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		<title>How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean</title>
		<link>https://blakistons.co.uk/how-europes-new-ai-rulebook-would-and-wouldnt-touch-autonomous-combat-aircraft-and-what-the-defence-carveouts-really-mean/</link>
		
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		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Nov 2025 18:28:20 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft — and what the defence carve-outs really mean. In Brief&#8230; Purely military AI systems are out of scope of the EU AI Act. If an AI system is developed or used exclusively for military/defence or national-security [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/how-europes-new-ai-rulebook-would-and-wouldnt-touch-autonomous-combat-aircraft-and-what-the-defence-carveouts-really-mean/">How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<div>
By Richard Ryan, barrister and drone lawyer </p>
<p><em>How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft — and what the defence carve-outs really mean.</em></p>
<hr />
<h3>In Brief&#8230;</h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Purely military AI systems are out of scope</strong> of the EU AI Act. If an AI system is <strong>developed or used exclusively for military/defence or national-security purposes</strong>, the Act does not apply. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Dual-use is different.</strong> If the same autonomy stack, sensors or models are marketed or used for <strong>civilian</strong> purposes in the EU (for example, civil UAS, border or law-enforcement tasks), the Act can apply — with stringent duties for “high-risk” systems. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Real-world testing is regulated.</strong> Pre-market R&amp;D is generally excluded, <strong>but real-world testing isn’t</strong> — it requires specific safeguards and registration. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Foundation models (GPAI)</strong> have their own rules from <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>; the defence carve-out in the Act is written for <strong>AI systems</strong>, not explicitly for <strong>models</strong>. If a model is placed on the EU market generally, the provider’s GPAI obligations can still bite. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<blockquote>
<p><strong>Context:</strong> sUAS News reports that GA-ASI is showcasing its autonomous fighter portfolio (for example, YFQ-42A CCA, MQ-20 Avenger) at the International Fighter Conference in Rome, 4–6 Nov 2025. This post overlays that scenario with the EU AI Act’s rules.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<h2>1) First principles: When does the EU AI Act apply?</h2>
<p>The Act has <strong>extraterritorial reach</strong>. It covers (i) providers and deployers in the EU, (ii) providers placing on the EU market or putting systems into service in the EU — even if they are not established here — and (iii) providers/deployers in third countries <strong>where the AI system’s output is used in the EU</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<p>However, <strong>Article 2(3)</strong> draws a bright line: the Act <strong>does not apply</strong> to <strong>AI systems used exclusively</strong> for <strong>military, defence or national security</strong>. It also does not apply where a system is <strong>not</strong> placed on the EU market but its <strong>output is used in the EU exclusively</strong> for those purposes. Recital 24 reiterates this and clarifies that <strong>non-defence use falls back under the Act</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<p><strong>What this means in Rome:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>closed, defence-only</strong> showcase for European militaries: <strong>out of scope</strong>.</li>
<li>A <strong>civil-use pitch</strong>, civil flight trials, or plans to sell autonomy modules to <strong>EU civilian buyers</strong>: <strong>in scope</strong> (see the high-risk section below). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>2) The key defence carve-outs (and their limits)</h2>
<p><strong>Carve-out #1 — Defence/military:</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>“This Regulation shall not apply to AI systems … used exclusively for military, defence or national security purposes.” (Article 2(3))</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Two important nuances:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Exclusivity matters.</strong> The moment an autonomy stack or sensor suite is also <strong>marketed or used for civilian</strong> or law-enforcement tasks, the <strong>defence exclusion no longer shields those non-defence uses</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Models vs systems.</strong> The text explicitly excludes <strong>AI systems</strong> for defence; it <strong>does not create an explicit defence exclusion for general-purpose AI models</strong>. If a <strong>GPAI model</strong> is <strong>placed on the EU market</strong>, Chapter V obligations for model providers can still apply — even if one downstream customer is a defence user. (More on GPAI below.) (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Carve-out #2 — Pre-market R&amp;D:</strong><br />
  R&amp;D <strong>before</strong> placing on the market is generally outside scope, <strong>but real-world testing is not</strong>. Testing in real-world conditions triggers a dedicated regime (for example, registration, time limits, informed consent or special conditions for law enforcement, incident reporting). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<p><strong>Carve-out #3 — Emergency derogations (non-defence):</strong><br />
  For <strong>exceptional public-security reasons</strong> (or imminent threats to life/health), <strong>market surveillance authorities</strong> can authorise <strong>temporary use</strong> of a high-risk AI system <strong>before</strong> full conformity assessment — subject to strict conditions. Law-enforcement or civil-protection bodies can also use in urgent cases, then seek authorisation without undue delay. This is <strong>not</strong> a defence-specific carve-out, but it explains emergency deployments outside the military context. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>3) If the defence exclusion doesn’t apply, would autonomous fighters tech be “high-risk”?</h2>
<p>Very likely <strong>yes</strong> — for <strong>civil</strong> variants or dual-use spin-outs:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Annex I (product-safety route).</strong> AI that is a <strong>safety component</strong> of products covered by sectoral EU safety laws is <strong>high-risk</strong> where those products need <strong>third-party conformity assessment</strong>. That list <strong>explicitly includes EU civil aviation law (Reg. 2018/1139)</strong> — covering <strong>unmanned aircraft</strong> and their remotely controllable equipment. In a civil-UAS configuration, an autonomy stack acting as a safety component would be regulated as <strong>high-risk</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Annex III (stand-alone uses).</strong> Separate “high-risk” buckets also capture, for example, <strong>remote biometric identification</strong> and other sensitive functions (if and where permitted by Union/national law), <strong>critical infrastructure</strong> safety components, and more. If a fighter-born sensing suite were repurposed for <strong>civil border surveillance</strong> or <strong>public-space identification</strong>, you quickly hit these Annex III categories. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>What “high-risk” demands in practice</strong><br />
  Providers must implement a <strong>risk-management system</strong>, <strong>data governance</strong>, <strong>technical documentation</strong>, <strong>logging</strong>, <strong>transparency/instructions</strong>, <strong>human oversight</strong>, and <strong>accuracy/robustness/cybersecurity</strong> — then pass <strong>conformity assessment</strong>, issue an <strong>EU Declaration of Conformity</strong>, and affix <strong>CE marking</strong>. Deployers also carry duties (for example, monitoring, data relevance, user notification in some cases). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>4) Sensors on show: what about face recognition and other “red lines”?</h2>
<p>The <strong>EU bans</strong> several AI practices outright (from <strong>2 Feb 2025</strong>), including:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Untargeted scraping</strong> of facial images to build recognition databases.</li>
<li><strong>Biometric categorisation</strong> inferring sensitive traits (for example, race, political opinions, religion).</li>
<li><strong>Emotion recognition</strong> in workplaces or schools (with narrow safety/medical exceptions).</li>
<li><strong>Predictive “risk assessments”</strong> of criminality based solely on personality traits/profiling.</li>
<li><strong>Real-time remote biometric identification (RBI) in public spaces for law enforcement</strong> — <strong>unless</strong> strictly authorised and necessary for narrowly defined objectives (for example, locating a specific suspect in serious crimes, preventing a specific imminent threat, finding missing persons), with prior judicial/independent approval and registration. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Implication for a trade-show demo:</strong> training a camera on attendees to test <strong>real-time RBI</strong> in a public venue would <strong>likely be unlawful</strong> unless those strict law-enforcement exceptions and procedural safeguards apply — which they typically <strong>will not</strong> at a commercial defence conference. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>5) Real-world testing in the EU (civil or dual-use variants)</h2>
<p>If a provider runs <strong>real-world flight tests</strong> in the EU (outside the defence exclusion), the Act requires — among other things — <strong>registration</strong>, an EU-established entity or <strong>EU legal representative</strong>, limits on <strong>duration</strong> (normally up to six months, extendable once), rules on <strong>informed consent</strong> (with special handling for law-enforcement tests), <strong>qualified oversight</strong>, and the ability to <strong>reverse/ignore</strong> the system’s outputs. <strong>Serious incidents</strong> must be reported promptly. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>6) Foundation models (GPAI): obligations can still attach</h2>
<p>From <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>, <strong>Chapter V</strong> sets <strong>baseline transparency and copyright-policy duties</strong> for <strong>providers of general-purpose AI models</strong> (with extra obligations if the model presents <strong>systemic risks</strong>). The defence exclusion in Article 2(3) is framed for <strong>AI systems</strong>, not <strong>models</strong>. So, if a foundation model is <strong>placed on the EU market</strong>, the <strong>model provider</strong> can have obligations even if a downstream customer is a defence prime. (Open-source specifics and systemic-risk thresholds also apply.) (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</p>
<hr />
<h2>7) Timelines you need in Rome (as of 6 Nov 2025)</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Entry into force:</strong> 1 Aug 2024 (20 days after OJ publication).</li>
<li><strong>Prohibited practices + core chapters (I–II):</strong> apply from <strong>2 Feb 2025</strong>.</li>
<li><strong>GPAI rules (Chapter V), plus other chapters (III §4, VII, XII, and Article 78):</strong> apply from <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>.</li>
<li><strong>General application:</strong> <strong>2 Aug 2026</strong> (high-risk regime starts to bite broadly).</li>
<li><strong>Article 6(1) Annex III classification trigger &amp; related obligations:</strong> <strong>2 Aug 2027</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>8) Enforcement and penalties</h2>
<ul>
<li>Violating <strong>prohibited practices</strong> (Article 5) can draw fines up to <strong>€35m or 7%</strong> of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.</li>
<li>Other operator obligations can reach <strong>€15m or 3%</strong>; supplying <strong>misleading information</strong> can reach <strong>€7.5m or 1%</strong> (SMEs benefit from caps). Separate fine scales apply to EU institutions. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>9) Practical playbook for IFC attendees</h2>
<p><strong>If you are a defence OEM showing autonomy stacks:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Map uses</strong>: Defence-only (excluded) vs <strong>any civil or law-enforcement</strong> pathways (potentially in scope). Document the <strong>exclusivity</strong> of defence deployments if you rely on the carve-out. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>GPAI suppliers</strong>: If you place a <strong>foundation model</strong> on the EU market, expect <strong>Chapter V</strong> duties regardless of defence customers. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>No RBI demos</strong> on the show floor. Those prohibitions already apply in 2025. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li><strong>Planning EU flight tests</strong> for civil variants? Prepare for <strong>real-world testing</strong> conditions (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
<li>For <strong>civil UAS commercialisation</strong>, treat your autonomy as <strong>high-risk</strong> (EASA product-safety route), budget time for <strong>conformity assessment</strong> and <strong>CE marking</strong>. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>If you are a European ministry or agency:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Distinguish <strong>military operations</strong> (out of scope) from <strong>law-enforcement or border</strong> uses (in scope; watch <strong>RBI</strong> limits and high-risk duties). Consider <strong>Article 46</strong> emergency derogations only in <strong>exceptional</strong> and <strong>documented</strong> cases. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>If you are a civil UAS integrator:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Expect the full <strong>high-risk</strong> package (risk management, data governance, human oversight, cybersecurity, logs, conformity assessment, CE). Build compliance into your <strong>system architecture</strong>, <strong>ML pipelines</strong>, <strong>safety cases</strong>, and <strong>ops manuals</strong> from day one. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<h2>10) Quick decision pathway</h2>
<ol>
<li><strong>Is the use exclusively defence or national security?</strong><br />
      Yes: AI <strong>system</strong> is <strong>out of scope</strong>.<br />
      No: continue. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
<li><strong>Is it a civil product or law-enforcement/border use?</strong><br />
      Civil product with safety function (for example, civil UAS): <strong>High-risk</strong> via <strong>Annex I</strong> ? conformity assessment + CE. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)<br />
      Stand-alone sensitive use (for example, RBI, critical infrastructure): <strong>Annex III</strong> high-risk or <strong>Article 5</strong> prohibition applies. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
<li><strong>Is there a GPAI model being placed on the EU market?</strong><br />
      Yes: <strong>Chapter V</strong> duties for <strong>model providers</strong> from <strong>2 Aug 2025</strong>, separate from the defence carve-out for systems. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
<li><strong>Is this pre-market testing?</strong><br />
      <strong>Real-world testing</strong> rules apply (registration, oversight, incident reporting). (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)
    </li>
</ol>
<hr />
<h3>Bottom line for “Autonomous Fighters in Rome”</h3>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>military-only</strong> display of GA-ASI’s autonomous fighters is <strong>outside</strong> the AI Act.</li>
<li>Any <strong>civil</strong> spin-off (cargo drones, civil surveillance, airport ops) or <strong>law-enforcement</strong> application in the EU will trigger the Act — often at the <strong>high-risk</strong> level — together with <strong>tight prohibitions</strong> around biometric uses in public spaces. Plan your <strong>compliance architecture</strong> accordingly. (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401689" target="_blank" rel="noopener">EUR-Lex</a>)</li>
</ul>
<p><em>This article is informational and not legal advice. Citations are to the Official Journal text of the <strong>Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689)</strong> for scope (Art. 2), prohibitions (Art. 5), high-risk regime (Ch. III), real-world testing (Arts. 57–61), GPAI (Ch. V incl. Art. 53), timelines (Art. 113), and penalties (Art. 99–101).</em></p>
<hr />
<section aria-label="Author bio">
<p><strong>About the author — Richard Ryan</strong></p>
<p>Richard Ryan is a UK barrister (Direct Access), mediator and Chartered Arbitrator (FCIArb), and a Bencher of Gray’s Inn. He practises across defence, aerospace, construction, engineering and commodities, with a leading specialism in drone and counter-drone law, unmanned aviation regulation, and AI-enabled safety and compliance. Richard advises government, primes and operators on EU/UK UAS frameworks, BVLOS, U-space/UTM and the EU AI Act. He leads Blakiston’s Chambers and contributes regularly to industry guidance and policy consultations.</p>
</section>
</div>
<p><!-- End blog content --></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/how-europes-new-ai-rulebook-would-and-wouldnt-touch-autonomous-combat-aircraft-and-what-the-defence-carveouts-really-mean/">How Europe’s new AI rulebook would (and wouldn’t) touch autonomous combat aircraft—and what the defence carve?outs really mean</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
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		<title>Who Wins? Drone operators or Local Government?</title>
		<link>https://blakistons.co.uk/drone-operators-vs-local-authorities-unraveling-legal-conflicts-in-uk-airspace-regulation/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[zeroabove]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Nov 2019 15:49:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Airspace Legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Industry Challenges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Local Government Policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Navigation Order 2016]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Airspace Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[airspace rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Byelaws]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CAA Policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CAP 722]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil Aviation Authority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict Pre-emption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Filming Permissions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Flight Restrictions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Drone Operators]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Ambiguity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Clarity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Local Authorities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operator vs Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Quasi-Legislation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK Drone Laws]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blakistons.co.uk/?p=142</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>1. This is a question that is increasingly being asked by operators, whereby institutions1 are coming into conflict with drone operators. Institutions are seeking to rely upon local law in support of their established authority. This question raises several fundamental issues that concern both legal and policy issues for all stakeholders. 2. The Regulator The [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/drone-operators-vs-local-authorities-unraveling-legal-conflicts-in-uk-airspace-regulation/">Who Wins? Drone operators or Local Government?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1. This is a question that is increasingly being asked by operators, whereby institutions<sup>1</sup> are coming into conflict with drone operators. Institutions are seeking to rely upon local law in support of their established authority. This question raises several fundamental issues that concern both legal and policy issues for all stakeholders.</p>
<p><strong>2. The Regulator</strong></p>
<p>The CAA policy in respect of this conflict of law is stated on its website as at 23 May 2018<sup>2</sup>:</p>
<p style="font-style: italic;">&#8220;On its own, the standard permission does not give the right to fly unhindered and you will still require permission from the owner, manager or <strong>authority</strong> for the land from which the drone will be <strong>taking off and landing</strong>.  The conditions of the permission will also require that you &#8216;have control&#8217; over the area you intend to use the camera-drone, and this includes any people or vehicles in the area over which you intend to fly the aircraft.  The minimum distances are stated on the permission. [emphasis added]</p>
<p class="p3"><span class="s2"><i>Before filming you need to ensure that you have:</i></span></p>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li4"><span class="s2"><i>Permission from the Civil Aviation Authority,</i></span></li>
<li class="li4"><span class="s2"><i>Permission from the owner, manager or authority for the land from which the SUA will be taking off and landing, </i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><i>Control over the area you intend to use the SUA, including any persons, vessels or vehicles in the area over which you intend to operate the aircraft.</i></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="p2"><span class="s2"><i>… The CAA permission for camera-drone flights only addresses the flight safety aspects of the flight and does not constitute permission to disregard the legitimate interests of other statutory bodies such as the Police and Emergency Services, the Highway Agency, </i><b><i>local authorities (and their agents) or any other statutory body</i></b><i>. [emphasis added]</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s2"><i>… In order to exercise the necessary &#8216;control&#8217; over a nearby public environment, it will often be necessary to contact the local authority to make suitable arrangements such as road-closures or other restrictions of access.” (note: this paragraph does not state that it is in the local authorities’ gift to grant such permission)</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s2">CAP 722<sup>3</sup> further states at Page 34:</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s2"><i>“3.5 A CAA permission only addresses the flight safety aspects of the flight operation and does not constitute permission to disregard the legitimate interests of other </i></span><span class="s3"><i>statutory bodies</i></span><span class="s2"><i> such as the Police and Emergency Services, the Highway Agency, Data Commission, Transport for London or </i></span><span class="s3"><i>local authorities</i></span><span class="s2"><i>.</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s2">At Page 118, Appendix A – Operational Factors for SUA Flights within Congested Areas:</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s2">At A1: …</span> <span class="s2"><i>The procedures must address all relevant aspects of the congested areas they intend to operate within, taking into account any special circumstances or local conditions. Such measures may include but not be limited to: … </i></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><i>Utilisation of other agencies. Liaising with the Police, </i></span><span class="s2"><i>local authorities</i></span><span class="s1"><i> and other controlling agencies/organisation to gain official road closures, traffic cessation or site access restrictions.</i></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">At Page 119, Site Survey Assessment:</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">At A4: <i>Typical elements of an assessment that could affect the safety of the flight would include:</i></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s2"><i>local by-laws</i></span><span class="s1"><i>;</i></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">At Page 132, at paragraph 4.5:</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><i>Operating site planning and assessment. {Airspace operating environment considerations and procedures (e.g. Controlled Airspace), operations near other aircraft operations (local aerodromes or operating sites), operations near industrial sites or such activities as live firing, gas venting, high-intensity radio transmissions etc., </i></span><span class="s2"><i>local byelaw considerations</i></span><span class="s1"><i>, obstructions…” [emphasis added]</i></span></p>
<p><b></b><span class="s2"><b>3. Institutions</b></span></p>
<p class="p3"><span class="s1">Some of the contentious actors are contained within this document, but there are many more from discussions with operators.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Conflict arises from institutions that do not understand the law, policy or for the most part how operators (PfCO<sup>4</sup> holders) become qualified.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Conflict therefore arises between Operators and local authorities or any other statutory body.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>For example, organisations such as the National Trust, English Heritage, Cardiff City Council, Leeds City Council, London Ports Authority<sup>5</sup> and Film London.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>What has become increasingly common, is the ability of these bodies to charge a fee whilst simultaneously reviewing all the work that the CAA completes when granting a PfCO. Current aviation law, insofar as UAS is concerned, has not carved out express laws for institutions to provide clarity in relation to conflict pre-emption.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The London Ports Authority for example can justify the use of drones when a fee is paid, but exclude its use when it is not:</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>“Unregulated and careless drone use carries many potential hazards – ranging from risk of injury to passengers / crew on boats through to collision with oncoming vessels. There are also hazards to users of London’s busy bridges and passenger piers.</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>Consequently, the river is </i><b><i>not a safe place</i></b><i> for the routine use of any type of low flying aircraft – manned or </i><b><i>unmanned.</i></b></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>…. </i><b><i>However</i></b><i>, there are occasions when professional </i><b><i>film makers request use of a drone</i></b><i> to film a particular scene or berth operators use them to survey their berth. In such instances, the request will be considered carefully… [emphasis added]</i></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Furthermore, constraints are placed upon the operator that mirror that of the CAA’s responsibility:</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>“A minimum of four weeks’ notice of must be provided</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>2. The application should include:</i></span></p>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li2"><span class="s1"><i>proposed time and duration of filming</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><i>proposed location (to include a diagram showing flight area and take-off and landing site for the drone)</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><b><i>risk assessment and method statement</i></b></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><b><i>insurance</i></b><i> including public liability</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><b><i>details of proposed drone operating company</i></b><i> – i.e. </i><b><i>CAA licences<sup>6</sup></i></b><i> / certificates; type / size / weight of UAV [sic] [emphasis added]</i></span></li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><i>3. Applicant will also need to secure the following written consents for the specific date and location:</i></span></p>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li1"><span class="s1"><i>Civil Aviation Authority</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s1"><i>National Air Traffic Services</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s1"><i>relevant riparian (riverside) local authority and landowner consent where the drone flight and exclusion area will impact on adjacent land</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s1"><i>Metropolitan Police filming unit (in the central London area)”</i></span></li>
</ul>
<p><span class="s1">4. Cardiff City Council imposes a fee through their film office:</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>“</i><b><i>Use of DRONES</i></b><i>: Filming with a drone/UAV on council land will require special permission and will incur an additional charge of £250 per day. Please note that, </i><b><i>in line with the guidance on flying drones set out by the Civil Aviation Authority, the use of drones is prohibited</i></b><i> at many Cardiff locations to non-professionals.” [emphasis added]</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1">Other councils are also seeking to rely on erroneous byelaws to prevent legitimate drone operators from filming.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>The perception is that city councils are happy to grant TV companies permission as the medium of television as seen as free advertising. It is apparent from the </span>above that the CAA is being used to justify the basis of charging a fee, when the legal position of the CAA is being misrepresented.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Operators are now utilising the power of social media to voice their concerns…</p>
<ol class="ol1">
<li class="li1"><i></i><span class="s2">The National Trust<sup>7</sup> go further in explaining that the legal position is unclear:</span></li>
</ol>
<p class="p1"><span class="s2"><i>“All aerial activity above our sites is prohibited unless specific permission is granted, according to an existing byelaw. The overall </i></span><span class="s3"><b><i>legal position regarding drones is somewhat unclear</i></b></span><span class="s2"><i> and subject to forthcoming government consultation. [emphasis added]</i></span></p>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><i>We do not grant permission for private flying for the following reasons; &#8211;</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><i>CAA regulations state that </i><b><i>drones should not be flown above or near to people<sup>8</sup></i></b><i>. As our properties often have staff living or working on site, visitors present or have open access, unauthorised drone flying is both illegal and potentially puts people at risk.</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><i>Few non-commercial users have the correct training or permission from the Civil Aviation Authority<sup>9</sup> to operate drones…</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><i>Many drones have cameras attached and these could infringe data protection laws (filming people without permission) and potentially could contravene National Trust rules<sup>10</sup> on commercial photography and filming.</i></span></li>
<li class="li1"><span class="s2"><i>The presence of drones can impinge on the quiet enjoyment of our sites by other visitors and therefore potentially presents a public nuisance<sup>11</sup> risk.” [emphasis added]</i></span></li>
</ul>
<p><b></b><span class="s2"><b>7. Operators</b></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s3">Guidance on what is permitted given what is stipulated within Article 94 &amp; 95 of the Air Navigation Order (ANO) 2016<sup>12</sup> as this is perceived as a conflict given that operators are satisfied that the flight can be conducted safely and within necessary distances.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>There seems to be a reliance by institutions that any operator must be professional without defining what <i>professional’</i> is.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Consider the fact that UAS operators, that have permit and have been assessed, often carry out work for TV organisations and/or fly in a wide range of conditions.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>How are institutions therefore justified in assessing what is professional? The law, which regulates flying safely, is as follows:</span></p>
<p class="p3"><span class="s3"><b><i>“Small unmanned aircraft</i></b></span></p>
<p class="p4"><span class="s4"><b><i>94.</i></b><i>— </i></span><span class="s3"><i>(1) A person must not cause or permit any article or animal (whether or not attached to a parachute) to be dropped from a small unmanned aircraft so as to endanger persons or property.</i></span></p>
<p class="p4"><span class="s3"><i>(2) The remote pilot of a small unmanned aircraft may only fly the aircraft if reasonably satisfied that the flight can safely be made.</i></span></p>
<p class="p4"><span class="s3"><i>(3) The remote pilot of a small unmanned aircraft must maintain direct, unaided visual contact with the aircraft sufficient to monitor its flight path in relation to other aircraft, persons, vehicles, vessels and structures for the purpose of avoiding collisions.</i></span></p>
<p class="p4"><span class="s3"><i>(4) Intentionally blank (articles removed)</i></span></p>
<p class="p4"><small><br />
(5) The SUA operator must not cause or permit a small unmanned aircraft to be flown for the purposes of commercial operations, and the remote pilot of a small unmanned aircraft must not fly it for the purposes of commercial operations, except in accordance with a permission granted by the CAA.<br />
</small></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><i>Also, recently added 94A – small unmanned aircraft; permissions for certain flights and 94B – small unmanned aircraft: Interpretation of expressions used in the definition of “flight restriction zone.”</i></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"><b><i>Small unmanned surveillance aircraft</i></b></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s2"><b><i>95.</i></b><i>— </i></span><span class="s1"><i>(1) The SUA operator must not cause or permit a small unmanned surveillance aircraft to be flown in any of the circumstances described in paragraph (2), and the remote pilot of a small unmanned surveillance aircraft must not fly it in any of those circumstances, except in accordance with a permission issued by the CAA.</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(2) The circumstances referred to in paragraph (1) are-</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(a) over or within 150 metres of any congested area;</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(b) over or within 150 metres of an organised open-air assembly of more than 1,000 persons;</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(c) within 50 metres of any vessel, vehicle or structure which is not under the control of the SUA operator or the remote pilot of the aircraft; or</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(d) subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), within 50 metres of any person.</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(3) Subject to paragraph (4), during take-off or landing, a small unmanned surveillance aircraft must not be flown within 30 metres of any person.</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(4) Paragraphs (2)(d) and (3) do not apply to the remote pilot of the small unmanned surveillance aircraft or a person under the control of the remote pilot of the aircraft.</i></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s1"><i>(5) In this article, “a small unmanned surveillance aircraft” means a small unmanned aircraft which is equipped to undertake any form of surveillance or data acquisition.”</i></span></p>
<p><span class="s2"><b>8. Legal Ambiguity</b></span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s3"> It is clear from the above that the level of uncertainty is unabating and indicators suggest that it is a pattern that shall continue to increase between the 4000+ operators that are registered as PfCO holders by the CAA and those institutions that are permitted to regulate local activity. As the National Trust state above, the legal position is unclear.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>What is also unclear is when this position may achieve clarity for both operators and institutions.</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s3"> In circumstances such as these, there are competing interests between state law, as enacted and enforced by a regulator, and the local state seeking to enact a local law for good rule and government.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>It is apparent that the two are not operating in harmony in the UK and in other jurisdictions<sup>13</sup>. There is some degree of uncertainty around conflict pre-emption as it may be argued that local laws are directly in conflict with the ANO 2016.</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s3"> Furthermore, it is apparent that institutions do not specify under what powers they are able to enact local law. Some institutions refer to the CAA and misrepresent what the law actually is and its intent.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>It is trite law that institutions do not have the power to regulate airspace.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>The operator perception is that this is another local government revenue generation programme as it is a disruptor from conventional filming and/or unnecessary as the airspace has no owners, just users. The operator perception is that this cannot be governed by local authorities.</span></p>
<p class="p2"><span class="s3"> The most encountered forms of quasi-legislation are: Bye-laws, codes of conduct, codes of practice, rules, orders, guidance and directions.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Quasi-legislation is either statutory or non-statutory.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>There is nothing to prevent a government department or any other body from issuing guidance, codes or other documents dealing with any matter they want to regulate or control.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Ultimately, it is for the courts to decide the extent to which the courts feel able or required to inquire into how reasonable it is for the guidance to be issued at all.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Also, whether the quasi-legislation deserves deference given the way it was composed and, in particular, the range of views it represents. Quasi-legislation for the most part is drafted to be less “hard-edged” or “black-letter” than Acts or statutory instruments and are intended to be more directing the general approach than mandating precise steps to be taken.</span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Byelaws<sup>14</sup> can be divided into the following categories:</span></p>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li2"><span class="s3"><b>Local authority byelaws:</b> These are made by local authorities and deal with various issues associated with a local authority’s functions;</span></li>
<li class="li2"><span class="s3"><b>Countryside byelaws:</b> These byelaws can be made by a local authority, a national park authority, or other bodies established by statute to look after a particular area;</span></li>
<li class="li2"><span class="s3"><b>Transport byelaws:</b> Under various legislation, a number of public transport operators (sometimes private companies) have the power to make bye-laws regulating conduct on public transport;</span></li>
<li class="li2"><span class="s3"><b>Military land byelaws:</b> The Secretary of State for Defence has the power to make byelaws relating to the use of land for military purposes.</span></li>
</ul>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Local authorities in England can enforce byelaws, which is what the CAA refer to in paragraph 3 above. A byelaw is a form of delegated legislation made under an enabling power established by legislation.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>It is confirmed by the Secretary of State of the relevant government department under section 236 of the Local Government Act 1972, unless it is a byelaw of a class prescribed by the relevant Statutory Instrument. Byelaws commonly require something to be done or refrained from in a particular location and are accompanied by a sanction or penalty for non-compliance.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>They have the force of law within the areas to which they apply, but they can also be challenged in the courts.</span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1"> A general power for making byelaws is set out in section 235 of the Local Government Act 1972, which states that: <i>“The council of a district and the council of a </i></span><i>London borough may make byelaws for the good rule and government of the whole or any part of the district or borough, as the case may be, and for the prevention and suppression of nuisances therein.”</i></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">Powers to make byelaws by other government departments also include:</span></p>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li2"><span class="s3">Defra: town and village greens, national parks and AONB (areas of outstanding natural beauty);</span></li>
<li class="li2"><span class="s3">DfT: ports, harbours and airports.</span></li>
</ul>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">In order for a local authority to make a byelaw it must:</span></p>
<ul class="ul1">
<li class="li2"><span class="s3">Establish the need for a byelaw;</span></li>
<li class="li2"><span class="s3">Check existing legislation;</span></li>
<li class="li2"><span class="s3">Find the necessary legislative power that will enable it to make a byelaw.</span></li>
</ul>
<p class="p4"><span class="s1">Before a local authority concludes that a byelaw is the best course of action, it should check all current legislation to see if the nuisance is dealt with elsewhere, that is, whether there is a need to draft a byelaw or whether there is already legislation in place to deal with it. A local authority must ensure that the proposed byelaw does not duplicate or contradict any existing legislation.</span></p>
<p><b></b><span class="s5"><b>9. Conclusion</b></span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">In conclusion, this paper attempts to seek clarity on what the position is between the local and state law.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>Clarity in the law provides benefits and certainty to all stakeholders.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span>This is becoming a growing issue between stakeholders, which at this fairly “embryonic” stage in an evolving industry, provides the all stakeholders with an opportunity to positively engage with legislators. </span></p>
<p class="p1"><span class="s1">The guidance is CAP722 is clearly not sufficient and does require further amendment. Taking the USA as an example, even with FAA regulation<sup>15</sup>, in 2017 at least 38 states were considering legislating UAS use with some states passing over 20 pieces of legislation. So far 41 states have enacted laws, which are wide and varied. The answer to the question at the top of the page is that NOBODY WINS!</span></p>
<p><strong>References:</strong></p>
<p><small>1. Local Authorities and other established bodies under law.<br />
2. <a href="https://www.caa.co.uk/Commercial-industry/Aircraft/Unmanned-aircraft/Small-drones/Guidance-on-using-small-drones-for-commercial-work/">https://www.caa.co.uk/Commercial-industry/Aircraft/Unmanned-aircraft/Small-drones/Guidance-on-using-small-drones-for-commercial-work/</a><br />
3. <a href="http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%20722%20Sixth%20Edition%20March%202015.pdf">http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%20722%20Sixth%20Edition%20March%202015.pdf</a><br />
4. Permission for Commercial Operations granted by the CAA because of attending an NQE approved course, the CAA receiving a recommendation from the NQE and the Operator submitting an application with a compliant Operations Manual.<br />
5. <a href="http://www.pla.co.uk/Safety/Use-of-drones/unmanned-aerial-vehicles-UAVs">http://www.pla.co.uk/Safety/Use-of-drones/unmanned-aerial-vehicles-UAVs</a><br />
6. The CAA issues a Permit, not a licence.<br />
7. <a href="https://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/features/flying-drones-at-our-places">https://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/features/flying-drones-at-our-places</a><br />
8. Subject to certain distance limitations, which is not referred to.<br />
9. The CAA only issue a Permission to those that intend commercial operations, it is not understood what “few non-commercial users” refers to.<br />
10. Rules may be viewed as irrelevant given that the NT has the power to enact byelaws.<br />
11. Pickering v Rudd (1815) 4 Camp 219 – it would not be a trespass to pass over a man’s land in a balloon. Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews &amp; General [1978] 1 QB 479 – overturned the Latin maxim “Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos” (for whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to heaven and down to hell) rights restricted in airspace above land to such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land, actions of photography did not constitute a trespass. Excessive photography might.<br />
12. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/765/contents/made which shall change from July 2018.<br />
13. http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx provides an interesting insight into the USA State Legislatures as it compares to Federal Law.<br />
14. Validity of a byelaw: subject to scrutiny by the courts where (1) there is a judicial review or (2) defence of a person prosecuted for a breach of a byelaw. Courts consider the following questions: (1) is it reasonable? (2) is it certain and positive in its terms? (3) is it consistent with existing legislation? (4) is it ultra vires, that is, did the relevant authority have the power to make it?<br />
15. Federal Aviation Administration</small></p>
<p class="p6"><span class="s1"><b>This article is not a substitute for professional legal advice. This article does not create an attorney/lawyer-client relationship, nor is it a solicitation to offer legal advice.</b></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk/drone-operators-vs-local-authorities-unraveling-legal-conflicts-in-uk-airspace-regulation/">Who Wins? Drone operators or Local Government?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blakistons.co.uk">Blakistons</a>.</p>
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