Aviation Regulations Archives - Blakistons

How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean

admin.richard — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 18:28:20 +0000

By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer

How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft — and what the defence carve-outs really mean.

In Brief…

Purely military AI systems are out of scope of the EU AI Act. If an AI system is developed or used exclusively for military/defence or national-security purposes, the Act does not apply. (EUR-Lex)
Dual-use is different. If the same autonomy stack, sensors or models are marketed or used for civilian purposes in the EU (for example, civil UAS, border or law-enforcement tasks), the Act can apply — with stringent duties for “high-risk” systems. (EUR-Lex)
Real-world testing is regulated. Pre-market R&D is generally excluded, but real-world testing isn’t — it requires specific safeguards and registration. (EUR-Lex)
Foundation models (GPAI) have their own rules from 2 Aug 2025; the defence carve-out in the Act is written for AI systems, not explicitly for models. If a model is placed on the EU market generally, the provider’s GPAI obligations can still bite. (EUR-Lex)

Context: sUAS News reports that GA-ASI is showcasing its autonomous fighter portfolio (for example, YFQ-42A CCA, MQ-20 Avenger) at the International Fighter Conference in Rome, 4–6 Nov 2025. This post overlays that scenario with the EU AI Act’s rules.

1) First principles: When does the EU AI Act apply?

The Act has extraterritorial reach. It covers (i) providers and deployers in the EU, (ii) providers placing on the EU market or putting systems into service in the EU — even if they are not established here — and (iii) providers/deployers in third countries where the AI system’s output is used in the EU. (EUR-Lex)

However, Article 2(3) draws a bright line: the Act does not apply to AI systems used exclusively for military, defence or national security. It also does not apply where a system is not placed on the EU market but its output is used in the EU exclusively for those purposes. Recital 24 reiterates this and clarifies that non-defence use falls back under the Act. (EUR-Lex)

What this means in Rome:

A closed, defence-only showcase for European militaries: out of scope.
A civil-use pitch, civil flight trials, or plans to sell autonomy modules to EU civilian buyers: in scope (see the high-risk section below). (EUR-Lex)

2) The key defence carve-outs (and their limits)

Carve-out #1 — Defence/military:

“This Regulation shall not apply to AI systems … used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes.” (Article 2(3))

Two important nuances:

Exclusivity matters. The moment an autonomy stack or sensor suite is also marketed or used for civilian or law-enforcement tasks, the defence exclusion no longer shields those non-defence uses. (EUR-Lex)
Models vs systems. The text explicitly excludes AI systems for defence; it does not create an explicit defence exclusion for general-purpose AI models. If a GPAI model is placed on the EU market, Chapter V obligations for model providers can still apply — even if one downstream customer is a defence user. (More on GPAI below.) (EUR-Lex)

Carve-out #2 — Pre-market R&D:
R&D before placing on the market is generally outside scope, but real-world testing is not. Testing in real-world conditions triggers a dedicated regime (for example, registration, time limits, informed consent or special conditions for law enforcement, incident reporting). (EUR-Lex)

Carve-out #3 — Emergency derogations (non-defence):
For exceptional public-security reasons (or imminent threats to life/health), market surveillance authorities can authorise temporary use of a high-risk AI system before full conformity assessment — subject to strict conditions. Law-enforcement or civil-protection bodies can also use in urgent cases, then seek authorisation without undue delay. This is not a defence-specific carve-out, but it explains emergency deployments outside the military context. (EUR-Lex)

3) If the defence exclusion doesn’t apply, would autonomous fighters tech be “high-risk”?

Very likely yes — for civil variants or dual-use spin-outs:

Annex I (product-safety route). AI that is a safety component of products covered by sectoral EU safety laws is high-risk where those products need third-party conformity assessment. That list explicitly includes EU civil aviation law (Reg. 2018/1139) — covering unmanned aircraft and their remotely controllable equipment. In a civil-UAS configuration, an autonomy stack acting as a safety component would be regulated as high-risk. (EUR-Lex)
Annex III (stand-alone uses). Separate “high-risk” buckets also capture, for example, remote biometric identification and other sensitive functions (if and where permitted by Union/national law), critical infrastructure safety components, and more. If a fighter-born sensing suite were repurposed for civil border surveillance or public-space identification, you quickly hit these Annex III categories. (EUR-Lex)

What “high-risk” demands in practice
Providers must implement a risk-management system, data governance, technical documentation, logging, transparency/instructions, human oversight, and accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity — then pass conformity assessment, issue an EU Declaration of Conformity, and affix CE marking. Deployers also carry duties (for example, monitoring, data relevance, user notification in some cases). (EUR-Lex)

4) Sensors on show: what about face recognition and other “red lines”?

The EU bans several AI practices outright (from 2 Feb 2025), including:

Untargeted scraping of facial images to build recognition databases.
Biometric categorisation inferring sensitive traits (for example, race, political opinions, religion).
Emotion recognition in workplaces or schools (with narrow safety/medical exceptions).
Predictive “risk assessments” of criminality based solely on personality traits/profiling.
Real-time remote biometric identification (RBI) in public spaces for law enforcement — unless strictly authorised and necessary for narrowly defined objectives (for example, locating a specific suspect in serious crimes, preventing a specific imminent threat, finding missing persons), with prior judicial/independent approval and registration. (EUR-Lex)

Implication for a trade-show demo: training a camera on attendees to test real-time RBI in a public venue would likely be unlawful unless those strict law-enforcement exceptions and procedural safeguards apply — which they typically will not at a commercial defence conference. (EUR-Lex)

5) Real-world testing in the EU (civil or dual-use variants)

If a provider runs real-world flight tests in the EU (outside the defence exclusion), the Act requires — among other things — registration, an EU-established entity or EU legal representative, limits on duration (normally up to six months, extendable once), rules on informed consent (with special handling for law-enforcement tests), qualified oversight, and the ability to reverse/ignore the system’s outputs. Serious incidents must be reported promptly. (EUR-Lex)

6) Foundation models (GPAI): obligations can still attach

From 2 Aug 2025, Chapter V sets baseline transparency and copyright-policy duties for providers of general-purpose AI models (with extra obligations if the model presents systemic risks). The defence exclusion in Article 2(3) is framed for AI systems, not models. So, if a foundation model is placed on the EU market, the model provider can have obligations even if a downstream customer is a defence prime. (Open-source specifics and systemic-risk thresholds also apply.) (EUR-Lex)

7) Timelines you need in Rome (as of 6 Nov 2025)

Entry into force: 1 Aug 2024 (20 days after OJ publication).
Prohibited practices + core chapters (I–II): apply from 2 Feb 2025.
GPAI rules (Chapter V), plus other chapters (III §4, VII, XII, and Article 78): apply from 2 Aug 2025.
General application: 2 Aug 2026 (high-risk regime starts to bite broadly).
Article 6(1) Annex III classification trigger & related obligations: 2 Aug 2027. (EUR-Lex)

8) Enforcement and penalties

Violating prohibited practices (Article 5) can draw fines up to €35m or 7% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.
Other operator obligations can reach €15m or 3%; supplying misleading information can reach €7.5m or 1% (SMEs benefit from caps). Separate fine scales apply to EU institutions. (EUR-Lex)

9) Practical playbook for IFC attendees

If you are a defence OEM showing autonomy stacks:

Map uses: Defence-only (excluded) vs any civil or law-enforcement pathways (potentially in scope). Document the exclusivity of defence deployments if you rely on the carve-out. (EUR-Lex)
GPAI suppliers: If you place a foundation model on the EU market, expect Chapter V duties regardless of defence customers. (EUR-Lex)
No RBI demos on the show floor. Those prohibitions already apply in 2025. (EUR-Lex)
Planning EU flight tests for civil variants? Prepare for real-world testing conditions (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (EUR-Lex)
For civil UAS commercialisation, treat your autonomy as high-risk (EASA product-safety route), budget time for conformity assessment and CE marking. (EUR-Lex)

If you are a European ministry or agency:

Distinguish military operations (out of scope) from law-enforcement or border uses (in scope; watch RBI limits and high-risk duties). Consider Article 46 emergency derogations only in exceptional and documented cases. (EUR-Lex)

If you are a civil UAS integrator:

Expect the full high-risk package (risk management, data governance, human oversight, cybersecurity, logs, conformity assessment, CE). Build compliance into your system architecture, ML pipelines, safety cases, and ops manuals from day one. (EUR-Lex)

10) Quick decision pathway

Is the use exclusively defence or national security?
Yes: AI system is out of scope.
No: continue. (EUR-Lex)
Is it a civil product or law-enforcement/border use?
Civil product with safety function (for example, civil UAS): High-risk via Annex I ? conformity assessment + CE. (EUR-Lex)
Stand-alone sensitive use (for example, RBI, critical infrastructure): Annex III high-risk or Article 5 prohibition applies. (EUR-Lex)
Is there a GPAI model being placed on the EU market?
Yes: Chapter V duties for model providers from 2 Aug 2025, separate from the defence carve-out for systems. (EUR-Lex)
Is this pre-market testing?
Real-world testing rules apply (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (EUR-Lex)

Bottom line for “Autonomous Fighters in Rome”

A military-only display of GA-ASI’s autonomous fighters is outside the AI Act.
Any civil spin-off (cargo drones, civil surveillance, airport ops) or law-enforcement application in the EU will trigger the Act — often at the high-risk level — together with tight prohibitions around biometric uses in public spaces. Plan your compliance architecture accordingly. (EUR-Lex)

This article is informational and not legal advice. Citations are to the Official Journal text of the Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) for scope (Art. 2), prohibitions (Art. 5), high-risk regime (Ch. III), real-world testing (Arts. 57–61), GPAI (Ch. V incl. Art. 53), timelines (Art. 113), and penalties (Art. 99–101).

About the author — Richard Ryan

Richard Ryan is a UK barrister (Direct Access), mediator and Chartered Arbitrator (FCIArb), and a Bencher of Gray’s Inn. He practises across defence, aerospace, construction, engineering and commodities, with a leading specialism in drone and counter-drone law, unmanned aviation regulation, and AI-enabled safety and compliance. Richard advises government, primes and operators on EU/UK UAS frameworks, BVLOS, U-space/UTM and the EU AI Act. He leads Blakiston’s Chambers and contributes regularly to industry guidance and policy consultations.

The post How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean appeared first on Blakistons.

A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots

admin.richard — Thu, 06 Nov 2025 17:53:49 +0000

By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer

Constructive outcome, practical lessons. A technical proximity breach was confirmed, a more serious allegation was dismissed, and there are clear takeaways that raise standards on evidence, cooperation and public safety.

Outcome at a glance

Count 1 (conviction): Operating an unmanned aircraft close to the site of an ongoing emergency response — Air Navigation Order 2016 Articles 265B(3), 265B(5)(j) and 265F(3)(c) (reflecting UAS.OPEN.060(3)).
Count 2 (dismissed): Obstructing or hindering emergency workers — Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act 2006, sections 1 and 4 — no case to answer.
Sentence: £300 (reduced from £2,500). Deprivation order refused — the client’s equipment will be returned.

Competence, cooperation and public interest flying

The client is an experienced operator with hundreds of hours and thousands of flights, combining sound aviation literacy with routine work around public interest incidents. On the day in question, the client used aircraft tracking tools and air band monitoring, maintained a conservative standoff where no formal cordon existed, and landed promptly when requested by police. This was a measured and safety first response in a dynamic setting.

Lesson 1: Telemetry clarity

When presenting flight data, clarity matters. Plot the flight path with a thin, precise line so the base map remains legible, including fences, road edges, cordons and measured standoffs. A thick line can obscure the very features that prove separation.

Keep a clean thin line map and a forensic overlay with timestamps for take off, orbit points, return to home and landing, plus measured distances to fixed features.
Use a thin line that clearly shows accurate telemetry when placed on a map, not a thick line that obscures part of the map.

Lesson 2: Plan for seizure and understand where DJI DAT lives

High fidelity DJI DAT logs are stored on the aircraft and typically require connecting the drone to a computer to extract. If a drone is seized by police, immediate access to those DAT files is difficult.

Build redundancy: back up app and controller logs after each flight, use screen recordings of the flight user interface, and capture independent stills or video.
For sensitive assignments, consider periodic DAT offloads in advance.

Five straightforward commitments

Thin line telemetry as the default for mapping outputs.
Evidence resilience: dual path logging (logs plus screen capture) and periodic DAT offloads.
Proportionate communications near emergency activity where appropriate.
A simple one page ops note on every job covering airspace, standoffs and abort triggers.
Calm, courteous engagement with officers, with a record of powers used and a property schedule if equipment is seized.

Technical reference: cross motorway separation

To contextualise the judge’s description (opposite side of a six lane motorway plus hard shoulder plus verge), the following uses standard UK dimensions.

Assumptions from UK highway standards

Lane width (motorways): 3.65 m per lane (DMRB CD 127). [1]
Hard shoulder width: 3.3 m (National Highways). [2]
Central reservation (median): assume about 3.0 m (DMRB derived guidance). [3]
Verge: varies by site; on trunk roads, about 3.0 m is common. Use 2.0 to 3.0 m to bracket reality. [4]

Baseline components

Six lanes = 6 x 3.65 = 21.90 m. [1]
Two hard shoulders = 6.60 m. [2]
Central reservation (median) about 3.00 m. [3]
Verge per side about 2.0 to 3.0 m. [4]

Real world lateral separation (verge to verge)

Distance = 6 lanes + 2 x hard shoulder + 2 x verge + median

With 2.0 m verges (conservative): 21.90 + 6.60 + 4.00 + 3.00 = 35.50 m
With 3.0 m verges (typical): 21.90 + 6.60 + 6.00 + 3.00 = 37.50 m

Figure to use: about 37.5 m horizontal separation verge to verge (typical). Lower bound: about 35.5 m if verges are unusually narrow.

Lean reading (narrow phrasing)

Six lanes plus one hard shoulder plus one verge (omitting the median and the opposite side shoulder and verge):

21.90 + 3.30 + (2.0 to 3.0) = 27.2 to 28.2 m

This underestimates the physical cross section that most operators and engineers would use.

Add altitude for slant distance

If height is h, the slant range is sqrt(lateral^2 + h^2).

With 37.5 m lateral: 48.0 m at 30 m AGL, 70.8 m at 60 m, 125.7 m at 120 m.
With 35.5 m lateral: 46.5 m at 30 m, 69.2 m at 60 m, 124.2 m at 120 m.

Practical effect: even before adding any field offset inside the field beyond the verge, cross motorway separation is around 36 to 38 m. Any field offset adds to that figure. Slant range increases further with altitude.

Standards: DMRB CD 127, National Highways, TII DN GEO 03036, Transport Scotland.

Bottom line

This is a constructive outcome. The most serious allegation fell away, the fine is modest, and the client retains their equipment. More importantly, the experience is being used to lead on best practice: clearer telemetry, stronger data resilience and exemplary on scene conduct, supporting emergency services, informing the public and keeping UK skies safe.

About the author

Richard Ryan is a Barrister (Direct Access), Mediator and Chartered Arbitrator based in the UK, specialising in drone and counter-drone law, aviation regulation, and complex commercial disputes. He advises operators, insurers and public bodies on SORA/AAE approvals, BVLOS programmes, privacy/data governance, and risk allocation across the drone ecosystem.

This post is for general information only and is not legal advice.

The post A Constructive Outcome for Safer Skies: What the Client’s Case Means for UK Drone Pilots appeared first on Blakistons.

What the UK Drone Industry Can Learn from EASA’s Adoption of SORA 2.5

admin.richard — Tue, 30 Sep 2025 10:57:46 +0000

By Richard Ryan, Barrister & Drone Lawyer •
30th September 2025

Introduction

On 29 September 2025, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published ED Decision 2025/018/R, updating the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947. This update introduces the European version of the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) 2.5, developed by the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS).

Although the UK has left the EU regulatory framework, these developments are highly relevant. UK operators, manufacturers, and regulators can learn much from how EASA is simplifying compliance, clarifying roles, and promoting harmonisation across Member States.

What Changed under SORA 2.5?

Simplification of procedures: Ambiguities from earlier SORA versions have been removed, making it easier for operators and authorities to understand their obligations.
Clarity of roles: Responsibilities are now more clearly divided between operators, designers, and manufacturers. For example, design verification reports (DVRs) from EASA are required at SAIL IV, and type certification is required at SAIL V and VI.
Terminology alignment: EU-specific terms replace JARUS wording. For instance, “EVLOS” has been dropped in favour of “BVLOS with airspace observer”.
Containment requirements: Refined criteria for ground risk buffers and adjacent ground areas, particularly relevant for BVLOS and urban operations.
Flexibility for competent authorities: NAAs can use direct assessment, recognised entities, or qualified entities to review compliance.
Removal of weak cybersecurity rules: EASA stripped out JARUS’s cybersecurity provisions, deeming them disproportionate, but stressed that vulnerability assessments remain best practice.

Lessons for the UK CAA

Consistency and clarity – EASA has responded to industry feedback by clarifying operator versus manufacturer responsibilities. The UK’s guidance could benefit from similar precision, particularly in BVLOS authorisations.
Streamlining approvals – The two-phase SORA process (Phase 1 for risk identification, Phase 2 for compliance evidence) allows operators to obtain early regulatory feedback. This approach could make the UK’s OSC process faster and more predictable.
Population density mapping – EASA now recommends more accurate, dynamic maps to avoid over- or under-estimating risk in commercial and recreational areas. The UK could adopt a similar model, especially for urban drone delivery corridors.
Terminology alignment – Dropping “EVLOS” in favour of “BVLOS with AO” reflects operational reality and removes confusion. The UK should consider whether maintaining unique terminology helps or hinders international harmonisation.
Cybersecurity gap – By removing JARUS’s rules but encouraging vulnerability assessments, EASA has left space for proportionate, risk-based security. The CAA could similarly mandate cybersecurity risk assessments in line with wider aviation resilience standards.

Best Practice for UK Drone Pilots and Operators

Adopt SORA 2.5 methodology voluntarily – Even though the UK hasn’t formally adopted it, operators preparing risk assessments will benefit from aligning with European standards, especially if seeking approvals abroad.
Keep clear records – Maintain compliance matrices and comprehensive safety portfolios (CSPs) as outlined in SORA 2.5. This not only supports OSC applications but also protects operators in audits and insurance claims.
Use accurate population data – Don’t rely solely on outdated maps; supplement with local knowledge, real-time data, or site surveys to avoid underestimating risk.
Plan robust contingency procedures – Ensure abnormal and emergency procedures are well defined, tested, and rehearsed with crew. The new focus on containment means that “fly-away” risks must be demonstrably controlled.
Stay ahead on cybersecurity – Even though not mandated, conduct vulnerability assessments for command-and-control links and data storage. Cyber weaknesses could undermine insurance and liability cover.

Conclusion

EASA’s adoption of SORA 2.5 is a significant step towards regulatory clarity and harmonisation across Europe. The UK CAA should take note: simplifying authorisations, clarifying roles, and embracing proportionate risk-based approaches would strengthen the UK’s position as a leader in drone regulation.

For operators and pilots, the message is clear: best practice means anticipating international standards, not just meeting the minimum domestic requirement.

At Blakiston’s Chambers we advise drone operators, manufacturers, and service providers on all aspects of UK drone law, including airspace rights, regulatory compliance, and litigation risk. If your business is concerned about trespass or overflight liability, our team can help.

The post What the UK Drone Industry Can Learn from EASA’s Adoption of SORA 2.5 appeared first on Blakistons.

Trespass by Drones: Is Section 76 Civil Aviation Act 1982 Fit for Purpose?

admin.richard — Tue, 30 Sep 2025 09:51:14 +0000

Blakiston’s Chambers – Insight for Drone Operators •
30th September 2025

Why this matters for drone companies

The question of whether a drone operator can be sued for trespass when flying over private land is no longer a theoretical debate. With drones now routinely used for surveying, deliveries, inspections, and filming, landowners are increasingly asking whether they can stop flights above their property.

At the heart of this issue lies section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. Originally drafted for manned aviation, it has never been fully adapted to the realities of drones flying close to the ground, often well below 400 feet.

Recent High Court cases – Anglo-International Upholland Ltd v Wainwright (2023) and MBR Acres Ltd v Curtin (2025) – have thrown the law into sharper focus. For drone operators, the practical question is whether your drone can legally enter the airspace above a neighbour’s land without risking an injunction or damages claim.

Trespass: the basic position

Trespass is normally straightforward: step onto someone’s land without permission, and you’re liable – even if you cause no harm. Landowners don’t need to prove loss; mere entry is enough.

But what about airspace? Does a landowner “own the sky” above their property? Historically, English law used the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum – whoever owns the soil owns all the way up to the heavens. Courts have long since rejected that absolute view. Instead, the law recognises ownership only of the airspace “necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the land”.

For manned aircraft, Parliament drew a compromise in section 76(1): flights at a “reasonable height” cannot be challenged as trespass or nuisance. But what is a “reasonable height” when drones are often flown at 50 metres, 20 metres, or even lower?

Bernstein and the buffer zone

In Bernstein v Skyviews (1978), a landowner sued after an aircraft flew hundreds of feet above his estate to take photographs. The court held that this was not trespass, because the aircraft was too high to interfere with the landowner’s use of his land.

That decision gave us a rough principle: landowners control only the slice of airspace that matters to their ordinary use of land. The problem is that drones now operate in precisely that slice – near buildings, gardens, roads, and industrial sites – where interference with land use is most likely.

The new drone cases

1. Anglo-International (2023)

Drone flights over a derelict college were used to capture images which encouraged trespassers to enter the site. The judge treated the flights as mischievous and granted an injunction, holding that section 76 did not protect the operators.

The ruling was short and did not carefully analyse airspace ownership or flight height, but it showed courts are willing to act against drone flights if their purpose is seen as facilitating trespass or mischief.

2. MBR Acres (2025)

Animal rights campaigners used drones to film over a research facility. Some drones were flown as low as the height of a single-storey building, but evidence on height and operators was inconsistent.

The judge refused to grant an injunction. He accepted that flights at 50 metres or more did not interfere with the use of the land. Importantly, he suggested that other legal remedies – nuisance, harassment, or data protection – might be more appropriate than trespass.

What this means for drone operators

Trespass claims are harder to make stick than many landowners think. Courts are reluctant to find trespass unless flights interfere with the actual use of land (e.g. disrupting activity on site, flying extremely low, or endangering people).
Section 76 may be becoming redundant. Both Bernstein and MBR Acres suggest that unless a flight interferes with land use, there is no trespass at all – making section 76’s “reasonable height” defence almost irrelevant.
Purpose of flight matters – at least sometimes. In Anglo-International, mischievous use of drones was enough to justify an injunction. Operators engaged in legitimate commercial activity (surveying, deliveries, inspections) are on stronger ground.
Evidence is critical. Landowners will struggle to obtain injunctions unless they can prove height, frequency, and impact of flights. For operators, maintaining robust flight logs and compliance records (as required by the UK drone regulations) is the best defence.
Regulatory compliance is non-negotiable. Section 76 only protects operators if flights are lawful. Breach of drone regulations (flying beyond visual line of sight, too close to people, or over congested areas without permissions) will undermine any defence.

Looking ahead

The law remains unsettled. Drone operators should assume:

Routine overflights at safe, documented altitudes are unlikely to amount to trespass, provided they don’t interfere with land use.
Low-level flights directly over private land remain risky, particularly if they appear intrusive, harassing, or unsafe.
Other causes of action are emerging – nuisance, data protection, and harassment are likely to be more powerful tools for landowners than trespass.

For commercial operators, the key is to plan flight paths with landowner sensitivities in mind, document compliance, and keep up with evolving case law. What remains unclear is whether Parliament will modernise section 76 to deal explicitly with drones – or whether the courts will continue to adapt 20th-century law to 21st-century technology.

Blakiston’s Chambers advises drone operators, manufacturers, and service providers on all aspects of UK drone law, including airspace rights, regulatory compliance, and litigation risk. If your business is concerned about trespass or overflight liability, our team can help.

The post Trespass by Drones: Is Section 76 Civil Aviation Act 1982 Fit for Purpose? appeared first on Blakistons.

Transforming UK Airspace: A New Era for Drones and Aviation with NATS OpenAir

admin.richard — Tue, 26 Nov 2024 13:01:36 +0000

Transforming UK Airspace: A New Era for Drones and Aviation with NATS OpenAir

By Richard Ryan, Drone Lawyer

The skies over the UK are on the verge of a transformative shift, thanks to the ambitious NATS OpenAir initiative. Designed to integrate drones and advanced air mobility (eVTOLs) into shared airspace alongside traditional aircraft, the proposal promises innovation, efficiency, and safety. But as with any grand vision, the devil is in the detail.
Here’s an in-depth look at what the OpenAir initiative is getting right, where there are gaps, and how it can evolve to meet the needs of all airspace users.
________________________________________
1. Prioritising Data Privacy and Ownership

One of the most valuable resources in aviation is data. For drone operators, who depend on real-time information about flight paths, weather, and airspace restrictions, access to reliable data is critical. However, the OpenAir proposal is light on specifics about who owns the data and how privacy will be protected.
Without clear protections, drone operators might worry about their data being exploited—whether commercially or in ways that jeopardise their competitive edge.

The Fix:
OpenAir must adopt a clear data privacy framework. Operators should retain ownership of their data, with mandatory anonymisation for any information shared beyond essential safety and operational use. Only the bare minimum of data required for regulatory compliance should be shared, and stringent safeguards must prevent its misuse.
________________________________________
2. Keeping the Playing Field Fair

OpenAir is envisioned as a centralised hub for managing UK airspace, which sounds great—until you consider the potential impact on smaller players. Consolidating services under one entity like OpenAir might inadvertently stifle competition among Uncrewed Traffic Management Service Providers (UTMSPs).

The Fix:
To level the playing field, OpenAir should adopt open standards that allow seamless third-party integration. Smaller UTMSPs must be supported, not sidelined. Clear rules around equitable access to data and services will ensure innovation thrives without creating monopolies.
________________________________________
3. Setting Realistic Timelines

Integrating drones and eVTOLs into shared airspace isn’t a simple task. OpenAir’s proposed rollout timeline—beginning pilots in 2025 and achieving full deployment by 2028—might be overly ambitious, especially given the complexity of regulatory approvals and the need for robust infrastructure.

The Fix:
A phased approach with realistic benchmarks is the way forward. OpenAir should focus on pilot projects in key areas where demand is highest (e.g., urban delivery drones or emergency medical services). This would provide valuable data to refine the system while reducing the risk of rushed implementation.
________________________________________
4. Managing Costs for Drone Operators

OpenAir’s “user pays” principle makes sense in theory—those who use the airspace services should cover the costs. But smaller operators, such as local delivery drone companies, could be disproportionately affected by high fees, potentially pricing them out of the market.

The Fix:
Introduce tiered pricing. Small operators should pay less, at least during the initial phases. Alternatively, subsidies or credits could be offered to early adopters, ensuring fair access while fostering adoption across the board.
________________________________________
5. Addressing Legal Grey Areas

OpenAir aligns with the UK’s Airspace Modernisation Strategy, but its relationship with existing regulations like CAP 722 (which governs drone operations) needs to be crystal clear. Ambiguities in compliance requirements could delay approvals or lead to legal disputes.
Similarly, liability concerns loom large. If there’s a system outage or data error, who’s responsible for the fallout? Drone operators? OpenAir? The CAA? NATS? DfT?

The Fix:
OpenAir must explicitly state how its services integrate with CAP 722, especially for critical areas like Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations. As for liability, service agreements must clearly define responsibilities, ensuring all parties—operators, OpenAir, and regulators—understand their obligations.
________________________________________
6. Building Trust Through Transparency

For OpenAir to succeed, trust is key. Stakeholders—including drone operators, regulators, and public service agencies—must feel confident in the system’s fairness and security.

The Fix:
Establish an independent advisory board with representatives from all key groups, including Blakiston’s Chambers! This board would oversee the rollout of OpenAir, ensuring transparency and accountability. Regular public updates and feedback sessions would further build trust and address concerns early.
________________________________________
7. Looking to the Future

The potential of OpenAir is undeniable. By creating a unified platform for managing UK airspace, it could unlock opportunities ranging from efficient logistics to life-saving medical deliveries. But to truly succeed, OpenAir must:
1. Prioritise data privacy and ownership.
2. Ensure fair competition for all service providers.
3. Adopt a phased, realistic rollout plan.
4. Keep costs manageable for smaller operators.
5. Align with existing regulations like CAP 722.
6. Address liability concerns upfront.
7. Foster trust through transparency and stakeholder engagement.

The skies above us are changing, and with thoughtful planning, OpenAir could make the UK a global leader in integrated airspace management. But to get there, it must balance ambition with practicality, ensuring the system works for everyone—from global eVTOL operators to local delivery drones.
________________________________________
What do you think about the OpenAir proposal? Share your thoughts, especially if you’re a drone operator or part of the aviation industry. Your feedback could shape the future of our skies!

About the Author
Richard Ryan is a UK-based barrister and drone law expert with over 20 years of legal experience. Specializing in regulatory, operational, and safety challenges, Richard advises defence companies, regulatory bodies, and government agencies on the complexities of UAS operations. A former advisor to the UK Civil Aviation Authority and the House of Lords’ AUTMA committee, Richard is currently pursuing a PhD at Cranfield University, focusing on the legal implications of drone integration into global airspace.
Richard combines his legal expertise with a deep understanding of defence operations, having served in the British Army, including deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. His insights bridge the gap between operational realities and legal requirements, ensuring clients navigate the rapidly evolving world of drone technology with confidence.

The post Transforming UK Airspace: A New Era for Drones and Aviation with NATS OpenAir appeared first on Blakistons.

Drone Operators: Navigating the Legal Landscape of Trespass

zeroabove — Wed, 25 Sep 2024 11:38:53 +0000

With the growing use of drones in commercial operations, the recent Anglo International Upholland Ltd v Wainwright [2023] case sets an important legal precedent for drone operators. The High Court ruled that flying drones over private property can constitute trespass, especially when used to capture images that facilitate unlawful activity, such as trespass.

This case highlights the complexity of balancing Section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 with trespass laws. Section 76 offers protection when drones fly at a “reasonable height,” but this case found that using drones for unauthorised photography over a site nullified such protection. Additionally, the court ruled that the very act of flying drones for unlawful purposes could constitute trespass, even without exact evidence on flight height.

For drone operators, this ruling underlines the need for compliance with air navigation laws, obtaining property owner consent, and carefully considering the purpose and operation of drone flights. As the sector evolves, it’s crucial to stay updated with legal developments to avoid potential liability.

Key Takeaways:

Section 76 protections may not apply if drones are used for improper purposes.
The court is increasingly willing to view drone use in trespass contexts.

Drone operators should obtain permission for flights over private property and comply with regulations to mitigate legal risks.
A list of relevant questions for the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in light of the Anglo International Upholland Ltd v Wainwright [2023] case:

How does the CAA interpret “reasonable height” under Section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 for drone flights over private property?
Does the CAA plan to update its guidance on drone operations to address trespass concerns post- Wainwright*?
What steps should drone operators take to ensure compliance with both air navigation laws and property trespass rules
Will there be new regulations requiring landowner consent for drones flying over private property?
How does the CAA plan to enforce penalties for drones used unlawfully over private property?
Could the CAA clarify its position on privacy violations and trespass when drones capture images without consent?
What considerations are in place for determining unlawful drone use, even if the flight does not breach flight height limits?
Is there a possibility for the CAA to introduce more stringent guidelines for recreational versus commercial drone flights regarding private land?
How should drone operators document compliance to avoid liability under both CAA regulations and civil trespass claims?
Does the CAA foresee future collaborations with property law bodies to provide comprehensive guidance on airspace use above private land?

Let’s see if the UK CAA responds… Richard Ryan, barrister

Blakiston’s Chambers – “Leading the way in drone and counter-drone law, safeguarding airspace innovation and security.”

richard.ryan@blakistons.com

The post Drone Operators: Navigating the Legal Landscape of Trespass appeared first on Blakistons.