127%20-%20Cross-sections%20and%20headrooms.pdf" rel="nofollow">[1]</a></li>
<li>Two hard shoulders = <strong>6.60 m</strong>. <a href="https://nationalhighways.co.uk/our-work/smart-motorways-evidence-stocktake/emergency-area-width-review/" rel="nofollow">[2]</a></li>
<li>Central reservation (median) about <strong>3.00 m</strong>. <a href="https://cdn.tii.ie/publications/DN-GEO-03036-01.pdf" rel="nofollow">[3]</a></li>
<li>Verge per side about <strong>2.0 to 3.0 m</strong>. <a href="https://www.transport.gov.scot/publication/dmrb-stage-3-report-pass-of-birnam-to-tay-crossing-a9-dualling/engineering-assessment/" rel="nofollow">[4]</a></li>
</ul>
<h3>Real world lateral separation (verge to verge)</h3>
<p><code>Distance = 6 lanes + 2 x hard shoulder + 2 x verge + median</code></p>
<ul>
<li>With 2.0 m verges (conservative): <strong>21.90 + 6.60 + 4.00 + 3.00 = 35.50 m</strong></li>
<li>With 3.0 m verges (typical): <strong>21.90 + 6.60 + 6.00 + 3.00 = 37.50 m</strong></li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Figure to use:</strong> about <strong>37.5 m</strong> horizontal separation verge to verge (typical). <strong>Lower bound:</strong> about <strong>35.5 m</strong> if verges are unusually narrow.</p>
<h3>Lean reading (narrow phrasing)</h3>
<p>Six lanes plus one hard shoulder plus one verge (omitting the median and the opposite side shoulder and verge):</p>
<p><code>21.90 + 3.30 + (2.0 to 3.0) = 27.2 to 28.2 m</code></p>
<p>This underestimates the physical cross section that most operators and engineers would use.</p>
<h3>Add altitude for slant distance</h3>
<p>If height is h, the slant range is <code>sqrt(lateral^2 + h^2)</code>.</p>
<ul>
<li>With 37.5 m lateral: <strong>48.0 m</strong> at 30 m AGL, <strong>70.8 m</strong> at 60 m, <strong>125.7 m</strong> at 120 m.</li>
<li>With 35.5 m lateral: <strong>46.5 m</strong> at 30 m, <strong>69.2 m</strong> at 60 m, <strong>124.2 m</strong> at 120 m.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Practical effect:</strong> even before adding any field offset inside the field beyond the verge, cross motorway separation is around 36 to 38 m. Any field offset adds to that figure. Slant range increases further with altitude.</p>
<p>Standards: <a href="https://moderngov.fareham.gov.uk/documents/s27875/8.12%20DMRB%20CD127%20-%20Cross-sections%20and%20headrooms.pdf" rel="nofollow">DMRB CD 127</a>, <a href="https://nationalhighways.co.uk/our-work/smart-motorways-evidence-stocktake/emergency-area-width-review/" rel="nofollow">National Highways</a>, <a href="https://cdn.tii.ie/publications/DN-GEO-03036-01.pdf" rel="nofollow">TII DN GEO 03036</a>, <a href="https://www.transport.gov.scot/publication/dmrb-stage-3-report-pass-of-birnam-to-tay-crossing-a9-dualling/engineering-assessment/" rel="nofollow">Transport Scotland</a>.</p>
</section>
<section aria-labelledby="closing">
<h2 id="closing">Bottom line</h2>
<p>This is a constructive outcome. The most serious allegation fell away, the fine is modest, and the client retains their equipment. More importantly, the experience is being used to lead on best practice: clearer telemetry, stronger data resilience and exemplary on scene conduct, supporting emergency services, informing the public and keeping UK skies safe.</p>
</section>
<hr />
<section aria-labelledby="bio">
<h2 id="bio">About the author</h2>
<p><strong>Richard Ryan</strong> is a Barrister (Direct Access), Mediator and Chartered Arbitrator based in the UK, specialising in drone and counter-drone law, aviation regulation, and complex commercial disputes. He advises operators, insurers and public bodies on SORA/AAE approvals, BVLOS programmes, privacy/data governance, and risk allocation across the drone ecosystem.</p>
</section>
<p><em>This post is for general information only and is not legal advice.</em></p>
<p><!-- End WordPress post content --></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/a-constructive-outcome-for-safer-skies-what-the-clients-case-means-for-uk-drone-pilots/">A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Government’s Drone Resist Strategy is launched… October 2019</title>
		<link>https://blakistons.co.uk/uk-unveils-counter-drone-strategy-new-measures-to-combat-unmanned-aircraft-threats/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[zeroabove]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Nov 2019 15:48:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Drone Legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Law Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Government Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Detection Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Industry Standards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Registration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operational Responders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Police Powers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Unmanned Traffic Management System]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blakistons.co.uk/?p=139</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The government finally published the UK’s counter-unmanned aircraft strategy.  Ultimately directed at dealing with drone issues that relate to: Organised crime; Disruption to national infrastructure; Acts of terrorism; Threats to the UK’s national security. Interestingly the report refers to the incident at Gatwick airport during the Christmas period in 2018, but has failed to refer [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/uk-unveils-counter-drone-strategy-new-measures-to-combat-unmanned-aircraft-threats/">Government’s Drone Resist Strategy is launched… October 2019</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The government finally published the UK’s counter-unmanned aircraft strategy.  Ultimately directed at dealing with drone issues that relate to:</p>
<ol>
<li>Organised crime;</li>
<li>Disruption to national infrastructure;</li>
<li>Acts of terrorism;</li>
<li>Threats to the UK’s national security.</li>
</ol>
<p>Interestingly the report refers to the incident at Gatwick airport during the Christmas period in 2018, but has failed to refer to or provide any evidence that there was in fact a drone that caused so much disruption to so many.  To date, there is still no evidence and Sussex Police have conceded that their investigation produced nothing costing the tax payer hundreds of thousands of pounds. The government’s strategy for promoting legitimate drone use in the UK will be set out in the forthcoming Aviation Strategy (date to be announced).</p>
<p>The Strategy paper focuses on the following with my comments:</p>
<ul>
<li>The Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill will give police wide powers to deal with illegal drone use.</li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: this will be covered in more detail in another blog;</p>
<ul>
<li>A new industry action group will be formed that will include drone manufacturers to implement international design standards for integrated safety features and their technology pipelines;</li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: This is great, but realistically, is a Chinese manufacturer going to disclose their technology pipeline? How are different manufacturers going to agree international design standards unless mandated to do so?</p>
<ul>
<li>A mobile <a href="http://droneresist.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Drone Resist</a> unit containing detection and disruption equipment will be developed for deployment to drone-related incidents and major events across the UK;</li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: This is for the most part reactionary and how will the government mitigate the threat to a live drone attack in multiple locations simultaneously, e.g. three major airports at the same time being attacked by hostile drones.</p>
<ul>
<li>Police will have to log and record incidents of illegal and/or hostile drone activity to further understand the drone threat;</li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: Police should be doing something similar already as their CAA approved operations manual will most likely contain an obligation to record all flights; therefore not an unnecessary burden.</p>
<ul>
<li>Policymakers and regulators will engage with manufacturers of drone components;</li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: This is great, but what about a company’s intellectual property rights?  What if the company is in the Far East?</p>
<ul>
<li>By 30 November 2019, operators of drones weighing between 250g and 20Kg will have to register them with the CAA at a cost  and drone remote pilots will have to take an online competency test.  This will make <em>“it easier to identify a drone that is being misused.”</em></li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: The Irish Government have had registration since 2017 and it is a bureaucratic burden!  It has done nothing for safety apparently. Interesting to note how it will be easier to identify a drone that is being misused without actually stating how this is going to be achieved and why. It is almost another reason to justify registration, which cost has been recently reduced from £16 to £9 by the CAA for a registration platform that costs £millions, when data security by the CAA has recently proven not to be safe.</p>
<ul>
<li>The government is developing concepts for future implementation of an unmanned traffic management (UTM) system.</li>
</ul>
<p>Many governments are developing systems, but ultimately data from each drone operator will be required in order to provide the visibility necessary, and the same applies to some general aviation aircraft. The scope is being developed by a number of jurisdictions on both sides of the Atlantic.</p>
<ul>
<li>New definition of <em>“operational responders”</em> that must have counter drone knowledge, that just does not include the Police, but also:
<ul>
<li>Other public sector employees such as prison officers;</li>
<li>Private sector employees responsible for safety and security (prisons, CNI and crowded places);</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: Many will need training, will that be left to the NQE’s to pick up? There’s a potential business opportunity!</p>
<ul>
<li><em>“The police are able to legally deploy a range of DTI (detect, track and identify) and counter-drone effector systems”</em> versus <em>“current police powers need to be built upon to meet the evolving threat, and some of the processes that underpin these powers were not designed with counter-drone capability in mind.”</em></li>
</ul>
<p>COMMENT: There is a clear gap in the law here, are the Police acting illegally as the law is currently written? More analysis in another blog to follow.</p>
<p>It will come as no surprise that the paper raises many quesitons, but is a good start.  The governement is commited to working with various stakeholders, but the law must change so that all stakeholders can benfit accordingly…</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/uk-unveils-counter-drone-strategy-new-measures-to-combat-unmanned-aircraft-threats/">Government’s Drone Resist Strategy is launched… October 2019</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
